From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.10 03/24] KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 16:09:12 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170425150834.392043433@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170425150834.258486705@linuxfoundation.org>
4.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
commit c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b upstream.
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/keys/keyctl.c | 11 +++-------
security/keys/process_keys.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1256,8 +1256,8 @@ error:
* Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
* return the old setting.
*
- * If a process keyring is specified then this will be created if it doesn't
- * yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
+ * If a thread or process keyring is specified then it will be created if it
+ * doesn't yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
*/
long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
{
@@ -1282,11 +1282,8 @@ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqke
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret != -EEXIST)
- goto error;
- ret = 0;
- }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -127,13 +127,18 @@ error:
}
/*
- * Install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials. This keyring is
- * allowed to overrun the quota.
+ * Install a thread keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
+ * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
+ if (new->thread_keyring)
+ return 0;
+
keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
@@ -146,7 +151,9 @@ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struc
}
/*
- * Install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one.
+ * Install a thread keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
static int install_thread_keyring(void)
{
@@ -157,8 +164,6 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
- BUG_ON(new->thread_keyring);
-
ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
@@ -169,17 +174,17 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
}
/*
- * Install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct.
+ * Install a process keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
+ * one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.
*
- * Returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed,
- * and other value on any other error
+ * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
if (new->process_keyring)
- return -EEXIST;
+ return 0;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
@@ -193,11 +198,9 @@ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(stru
}
/*
- * Make sure a process keyring is installed for the current process. The
- * existing process keyring is not replaced.
+ * Install a process keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
*
- * Returns 0 if there is a process keyring by the end of this function, some
- * error otherwise.
+ * Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
static int install_process_keyring(void)
{
@@ -211,14 +214,18 @@ static int install_process_keyring(void)
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
- return ret != -EEXIST ? ret : 0;
+ return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
}
/*
- * Install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct.
+ * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the given credentials
+ * struct, replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL,
+ * then install a new anonymous session keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
*/
int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
{
@@ -253,8 +260,11 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(stru
}
/*
- * Install a session keyring, discarding the old one. If a keyring is not
- * supplied, an empty one is invented.
+ * Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,
+ * replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL, then
+ * install a new anonymous session keyring.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
*/
static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
{
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-25 15:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-25 15:09 [PATCH 4.10 00/24] 4.10.13-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 01/24] KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with . to be joined as session keyrings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 02/24] KEYS: Change the name of the dead type to ".dead" to prevent user access Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 04/24] tracing: Allocate the snapshot buffer before enabling probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 05/24] HID: wacom: Treat HID_DG_TOOLSERIALNUMBER as unsigned Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 06/24] ring-buffer: Have ring_buffer_iter_empty() return true when empty Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 07/24] mm: prevent NR_ISOLATE_* stats from going negative Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 08/24] cifs: Do not send echoes before Negotiate is complete Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 09/24] CIFS: remove bad_network_name flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 10/24] mmc: dw_mmc: silent verbose log when calling from PM context Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 11/24] s390/mm: fix CMMA vs KSM vs others Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 12/24] Input: elantech - add Fujitsu Lifebook E547 to force crc_enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 13/24] ACPI / power: Avoid maybe-uninitialized warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 14/24] mmc: dw_mmc: Dont allow Runtime PM for SDIO cards Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 15/24] mmc: sdhci-esdhc-imx: increase the pad I/O drive strength for DDR50 card Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 16/24] ubifs: Fix RENAME_WHITEOUT support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 17/24] ubifs: Fix O_TMPFILE corner case in ubifs_link() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 18/24] mac80211: reject ToDS broadcast data frames Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 19/24] mac80211: fix MU-MIMO follow-MAC mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 20/24] x86/mce: Make the MCE notifier a blocking one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 21/24] ubi/upd: Always flush after prepared for an update Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 22/24] powerpc/kprobe: Fix oops when kprobed on stdu instruction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 23/24] x86/mce/AMD: Give a name to MCA bank 3 when accessed with legacy MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 15:09 ` [PATCH 4.10 24/24] device-dax: switch to srcu, fix rcu_read_lock() vs pte allocation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-04-25 18:24 ` [PATCH 4.10 00/24] 4.10.13-stable review Shuah Khan
2017-04-26 2:23 ` Guenter Roeck
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20170425150834.392043433@linuxfoundation.org \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=ebiggers@google.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).