[PATCH for-3.18 00/24] Security fixes from 2015 and 2016 android security bulletins

[PATCH for-3.18 00/24] Security fixes from 2015 and 2016 android security bulletins

[Amit Pundir]

Hi Greg,

Please consider following security fixes for linux-3.18.y. This
is a follow up on my previous submission of similar security fixes,
https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg169868.html, picked up from
android security bulletins published in year 2017 so far.

Following are the fixes published in 2015 and 2016 monthly Android
Security Bulletins https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/,
and/or related follow-up fixes from upstream. Cherry-picked and build
tested on v3.18.52 for ARCH=arm/arm64/x86/x86_64/mips + allmodconfig.


Benjamin Tissoires (1):
  HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings

Bjørn Mork (1):
  cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind

Calvin Owens (1):
  sg: Fix double-free when drives detach during SG_IO

David Howells (2):
  ASN.1: Fix non-match detection failure on data overrun
  KEYS: Fix ASN.1 indefinite length object parsing

Eric Dumazet (2):
  ipv6: sctp: add rcu protection around np->opt
  ipv6: sctp: fix lockdep splat in sctp_v6_get_dst()

Hangbin Liu (1):
  net/ipv6: add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit

Jann Horn (1):
  sched: panic on corrupted stack end

Kangjie Lu (3):
  ALSA: timer: Fix leak in SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS
  ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_ccallback
  ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt

Keno Fischer (1):
  mm/huge_memory.c: respect FOLL_FORCE/FOLL_COW for thp

Lukas Czerner (1):
  ext4: fix potential use after free in __ext4_journal_stop

Mark Rutland (1):
  arm64: make sys_call_table const

Peter Hurley (1):
  tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields

Peter Zijlstra (2):
  perf: Fix event->ctx locking
  perf: Fix race in swevent hash

Rainer Weikusat (1):
  af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg

Suzuki K. Poulose (1):
  arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs

Takashi Iwai (3):
  ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
  ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
  xc2028: Fix use-after-free bug properly

WANG Cong (1):
  ppp: defer netns reference release for ppp channel

 Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt |   8 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c         |  21 ++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c                |   2 +-
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c                 |   3 +
 drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c    |  37 ++---
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c          |   5 +-
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c              |  20 +--
 drivers/scsi/sg.c                      |   8 +-
 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c                |   7 +
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c                    |   6 +-
 include/linux/ipv6.h                   |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h              |   1 +
 kernel/events/core.c                   | 264 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 kernel/sched/core.c                    |   3 +-
 lib/asn1_decoder.c                     |  21 +--
 mm/huge_memory.c                       |  12 +-
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c                    |  10 ++
 net/ipv6/ndisc.c                       |  16 +-
 net/sctp/ipv6.c                        |  16 +-
 net/unix/af_unix.c                     |   7 +-
 sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c             |   2 +
 sound/core/timer.c                     |  35 +++--
 22 files changed, 360 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-)

-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 01/24] arm64: make sys_call_table const

[Amit Pundir]

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

commit c623b33b4e9599c6ac5076f7db7369eb9869aa04 upstream.

As with x86, mark the sys_call_table const such that it will be placed
in the .rodata section. This will cause attempts to modify the table
(accidental or deliberate) to fail when strict page permissions are in
place. In the absence of strict page permissions, there should be no
functional change.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c
index 3fa98ff14f0e..df20b7918854 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sys.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
  * The sys_call_table array must be 4K aligned to be accessible from
  * kernel/entry.S.
  */
-void *sys_call_table[__NR_syscalls] __aligned(4096) = {
+void * const sys_call_table[__NR_syscalls] __aligned(4096) = {
 	[0 ... __NR_syscalls - 1] = sys_ni_syscall,
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 };
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 02/24] perf: Fix event->ctx locking

[Amit Pundir]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b upstream.

There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.

It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.

What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 207 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 26c40faa8ea4..3964293d1540 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -907,6 +907,77 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Because of perf_event::ctx migration in sys_perf_event_open::move_group and
+ * perf_pmu_migrate_context() we need some magic.
+ *
+ * Those places that change perf_event::ctx will hold both
+ * perf_event_ctx::mutex of the 'old' and 'new' ctx value.
+ *
+ * Lock ordering is by mutex address. There is one other site where
+ * perf_event_context::mutex nests and that is put_event(). But remember that
+ * that is a parent<->child context relation, and migration does not affect
+ * children, therefore these two orderings should not interact.
+ *
+ * The change in perf_event::ctx does not affect children (as claimed above)
+ * because the sys_perf_event_open() case will install a new event and break
+ * the ctx parent<->child relation, and perf_pmu_migrate_context() is only
+ * concerned with cpuctx and that doesn't have children.
+ *
+ * The places that change perf_event::ctx will issue:
+ *
+ *   perf_remove_from_context();
+ *   synchronize_rcu();
+ *   perf_install_in_context();
+ *
+ * to affect the change. The remove_from_context() + synchronize_rcu() should
+ * quiesce the event, after which we can install it in the new location. This
+ * means that only external vectors (perf_fops, prctl) can perturb the event
+ * while in transit. Therefore all such accessors should also acquire
+ * perf_event_context::mutex to serialize against this.
+ *
+ * However; because event->ctx can change while we're waiting to acquire
+ * ctx->mutex we must be careful and use the below perf_event_ctx_lock()
+ * function.
+ *
+ * Lock order:
+ *	task_struct::perf_event_mutex
+ *	  perf_event_context::mutex
+ *	    perf_event_context::lock
+ *	    perf_event::child_mutex;
+ *	    perf_event::mmap_mutex
+ *	    mmap_sem
+ */
+static struct perf_event_context *perf_event_ctx_lock(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+
+again:
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ctx = ACCESS_ONCE(event->ctx);
+	if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&ctx->refcount)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		goto again;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
+	if (event->ctx != ctx) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+		put_ctx(ctx);
+		goto again;
+	}
+
+	return ctx;
+}
+
+static void perf_event_ctx_unlock(struct perf_event *event,
+				  struct perf_event_context *ctx)
+{
+	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+	put_ctx(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
  * This must be done under the ctx->lock, such as to serialize against
  * context_equiv(), therefore we cannot call put_ctx() since that might end up
  * calling scheduler related locks and ctx->lock nests inside those.
@@ -1654,7 +1725,7 @@ int __perf_event_disable(void *info)
  * is the current context on this CPU and preemption is disabled,
  * hence we can't get into perf_event_task_sched_out for this context.
  */
-void perf_event_disable(struct perf_event *event)
+static void _perf_event_disable(struct perf_event *event)
 {
 	struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
 	struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
@@ -1695,6 +1766,19 @@ retry:
 	}
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
 }
+
+/*
+ * Strictly speaking kernel users cannot create groups and therefore this
+ * interface does not need the perf_event_ctx_lock() magic.
+ */
+void perf_event_disable(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+
+	ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+	_perf_event_disable(event);
+	perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_event_disable);
 
