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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 03/28] KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 16:08:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170425150814.847328457@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170425150814.719042460@linuxfoundation.org>

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

commit c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-7472.

Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:

	#include <keyutils.h>

	int main()
	{
		for (;;)
			keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
	}

Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.

Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 security/keys/keyctl.c       |   11 +++-------
 security/keys/process_keys.c |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1228,8 +1228,8 @@ error:
  * Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
  * return the old setting.
  *
- * If a process keyring is specified then this will be created if it doesn't
- * yet exist.  The old setting will be returned if successful.
+ * If a thread or process keyring is specified then it will be created if it
+ * doesn't yet exist.  The old setting will be returned if successful.
  */
 long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
 {
@@ -1254,11 +1254,8 @@ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqke
 
 	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
 		ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			if (ret != -EEXIST)
-				goto error;
-			ret = 0;
-		}
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto error;
 		goto set;
 
 	case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -125,13 +125,18 @@ error:
 }
 
 /*
- * Install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials.  This keyring is
- * allowed to overrun the quota.
+ * Install a thread keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
+ * one already.  This is allowed to overrun the quota.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
  */
 int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
 {
 	struct key *keyring;
 
+	if (new->thread_keyring)
+		return 0;
+
 	keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
 				KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
 				KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
@@ -143,7 +148,9 @@ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struc
 }
 
 /*
- * Install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one.
+ * Install a thread keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
  */
 static int install_thread_keyring(void)
 {
@@ -154,8 +161,6 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	BUG_ON(new->thread_keyring);
-
 	ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		abort_creds(new);
@@ -166,17 +171,17 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
 }
 
 /*
- * Install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct.
+ * Install a process keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
+ * one already.  This is allowed to overrun the quota.
  *
- * Returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed,
- * and other value on any other error
+ * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
  */
 int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
 {
 	struct key *keyring;
 
 	if (new->process_keyring)
-		return -EEXIST;
+		return 0;
 
 	keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
 				KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
@@ -189,11 +194,9 @@ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(stru
 }
 
 /*
- * Make sure a process keyring is installed for the current process.  The
- * existing process keyring is not replaced.
+ * Install a process keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
  *
- * Returns 0 if there is a process keyring by the end of this function, some
- * error otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
  */
 static int install_process_keyring(void)
 {
@@ -207,14 +210,18 @@ static int install_process_keyring(void)
 	ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		abort_creds(new);
-		return ret != -EEXIST ? ret : 0;
+		return ret;
 	}
 
 	return commit_creds(new);
 }
 
 /*
- * Install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct.
+ * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the given credentials
+ * struct, replacing the existing one if any.  If the given keyring is NULL,
+ * then install a new anonymous session keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
  */
 int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
 {
@@ -249,8 +256,11 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(stru
 }
 
 /*
- * Install a session keyring, discarding the old one.  If a keyring is not
- * supplied, an empty one is invented.
+ * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,
+ * replacing the existing one if any.  If the given keyring is NULL, then
+ * install a new anonymous session keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
  */
 static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
 {

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-04-25 15:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-25 15:08 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.64-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/28] KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with . to be joined as session keyrings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/28] KEYS: Change the name of the dead type to ".dead" to prevent user access Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/28] tracing: Allocate the snapshot buffer before enabling probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/28] ring-buffer: Have ring_buffer_iter_empty() return true when empty Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/28] cifs: Do not send echoes before Negotiate is complete Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-09 12:13   ` Ben Hutchings
2017-05-10  1:00     ` Pavel Shilovskiy
2017-05-25 16:59       ` Pavel Shilovskiy
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/28] CIFS: remove bad_network_name flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/28] s390/mm: fix CMMA vs KSM vs others Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/28] Drivers: hv: dont leak memory in vmbus_establish_gpadl() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/28] Drivers: hv: get rid of timeout in vmbus_open() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/28] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Reduce the delay between retries in vmbus_post_msg() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/28] VSOCK: Detach QP check should filter out non matching QPs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/28] Input: elantech - add Fujitsu Lifebook E547 to force crc_enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/28] ACPI / power: Avoid maybe-uninitialized warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/28] mmc: sdhci-esdhc-imx: increase the pad I/O drive strength for DDR50 card Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/28] mac80211: reject ToDS broadcast data frames Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/28] ubi/upd: Always flush after prepared for an update Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/28] powerpc/kprobe: Fix oops when kprobed on stdu instruction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/28] x86/mce/AMD: Give a name to MCA bank 3 when accessed with legacy MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 20/28] kvm: arm/arm64: Fix locking for kvm_free_stage2_pgd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 21/28] powerpc/64: Fix flush_(d|i)cache_range() called from modules Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 22/28] Tools: hv: kvp: ensure kvp device fd is closed on exec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 23/28] Drivers: hv: balloon: keep track of where ha_region starts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 24/28] Drivers: hv: balloon: account for gaps in hot add regions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 25/28] hv: dont reset hv_context.tsc_page on crash Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 26/28] x86, pmem: fix broken __copy_user_nocache cache-bypass assumptions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-09 17:00   ` Ben Hutchings
2017-05-09 17:10     ` Dan Williams
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 27/28] block: fix del_gendisk() vs blkdev_ioctl crash Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:08 ` [PATCH 4.4 28/28] tipc: fix crash during node removal Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 18:18 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.64-stable review Shuah Khan
2017-04-26  8:32   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 21:26 ` Guenter Roeck
2017-04-26  2:27 ` Guenter Roeck
2017-04-26  8:31   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-26 13:10     ` Guenter Roeck
2017-04-26 13:11       ` Guenter Roeck
2017-04-26 14:39     ` Guenter Roeck
2017-04-26 15:48       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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