From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Tyler Hicks , "Serge E. Hallyn" , James Morris , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.7 04/59] net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when determining net sysctl permissions Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 17:29:24 +0200 Message-Id: <20160912152128.937299474@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20160912152128.765864031@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20160912152128.765864031@linuxfoundation.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.7-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Tyler Hicks commit d6e0d306449bcb5fa3c80e7a3edf11d45abf9ae9 upstream. The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit message was being generated. The denial audit message caused confusion for some application authors because root-running Go applications always triggered the denial. To prevent this confusion, the capability check in net_ctl_permissions() is switched to the noaudit variant. BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1465724 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sysctl_net.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/sysctl_net.c +++ b/net/sysctl_net.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ct kgid_t root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0); /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ - if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || + if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) || uid_eq(root_uid, current_euid())) { int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;