 static void perf_set_shadow_time(struct perf_event *event,
@@ -2158,7 +2242,7 @@ unlock:
  * perf_event_for_each_child or perf_event_for_each as described
  * for perf_event_disable.
  */
-void perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event)
+static void _perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event)
 {
 	struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
 	struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
@@ -2214,9 +2298,21 @@ retry:
 out:
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
 }
+
+/*
+ * See perf_event_disable();
+ */
+void perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+
+	ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+	_perf_event_enable(event);
+	perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_event_enable);
 
-int perf_event_refresh(struct perf_event *event, int refresh)
+static int _perf_event_refresh(struct perf_event *event, int refresh)
 {
 	/*
 	 * not supported on inherited events
@@ -2225,10 +2321,25 @@ int perf_event_refresh(struct perf_event *event, int refresh)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	atomic_add(refresh, &event->event_limit);
-	perf_event_enable(event);
+	_perf_event_enable(event);
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+/*
+ * See perf_event_disable()
+ */
+int perf_event_refresh(struct perf_event *event, int refresh)
+{
+	struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+	int ret;
+
+	ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+	ret = _perf_event_refresh(event, refresh);
+	perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_event_refresh);
 
 static void ctx_sched_out(struct perf_event_context *ctx,
@@ -3421,7 +3532,16 @@ static void perf_remove_from_owner(struct perf_event *event)
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	if (owner) {
-		mutex_lock(&owner->perf_event_mutex);
+		/*
+		 * If we're here through perf_event_exit_task() we're already
+		 * holding ctx->mutex which would be an inversion wrt. the
+		 * normal lock order.
+		 *
+		 * However we can safely take this lock because its the child
+		 * ctx->mutex.
+		 */
+		mutex_lock_nested(&owner->perf_event_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+
 		/*
 		 * We have to re-check the event->owner field, if it is cleared
 		 * we raced with perf_event_exit_task(), acquiring the mutex
@@ -3547,12 +3667,13 @@ static int perf_event_read_group(struct perf_event *event,
 				   u64 read_format, char __user *buf)
 {
 	struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader, *sub;
-	int n = 0, size = 0, ret = -EFAULT;
 	struct perf_event_context *ctx = leader->ctx;
-	u64 values[5];
+	int n = 0, size = 0, ret;
 	u64 count, enabled, running;
+	u64 values[5];
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
 
-	mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
 	count = perf_event_read_value(leader, &enabled, &running);
 
 	values[n++] = 1 + leader->nr_siblings;
@@ -3567,7 +3688,7 @@ static int perf_event_read_group(struct perf_event *event,
 	size = n * sizeof(u64);
 
 	if (copy_to_user(buf, values, size))
-		goto unlock;
+		return -EFAULT;
 
 	ret = size;
 
@@ -3581,14 +3702,11 @@ static int perf_event_read_group(struct perf_event *event,
 		size = n * sizeof(u64);
 
 		if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, values, size)) {
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-			goto unlock;
+			return -EFAULT;
 		}
 
 		ret += size;
 	}
-unlock:
-	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -3660,8 +3778,14 @@ static ssize_t
 perf_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
+	struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+	int ret;
 
-	return perf_read_hw(event, buf, count);
+	ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+	ret = perf_read_hw(event, buf, count);
+	perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static unsigned int perf_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
@@ -3687,7 +3811,7 @@ static unsigned int perf_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 	return events;
 }
 
-static void perf_event_reset(struct perf_event *event)
+static void _perf_event_reset(struct perf_event *event)
 {
 	(void)perf_event_read(event);
 	local64_set(&event->count, 0);
@@ -3706,6 +3830,7 @@ static void perf_event_for_each_child(struct perf_event *event,
 	struct perf_event *child;
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx->parent_ctx);
+
 	mutex_lock(&event->child_mutex);
 	func(event);
 	list_for_each_entry(child, &event->child_list, child_list)
@@ -3719,14 +3844,13 @@ static void perf_event_for_each(struct perf_event *event,
 	struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
 	struct perf_event *sibling;
 
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
-	mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
+
 	event = event->group_leader;
 
 	perf_event_for_each_child(event, func);
 	list_for_each_entry(sibling, &event->sibling_list, group_entry)
 		perf_event_for_each_child(sibling, func);
-	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
 }
 
 struct period_event {
@@ -3831,25 +3955,24 @@ static int perf_event_set_output(struct perf_event *event,
 				 struct perf_event *output_event);
 static int perf_event_set_filter(struct perf_event *event, void __user *arg);
 
-static long perf_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+static long _perf_ioctl(struct perf_event *event, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
 	void (*func)(struct perf_event *);
 	u32 flags = arg;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case PERF_EVENT_IOC_ENABLE:
-		func = perf_event_enable;
+		func = _perf_event_enable;
 		break;
 	case PERF_EVENT_IOC_DISABLE:
-		func = perf_event_disable;
+		func = _perf_event_disable;
 		break;
 	case PERF_EVENT_IOC_RESET:
-		func = perf_event_reset;
+		func = _perf_event_reset;
 		break;
 
 	case PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH:
-		return perf_event_refresh(event, arg);
+		return _perf_event_refresh(event, arg);
 
 	case PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD:
 		return perf_event_period(event, (u64 __user *)arg);
@@ -3896,6 +4019,19 @@ static long perf_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static long perf_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
+	struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+	long ret;
+
+	ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+	ret = _perf_ioctl(event, cmd, arg);
+	perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 static long perf_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 				unsigned long arg)
@@ -3918,11 +4054,15 @@ static long perf_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
 int perf_event_task_enable(void)
 {
+	struct perf_event_context *ctx;
 	struct perf_event *event;
 
