From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Konovalov , David Lebrun , "David S. Miller" Subject: [PATCH 4.10 24/62] ipv6: sr: fix out-of-bounds access in SRH validation Date: Mon, 1 May 2017 14:34:37 -0700 Message-Id: <20170501212731.723889404@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20170501212730.774855694@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20170501212730.774855694@linuxfoundation.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: David Lebrun [ Upstream commit 2f3bb64247b5b083d05ccecad9c2e139bbfdc294 ] This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in seg6_validate_srh() when the trailing data is less than sizeof(struct sr6_tlv). Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: David Lebrun Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/seg6.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv6/seg6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6.c @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ bool seg6_validate_srh(struct ipv6_sr_hd struct sr6_tlv *tlv; unsigned int tlv_len; + if (trailing < sizeof(*tlv)) + return false; + tlv = (struct sr6_tlv *)((unsigned char *)srh + tlv_offset); tlv_len = sizeof(*tlv) + tlv->len;