From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers , Theodore Tso Subject: [PATCH 3.14 14/46] random: properly align get_random_int_hash Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2016 15:54:36 +0200 Message-Id: <20160818135444.550472497@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20160818135442.457400364@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20160818135442.457400364@linuxfoundation.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric Biggers commit b1132deac01c2332d234fa821a70022796b79182 upstream. get_random_long() reads from the get_random_int_hash array using an unsigned long pointer. For this code to be guaranteed correct on all architectures, the array must be aligned to an unsigned long boundary. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1632,13 +1632,15 @@ int random_int_secret_init(void) return 0; } +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash) + __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)); + /* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of * depleting entropy is too high */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash); unsigned int get_random_int(void) { __u32 *hash;