 	mutex_lock(&current->perf_event_mutex);
-	list_for_each_entry(event, &current->perf_event_list, owner_entry)
-		perf_event_for_each_child(event, perf_event_enable);
+	list_for_each_entry(event, &current->perf_event_list, owner_entry) {
+		ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+		perf_event_for_each_child(event, _perf_event_enable);
+		perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+	}
 	mutex_unlock(&current->perf_event_mutex);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -3930,11 +4070,15 @@ int perf_event_task_enable(void)
 
 int perf_event_task_disable(void)
 {
+	struct perf_event_context *ctx;
 	struct perf_event *event;
 
 	mutex_lock(&current->perf_event_mutex);
-	list_for_each_entry(event, &current->perf_event_list, owner_entry)
-		perf_event_for_each_child(event, perf_event_disable);
+	list_for_each_entry(event, &current->perf_event_list, owner_entry) {
+		ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+		perf_event_for_each_child(event, _perf_event_disable);
+		perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+	}
 	mutex_unlock(&current->perf_event_mutex);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -7271,6 +7415,15 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static void mutex_lock_double(struct mutex *a, struct mutex *b)
+{
+	if (b < a)
+		swap(a, b);
+
+	mutex_lock(a);
+	mutex_lock_nested(b, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+}
+
 /**
  * sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
  *
@@ -7286,7 +7439,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	struct perf_event *group_leader = NULL, *output_event = NULL;
 	struct perf_event *event, *sibling;
 	struct perf_event_attr attr;
-	struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+	struct perf_event_context *ctx, *uninitialized_var(gctx);
 	struct file *event_file = NULL;
 	struct fd group = {NULL, 0};
 	struct task_struct *task = NULL;
@@ -7484,9 +7637,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (move_group) {
-		struct perf_event_context *gctx = group_leader->ctx;
+		gctx = group_leader->ctx;
+
+		/*
+		 * See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
+		 * of swizzling perf_event::ctx.
+		 */
+		mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
 
-		mutex_lock(&gctx->mutex);
 		perf_remove_from_context(group_leader, false);
 
 		/*
@@ -7501,15 +7659,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 			perf_event__state_init(sibling);
 			put_ctx(gctx);
 		}
-		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
-		put_ctx(gctx);
+	} else {
+		mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
 	}
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
-	mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
 
 	if (move_group) {
+		/*
+		 * Wait for everybody to stop referencing the events through
+		 * the old lists, before installing it on new lists.
+		 */
 		synchronize_rcu();
+
 		perf_install_in_context(ctx, group_leader, group_leader->cpu);
 		get_ctx(ctx);
 		list_for_each_entry(sibling, &group_leader->sibling_list,
@@ -7521,6 +7683,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
 	perf_install_in_context(ctx, event, event->cpu);
 	perf_unpin_context(ctx);
+
+	if (move_group) {
+		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+		put_ctx(gctx);
+	}
 	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
 
 	put_online_cpus();
@@ -7628,7 +7795,11 @@ void perf_pmu_migrate_context(struct pmu *pmu, int src_cpu, int dst_cpu)
 	src_ctx = &per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, src_cpu)->ctx;
 	dst_ctx = &per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, dst_cpu)->ctx;
 
-	mutex_lock(&src_ctx->mutex);
+	/*
+	 * See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
+	 * of swizzling perf_event::ctx.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock_double(&src_ctx->mutex, &dst_ctx->mutex);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &src_ctx->event_list,
 				 event_entry) {
 		perf_remove_from_context(event, false);
@@ -7636,11 +7807,9 @@ void perf_pmu_migrate_context(struct pmu *pmu, int src_cpu, int dst_cpu)
 		put_ctx(src_ctx);
 		list_add(&event->migrate_entry, &events);
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&src_ctx->mutex);
 
 	synchronize_rcu();
 
-	mutex_lock(&dst_ctx->mutex);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &events, migrate_entry) {
 		list_del(&event->migrate_entry);
 		if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
@@ -7650,6 +7819,7 @@ void perf_pmu_migrate_context(struct pmu *pmu, int src_cpu, int dst_cpu)
 		get_ctx(dst_ctx);
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&dst_ctx->mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&src_ctx->mutex);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_pmu_migrate_context);
 
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 03/24] arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs

[Amit Pundir]

From: "Suzuki K. Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>

commit 8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071 upstream.

The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.

The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.

This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:

Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0

[<          (null)>]           (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value

Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.

Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
index aa29ecb4f800..78a5894b1621 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
@@ -316,22 +316,31 @@ out:
 }
 
 static int
-validate_event(struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
-	       struct perf_event *event)
+validate_event(struct pmu *pmu, struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
+				struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
+	struct arm_pmu *armpmu;
 	struct hw_perf_event fake_event = event->hw;
 	struct pmu *leader_pmu = event->group_leader->pmu;
 
 	if (is_software_event(event))
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs (e.g. CPU + CCI). The
+	 * core perf code won't check that the pmu->ctx == leader->ctx
+	 * until after pmu->event_init(event).
+	 */
+	if (event->pmu != pmu)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (event->pmu != leader_pmu || event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
 		return 1;
 
 	if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF && !event->attr.enable_on_exec)
 		return 1;
 
+	armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
 	return armpmu->get_event_idx(hw_events, &fake_event) >= 0;
 }
 
@@ -349,15 +358,15 @@ validate_group(struct perf_event *event)
 	memset(fake_used_mask, 0, sizeof(fake_used_mask));
 	fake_pmu.used_mask = fake_used_mask;
 
-	if (!validate_event(&fake_pmu, leader))
+	if (!validate_event(event->pmu, &fake_pmu, leader))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(sibling, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry) {
-		if (!validate_event(&fake_pmu, sibling))
+		if (!validate_event(event->pmu, &fake_pmu, sibling))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (!validate_event(&fake_pmu, event))
+	if (!validate_event(event->pmu, &fake_pmu, event))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 04/24] perf: Fix race in swevent hash

[Amit Pundir]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373 upstream.

There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.

Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.

When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.

Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 20 +-------------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 3964293d1540..4886c0e97bbd 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -5851,9 +5851,6 @@ struct swevent_htable {
 
 	/* Recursion avoidance in each contexts */
 	int				recursion[PERF_NR_CONTEXTS];
-
-	/* Keeps track of cpu being initialized/exited */
-	bool				online;
 };
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct swevent_htable, swevent_htable);
@@ -6111,14 +6108,8 @@ static int perf_swevent_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
 	hwc->state = !(flags & PERF_EF_START);
 
 	head = find_swevent_head(swhash, event);
-	if (!head) {
-		/*
-		 * We can race with cpu hotplug code. Do not
-		 * WARN if the cpu just got unplugged.
-		 */
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(swhash->online);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!head))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	hlist_add_head_rcu(&event->hlist_entry, head);
 
@@ -6185,7 +6176,6 @@ static int swevent_hlist_get_cpu(struct perf_event *event, int cpu)
 	int err = 0;
 
 	mutex_lock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
-
 	if (!swevent_hlist_deref(swhash) && cpu_online(cpu)) {
 		struct swevent_hlist *hlist;
 
@@ -8342,7 +8332,6 @@ static void perf_event_init_cpu(int cpu)
 	struct swevent_htable *swhash = &per_cpu(swevent_htable, cpu);
 
 	mutex_lock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
-	swhash->online = true;
 	if (swhash->hlist_refcount > 0) {
 		struct swevent_hlist *hlist;
 
@@ -8395,14 +8384,7 @@ static void perf_event_exit_cpu_context(int cpu)
 
 static void perf_event_exit_cpu(int cpu)
 {
-	struct swevent_htable *swhash = &per_cpu(swevent_htable, cpu);
-
 	perf_event_exit_cpu_context(cpu);
-
-	mutex_lock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
-	swhash->online = false;
-	swevent_hlist_release(swhash);
-	mutex_unlock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
 }
 #else
 static inline void perf_event_exit_cpu(int cpu) { }
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 05/24] ASN.1: Fix non-match detection failure on data overrun

[Amit Pundir]

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit 0d62e9dd6da45bbf0f33a8617afc5fe774c8f45f upstream.

If the ASN.1 decoder is asked to parse a sequence of objects, non-optional
matches get skipped if there's no more data to be had rather than a
data-overrun error being reported.

This is due to the code segment that decides whether to skip optional
matches (ie. matches that could get ignored because an element is marked
OPTIONAL in the grammar) due to a lack of data also skips non-optional
elements if the data pointer has reached the end of the buffer.

This can be tested with the data decoder for the new RSA akcipher algorithm
that takes three non-optional integers.  Currently, it skips the last
integer if there is insufficient data.

Without the fix, #defining DEBUG in asn1_decoder.c will show something
like:

	next_op: pc=0/13 dp=0/270 C=0 J=0
	- match? 30 30 00
	- TAG: 30 266 CONS
	next_op: pc=2/13 dp=4/270 C=1 J=0
	- match? 02 02 00
	- TAG: 02 257
	- LEAF: 257
	next_op: pc=5/13 dp=265/270 C=1 J=0
	- match? 02 02 00
	- TAG: 02 3
	- LEAF: 3
	next_op: pc=8/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0
	next_op: pc=11/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0
	- end cons t=4 dp=270 l=270/270

The next_op line for pc=8/13 should be followed by a match line.

This is not exploitable for X.509 certificates by means of shortening the
message and fixing up the ASN.1 CONS tags because:

 (1) The relevant records being built up are cleared before use.

 (2) If the message is shortened sufficiently to remove the public key, the
     ASN.1 parse of the RSA key will fail quickly due to a lack of data.

 (3) Extracted signature data is either turned into MPIs (which cope with a
     0 length) or is simpler integers specifying algoritms and suchlike
     (which can validly be 0); and

 (4) The AKID and SKID extensions are optional and their removal is handled
     without risking passing a NULL to asymmetric_key_generate_id().

 (5) If the certificate is truncated sufficiently to remove the subject,
     issuer or serialNumber then the ASN.1 decoder will fail with a 'Cons
     stack underflow' return.

This is not exploitable for PKCS#7 messages by means of removal of elements
from such a message from the tail end of a sequence:

 (1) Any shortened X.509 certs embedded in the PKCS#7 message are survivable
     as detailed above.

 (2) The message digest content isn't used if it shows a NULL pointer,
     similarly, the authattrs aren't used if that shows a NULL pointer.

 (3) A missing signature results in a NULL MPI - which the MPI routines deal
     with.

 (4) If data is NULL, it is expected that the message has detached content and
     that is handled appropriately.

 (5) If the serialNumber is excised, the unconditional action associated
     with it will pick up the containing SEQUENCE instead, so no NULL
     pointer will be seen here.

     If both the issuer and the serialNumber are excised, the ASN.1 decode
     will fail with an 'Unexpected tag' return.

     In either case, there's no way to get to asymmetric_key_generate_id()
     with a NULL pointer.

 (6) Other fields are decoded to simple integers.  Shortening the message
     to omit an algorithm ID field will cause checks on this to fail early
     in the verification process.

This can also be tested by snipping objects off of the end of the ASN.1 stream
such that mandatory tags are removed - or even from the end of internal
SEQUENCEs.  If any mandatory tag is missing, the error EBADMSG *should* be
produced.  Without this patch ERANGE or ENOPKG might be produced or the parse
may apparently succeed, perhaps with ENOKEY or EKEYREJECTED being produced
later, depending on what gets snipped.

Just snipping off the final BIT_STRING or OCTET_STRING from either sample
should be a start since both are mandatory and neither will cause an EBADMSG
without the patches

Reported-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 lib/asn1_decoder.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
index 1a000bb050f9..d60ce8a53650 100644
--- a/lib/asn1_decoder.c
+++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
@@ -208,9 +208,8 @@ next_op:
 		unsigned char tmp;
 
 		/* Skip conditional matches if possible */
-		if ((op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND &&
-		     flags & FLAG_MATCHED) ||
-		    dp == datalen) {
+		if ((op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__COND && flags & FLAG_MATCHED) ||
+		    (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__SKIP && dp == datalen)) {
 			pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
 			goto next_op;
 		}
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 06/24] KEYS: Fix ASN.1 indefinite length object parsing

[Amit Pundir]

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit 23c8a812dc3c621009e4f0e5342aa4e2ede1ceaa upstream.

This fixes CVE-2016-0758.

In the ASN.1 decoder, when the length field of an ASN.1 value is extracted,
it isn't validated against the remaining amount of data before being added
to the cursor.  With a sufficiently large size indicated, the check:

	datalen - dp < 2

may then fail due to integer overflow.

Fix this by checking the length indicated against the amount of remaining
data in both places a definite length is determined.

Whilst we're at it, make the following changes:

 (1) Check the maximum size of extended length does not exceed the capacity
     of the variable it's being stored in (len) rather than the type that
     variable is assumed to be (size_t).

 (2) Compare the EOC tag to the symbolic constant ASN1_EOC rather than the
     integer 0.

 (3) To reduce confusion, move the initialisation of len outside of:

	for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {

     since it doesn't have anything to do with the loop counter n.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 lib/asn1_decoder.c | 16 +++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
index d60ce8a53650..806c5b6b4b3a 100644
--- a/lib/asn1_decoder.c
+++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ next_tag:
 
 	/* Extract a tag from the data */
 	tag = data[dp++];
-	if (tag == 0) {
+	if (tag == ASN1_EOC) {
 		/* It appears to be an EOC. */
 		if (data[dp++] != 0)
 			goto invalid_eoc;
@@ -91,10 +91,8 @@ next_tag:
 
 	/* Extract the length */
 	len = data[dp++];
-	if (len <= 0x7f) {
-		dp += len;
-		goto next_tag;
-	}
+	if (len <= 0x7f)
+		goto check_length;
 
 	if (unlikely(len == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) {
 		/* Indefinite length */
@@ -105,14 +103,18 @@ next_tag:
 	}
 
 	n = len - 0x80;
-	if (unlikely(n > sizeof(size_t) - 1))
+	if (unlikely(n > sizeof(len) - 1))
 		goto length_too_long;
 	if (unlikely(n > datalen - dp))
 		goto data_overrun_error;
-	for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) {
+	len = 0;
+	for (; n > 0; n--) {
 		len <<= 8;
 		len |= data[dp++];
 	}
+check_length:
+	if (len > datalen - dp)
+		goto data_overrun_error;
 	dp += len;
 	goto next_tag;
 
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 07/24] ext4: fix potential use after free in __ext4_journal_stop

[Amit Pundir]

From: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>

commit 6934da9238da947628be83635e365df41064b09b upstream.

There is a use-after-free possibility in __ext4_journal_stop() in the
case that we free the handle in the first jbd2_journal_stop() because
we're referencing handle->h_err afterwards. This was introduced in
9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625 and it is wrong. Fix it by
storing the handle->h_err value beforehand and avoid referencing
potentially freed handle.

Fixes: 9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c b/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c
index d41843181818..e770c1ee4613 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.c
@@ -88,13 +88,13 @@ int __ext4_journal_stop(const char *where, unsigned int line, handle_t *handle)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	err = handle->h_err;
 	if (!handle->h_transaction) {
-		err = jbd2_journal_stop(handle);
-		return handle->h_err ? handle->h_err : err;
+		rc = jbd2_journal_stop(handle);
+		return err ? err : rc;
 	}
 
 	sb = handle->h_transaction->t_journal->j_private;
-	err = handle->h_err;
 	rc = jbd2_journal_stop(handle);
 
 	if (!err)
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 08/24] sg: Fix double-free when drives detach during SG_IO

[Amit Pundir]

From: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>

commit f3951a3709ff50990bf3e188c27d346792103432 upstream.

In sg_common_write(), we free the block request and return -ENODEV if
the device is detached in the middle of the SG_IO ioctl().

Unfortunately, sg_finish_rem_req() also tries to free srp->rq, so we
end up freeing rq->cmd in the already free rq object, and then free
the object itself out from under the current user.

This ends up corrupting random memory via the list_head on the rq
object. The most common crash trace I saw is this:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at block/blk-core.c:1420!
  Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff81281eab>] blk_put_request+0x5b/0x80
  [<ffffffffa0069e5b>] sg_finish_rem_req+0x6b/0x120 [sg]
  [<ffffffffa006bcb9>] sg_common_write.isra.14+0x459/0x5a0 [sg]
  [<ffffffff8125b328>] ? selinux_file_alloc_security+0x48/0x70
  [<ffffffffa006bf95>] sg_new_write.isra.17+0x195/0x2d0 [sg]
  [<ffffffffa006cef4>] sg_ioctl+0x644/0xdb0 [sg]
  [<ffffffff81170f80>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x90/0x520
  [<ffffffff81258967>] ? file_has_perm+0x97/0xb0
  [<ffffffff811714a1>] SyS_ioctl+0x91/0xb0
  [<ffffffff81602afb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
    RIP [<ffffffff81281e04>] __blk_put_request+0x154/0x1a0

The solution is straightforward: just set srp->rq to NULL in the
failure branch so that sg_finish_rem_req() doesn't attempt to re-free
it.

Additionally, since sg_rq_end_io() will never be called on the object
when this happens, we need to free memory backing ->cmd if it isn't
embedded in the object itself.

KASAN was extremely helpful in finding the root cause of this bug.

Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/sg.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sg.c b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
index e50adf710229..71b30e18f2f0 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -791,8 +791,14 @@ sg_common_write(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp,
 		return k;	/* probably out of space --> ENOMEM */
 	}
 	if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
-		if (srp->bio)
+		if (srp->bio) {
+			if (srp->rq->cmd != srp->rq->__cmd)
+				kfree(srp->rq->cmd);
+
 			blk_end_request_all(srp->rq, -EIO);
+			srp->rq = NULL;
+		}
+
 		sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 09/24] tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields

[Amit Pundir]

From: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>

commit dd42bf1197144ede075a9d4793123f7689e164bc upstream.

Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].

Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.

[1]
    commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
    Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
    Date:   Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200

    isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset

[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
    [  634.336761] ==================================================================
    [  634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
    [  634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
    [  634.340359] =============================================================================
    [  634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    ...
    [  634.405018] Call Trace:
    [  634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
    [  634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
    [  634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
    [  634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
    [  634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
    [  634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
    [  634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
    [  634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
    [  634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
    [  634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
    [  634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
    [  634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)

Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c b/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c
index 2d822aa259b2..2bf08366cd5b 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c
@@ -414,6 +414,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tty_ldisc_flush);
  *	they are not on hot paths so a little discipline won't do
  *	any harm.
  *
+ *	The line discipline-related tty_struct fields are reset to
+ *	prevent the ldisc driver from re-using stale information for
+ *	the new ldisc instance.
+ *
  *	Locking: takes termios_rwsem
  */
 
@@ -422,6 +426,9 @@ static void tty_set_termios_ldisc(struct tty_struct *tty, int num)
 	down_write(&tty->termios_rwsem);
 	tty->termios.c_line = num;
 	up_write(&tty->termios_rwsem);
+
+	tty->disc_data = NULL;
+	tty->receive_room = 0;
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 10/24] net/ipv6: add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit

[Amit Pundir]

From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>

commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4 upstream.

Commit 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface")
disabled accept hop limit from RA if it is smaller than the current hop
limit for security stuff. But this behavior kind of break the RFC definition.

RFC 4861, 6.3.4.  Processing Received Router Advertisements
   A Router Advertisement field (e.g., Cur Hop Limit, Reachable Time,
   and Retrans Timer) may contain a value denoting that it is
   unspecified.  In such cases, the parameter should be ignored and the
   host should continue using whatever value it is already using.

   If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set
   its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

So add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit to let user choose the minimum
hop limit value they can accept from RA. And set default to 1 to meet RFC
standards.

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt |  8 ++++++++
 include/linux/ipv6.h                   |  1 +
 include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h              |  1 +
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c                    | 10 ++++++++++
 net/ipv6/ndisc.c                       | 16 +++++++---------
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
index a476b08a43e0..628d342a806f 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
+++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
@@ -1256,6 +1256,14 @@ accept_ra_from_local - BOOLEAN
 	   disabled if accept_ra_from_local is disabled
                on a specific interface.
 
+accept_ra_min_hop_limit - INTEGER
+	Minimum hop limit Information in Router Advertisement.
+
+	Hop limit Information in Router Advertisement less than this
+	variable shall be ignored.
+
+	Default: 1
+
 accept_ra_pinfo - BOOLEAN
 	Learn Prefix Information in Router Advertisement.
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ipv6.h b/include/linux/ipv6.h
index 2725b03b4ae2..5b8ffda9b668 100644
--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct ipv6_devconf {
 	__s32		max_desync_factor;
 	__s32		max_addresses;
 	__s32		accept_ra_defrtr;
+	__s32		accept_ra_min_hop_limit;
 	__s32		accept_ra_pinfo;
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
 	__s32		accept_ra_rtr_pref;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h b/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h
index efa2666f4b8a..ea3a39c0ac5d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ipv6.h
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ enum {
 	DEVCONF_MLDV2_UNSOLICITED_REPORT_INTERVAL,
 	DEVCONF_SUPPRESS_FRAG_NDISC,
 	DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_FROM_LOCAL,
+	DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MIN_HOP_LIMIT,
 	DEVCONF_MAX
 };
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index 4cc14452d5cc..43840e080d85 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ static struct ipv6_devconf ipv6_devconf __read_mostly = {
 	.max_addresses		= IPV6_MAX_ADDRESSES,
 	.accept_ra_defrtr	= 1,
 	.accept_ra_from_local	= 0,
+	.accept_ra_min_hop_limit= 1,
 	.accept_ra_pinfo	= 1,
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
 	.accept_ra_rtr_pref	= 1,
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ static struct ipv6_devconf ipv6_devconf_dflt __read_mostly = {
 	.max_addresses		= IPV6_MAX_ADDRESSES,
 	.accept_ra_defrtr	= 1,
 	.accept_ra_from_local	= 0,
+	.accept_ra_min_hop_limit= 1,
 	.accept_ra_pinfo	= 1,
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
 	.accept_ra_rtr_pref	= 1,
@@ -4320,6 +4322,7 @@ static inline void ipv6_store_devconf(struct ipv6_devconf *cnf,
 	array[DEVCONF_MAX_DESYNC_FACTOR] = cnf->max_desync_factor;
 	array[DEVCONF_MAX_ADDRESSES] = cnf->max_addresses;
 	array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_DEFRTR] = cnf->accept_ra_defrtr;
+	array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_MIN_HOP_LIMIT] = cnf->accept_ra_min_hop_limit;
 	array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_PINFO] = cnf->accept_ra_pinfo;
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF
 	array[DEVCONF_ACCEPT_RA_RTR_PREF] = cnf->accept_ra_rtr_pref;
@@ -5136,6 +5139,13 @@ static struct addrconf_sysctl_table
 			.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 		},
 		{
+			.procname	= "accept_ra_min_hop_limit",
+			.data		= &ipv6_devconf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit,
+			.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+			.mode		= 0644,
+			.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+		},
+		{
 			.procname	= "accept_ra_pinfo",
 			.data		= &ipv6_devconf.accept_ra_pinfo,
 			.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
index a46c50423aec..6e7bf721840e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c
@@ -1214,18 +1214,16 @@ static void ndisc_router_discovery(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if (rt)
 		rt6_set_expires(rt, jiffies + (HZ * lifetime));
-	if (ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
-		/* Only set hop_limit on the interface if it is higher than
-		 * the current hop_limit.
-		 */
-		if (in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit < ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
+	if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit < 256 &&
+	    ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
+		if (in6_dev->cnf.accept_ra_min_hop_limit <= ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit) {
 			in6_dev->cnf.hop_limit = ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit;
+			if (rt)
+				dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT,
+					       ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit);
 		} else {
-			ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: Got route advertisement with lower hop_limit than current\n");
+			ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "RA: Got route advertisement with lower hop_limit than minimum\n");
 		}
-		if (rt)
-			dst_metric_set(&rt->dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT,
-				       ra_msg->icmph.icmp6_hop_limit);
 	}
 
 skip_defrtr:
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 11/24] ipv6: sctp: add rcu protection around np->opt

[Amit Pundir]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

commit c836a8ba93869d6a0290a6ae0047fbef09066871 upstream.

This patch completes the work I did in commit 45f6fad84cc3
("ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt"), as I missed
sctp part.

This simply makes sure np->opt is used with proper RCU locking
and accessors.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 net/sctp/ipv6.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
index 18361cbfc882..15bc2886a529 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ static int sctp_v6_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sctp_transport *transport)
 	struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
 	struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
 	struct flowi6 *fl6 = &transport->fl.u.ip6;
+	int res;
 
 	pr_debug("%s: skb:%p, len:%d, src:%pI6 dst:%pI6\n", __func__, skb,
 		 skb->len, &fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr);
@@ -220,7 +221,10 @@ static int sctp_v6_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sctp_transport *transport)
 
 	SCTP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), SCTP_MIB_OUTSCTPPACKS);
 
-	return ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), np->tclass);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return res;
 }
 
 /* Returns the dst cache entry for the given source and destination ip
@@ -262,7 +266,10 @@ static void sctp_v6_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
 		pr_debug("src=%pI6 - ", &fl6->saddr);
 	}
 
-	final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
 	if (!asoc || saddr)
 		goto out;
@@ -321,7 +328,7 @@ static void sctp_v6_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
 	if (baddr) {
 		fl6->saddr = baddr->v6.sin6_addr;
 		fl6->fl6_sport = baddr->v6.sin6_port;
-		final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+		final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
 		dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
 	}
 
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 12/24] ipv6: sctp: fix lockdep splat in sctp_v6_get_dst()

[Amit Pundir]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

commit 69ce6487dcd364245a3d26322fc8f4ffd1e8d947 upstream.

While cooking the sctp np->opt rcu fixes, I forgot to move
one rcu_read_unlock() after the added rcu_dereference() in
sctp_v6_get_dst()

This gave lockdep warnings reported by Dave Jones.

Fixes: c836a8ba9386 ("ipv6: sctp: add rcu protection around np->opt")
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 net/sctp/ipv6.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
index 15bc2886a529..5fb8b7b579f9 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -323,14 +323,13 @@ static void sctp_v6_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
 	if (baddr) {
 		fl6->saddr = baddr->v6.sin6_addr;
 		fl6->fl6_sport = baddr->v6.sin6_port;
 		final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final);
 		dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p);
 	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 out:
 	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dst)) {
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 13/24] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg

[Amit Pundir]

From: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>

commit a5527dda344fff0514b7989ef7a755729769daa1 upstream.

The unix_dgram_sendmsg routine use the following test

if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {

to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either
established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an
unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the
specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or
because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of
the unix_peer_get but disconnected before the unix_state_lock(other). In
both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which
might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock
the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk
check to guard against this.

Fixes: 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue")
Reported-By: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Tested-by: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 net/unix/af_unix.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 7950b4c26651..29b1f4dc48ca 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1722,7 +1722,12 @@ restart_locked:
 			goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
+	/* other == sk && unix_peer(other) != sk if
+	 * - unix_peer(sk) == NULL, destination address bound to sk
+	 * - unix_peer(sk) == sk by time of get but disconnected before lock
+	 */
+	if (other != sk &&
+	    unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
 		if (timeo) {
 			timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
 
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 14/24] ppp: defer netns reference release for ppp channel

[Amit Pundir]

From: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>

commit 205e1e255c479f3fd77446415706463b282f94e4 upstream.

Matt reported that we have a NULL pointer dereference
in ppp_pernet() from ppp_connect_channel(),
i.e. pch->chan_net is NULL.

This is due to that a parallel ppp_unregister_channel()
could happen while we are in ppp_connect_channel(), during
which pch->chan_net set to NULL. Since we need a reference
to net per channel, it makes sense to sync the refcnt
with the life time of the channel, therefore we should
release this reference when we destroy it.

Fixes: 1f461dcdd296 ("ppp: take reference on channels netns")
Reported-by: Matt Bennett <Matt.Bennett@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: linux-ppp@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c
index e3fbbbbd84e7..3dd1c19756ec 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c
@@ -2342,8 +2342,6 @@ ppp_unregister_channel(struct ppp_channel *chan)
 	spin_lock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
 	list_del(&pch->list);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&pn->all_channels_lock);
-	put_net(pch->chan_net);
-	pch->chan_net = NULL;
 
 	pch->file.dead = 1;
 	wake_up_interruptible(&pch->file.rwait);
@@ -2960,6 +2958,9 @@ ppp_disconnect_channel(struct channel *pch)
  */
 static void ppp_destroy_channel(struct channel *pch)
 {
+	put_net(pch->chan_net);
+	pch->chan_net = NULL;
+
 	atomic_dec(&channel_count);
 
 	if (!pch->file.dead) {
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 15/24] HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings

[Amit Pundir]

From: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>

commit 50220dead1650609206efe91f0cc116132d59b3f upstream.

Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.

The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
index 19a3a12f3257..34dda44cb910 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
@@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ static void hid_input_field(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_field *field,
 		/* Ignore report if ErrorRollOver */
 		if (!(field->flags & HID_MAIN_ITEM_VARIABLE) &&
 		    value[n] >= min && value[n] <= max &&
+		    value[n] - min < field->maxusage &&
 		    field->usage[value[n] - min].hid == HID_UP_KEYBOARD + 1)
 			goto exit;
 	}
@@ -1225,11 +1226,13 @@ static void hid_input_field(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_field *field,
 		}
 
 		if (field->value[n] >= min && field->value[n] <= max
+			&& field->value[n] - min < field->maxusage
 			&& field->usage[field->value[n] - min].hid
 			&& search(value, field->value[n], count))
 				hid_process_event(hid, field, &field->usage[field->value[n] - min], 0, interrupt);
 
 		if (value[n] >= min && value[n] <= max
+			&& value[n] - min < field->maxusage
 			&& field->usage[value[n] - min].hid
 			&& search(field->value, value[n], count))
 				hid_process_event(hid, field, &field->usage[value[n] - min], 1, interrupt);
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 16/24] cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind

[Amit Pundir]

From: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>

commit 4d06dd537f95683aba3651098ae288b7cbff8274 upstream.

usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.

Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.

Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 20 +++++---------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c
index 614b4ca6420a..02e7b9e6a641 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c
@@ -952,23 +952,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cdc_ncm_select_altsetting);
 
 static int cdc_ncm_bind(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	/* MBIM backwards compatible function? */
 	if (cdc_ncm_select_altsetting(intf) != CDC_NCM_COMM_ALTSETTING_NCM)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	/* The NCM data altsetting is fixed */
-	ret = cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM);
-
-	/*
-	 * We should get an event when network connection is "connected" or
-	 * "disconnected". Set network connection in "disconnected" state
-	 * (carrier is OFF) during attach, so the IP network stack does not
-	 * start IPv6 negotiation and more.
-	 */
-	usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);
-	return ret;
+	return cdc_ncm_bind_common(dev, intf, CDC_NCM_DATA_ALTSETTING_NCM);
 }
 
 static void cdc_ncm_align_tail(struct sk_buff *skb, size_t modulus, size_t remainder, size_t max)
@@ -1510,7 +1499,8 @@ static void cdc_ncm_status(struct usbnet *dev, struct urb *urb)
 
 static const struct driver_info cdc_ncm_info = {
 	.description = "CDC NCM",
-	.flags = FLAG_POINTTOPOINT | FLAG_NO_SETINT | FLAG_MULTI_PACKET,
+	.flags = FLAG_POINTTOPOINT | FLAG_NO_SETINT | FLAG_MULTI_PACKET
+			| FLAG_LINK_INTR,
 	.bind = cdc_ncm_bind,
 	.unbind = cdc_ncm_unbind,
 	.manage_power = usbnet_manage_power,
@@ -1523,7 +1513,7 @@ static const struct driver_info cdc_ncm_info = {
 static const struct driver_info wwan_info = {
 	.description = "Mobile Broadband Network Device",
 	.flags = FLAG_POINTTOPOINT | FLAG_NO_SETINT | FLAG_MULTI_PACKET
-			| FLAG_WWAN,
+			| FLAG_LINK_INTR | FLAG_WWAN,
 	.bind = cdc_ncm_bind,
 	.unbind = cdc_ncm_unbind,
 	.manage_power = usbnet_manage_power,
@@ -1536,7 +1526,7 @@ static const struct driver_info wwan_info = {
 static const struct driver_info wwan_noarp_info = {
 	.description = "Mobile Broadband Network Device (NO ARP)",
 	.flags = FLAG_POINTTOPOINT | FLAG_NO_SETINT | FLAG_MULTI_PACKET
-			| FLAG_WWAN | FLAG_NOARP,
+			| FLAG_LINK_INTR | FLAG_WWAN | FLAG_NOARP,
 	.bind = cdc_ncm_bind,
 	.unbind = cdc_ncm_unbind,
 	.manage_power = usbnet_manage_power,
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 17/24] ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close

[Amit Pundir]

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 3567eb6af614dac436c4b16a8d426f9faed639b3 upstream.

ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client.  This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.

This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
index a0cda38205b9..77ec21420355 100644
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
@@ -142,8 +142,10 @@ static struct snd_seq_queue *queue_new(int owner, int locked)
 static void queue_delete(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
 {
 	/* stop and release the timer */
+	mutex_lock(&q->timer_mutex);
 	snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
 	snd_seq_timer_close(q);
+	mutex_unlock(&q->timer_mutex);
 	/* wait until access free */
 	snd_use_lock_sync(&q->use_lock);
 	/* release resources... */
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 18/24] ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls

[Amit Pundir]

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit af368027a49a751d6ff4ee9e3f9961f35bb4fede upstream.

ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object.  A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive.  We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.

The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency.  But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 sound/core/timer.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index c9da76e05b3f..fa4ded0c2230 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ struct snd_timer_user {
 	struct timespec tstamp;		/* trigger tstamp */
 	wait_queue_head_t qchange_sleep;
 	struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-	struct mutex tread_sem;
+	struct mutex ioctl_lock;
 };
 
 /* list of timers */
@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	spin_lock_init(&tu->qlock);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&tu->qchange_sleep);
-	mutex_init(&tu->tread_sem);
+	mutex_init(&tu->ioctl_lock);
 	tu->ticks = 1;
 	tu->queue_size = 128;
 	tu->queue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_read),
@@ -1362,8 +1362,10 @@ static int snd_timer_user_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	if (file->private_data) {
 		tu = file->private_data;
 		file->private_data = NULL;
+		mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
 		if (tu->timeri)
 			snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
+		mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
 		kfree(tu->queue);
 		kfree(tu->tqueue);
 		kfree(tu);
@@ -1601,7 +1603,6 @@ static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
 	int err = 0;
 
 	tu = file->private_data;
-	mutex_lock(&tu->tread_sem);
 	if (tu->timeri) {
 		snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
 		tu->timeri = NULL;
@@ -1645,7 +1646,6 @@ static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
 	}
 
       __err:
-      	mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -1861,7 +1861,7 @@ enum {
 	SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PAUSE_OLD = _IO('T', 0x23),
 };
 
-static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+static long __snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 				 unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct snd_timer_user *tu;
@@ -1878,17 +1878,11 @@ static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	{
 		int xarg;
 
-		mutex_lock(&tu->tread_sem);
-		if (tu->timeri)	{	/* too late */
-			mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
+		if (tu->timeri)	/* too late */
 			return -EBUSY;
-		}
-		if (get_user(xarg, p)) {
-			mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
+		if (get_user(xarg, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		}
 		tu->tread = xarg ? 1 : 0;
-		mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GINFO:
@@ -1921,6 +1915,18 @@ static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	return -ENOTTY;
 }
 
+static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+				 unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct snd_timer_user *tu = file->private_data;
+	long ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+	ret = __snd_timer_user_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
+	mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int snd_timer_user_fasync(int fd, struct file * file, int on)
 {
 	struct snd_timer_user *tu;
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 19/24] ALSA: timer: Fix leak in SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS

[Amit Pundir]

From: Kangjie Lu <kangjielu@gmail.com>

commit cec8f96e49d9be372fdb0c3836dcf31ec71e457e upstream.

The stack object “tread” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 sound/core/timer.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index fa4ded0c2230..ede058bd49a4 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -1759,6 +1759,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_params(struct file *file,
 	if (tu->timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT) {
 		if (tu->tread) {
 			struct snd_timer_tread tread;
+			memset(&tread, 0, sizeof(tread));
 			tread.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_EARLY;
 			tread.tstamp.tv_sec = 0;
 			tread.tstamp.tv_nsec = 0;
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 20/24] ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_ccallback

[Amit Pundir]

From: Kangjie Lu <kangjielu@gmail.com>

commit 9a47e9cff994f37f7f0dbd9ae23740d0f64f9fe6 upstream.

The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 sound/core/timer.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index ede058bd49a4..47c8beb5eb40 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -1260,6 +1260,7 @@ static void snd_timer_user_ccallback(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
 		tu->tstamp = *tstamp;
 	if ((tu->filter & (1 << event)) == 0 || !tu->tread)
 		return;
+	memset(&r1, 0, sizeof(r1));
 	r1.event = event;
 	r1.tstamp = *tstamp;
 	r1.val = resolution;
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 21/24] ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt

[Amit Pundir]

From: Kangjie Lu <kangjielu@gmail.com>

commit e4ec8cc8039a7063e24204299b462bd1383184a5 upstream.

The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.

Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 sound/core/timer.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index 47c8beb5eb40..d448437df4b5 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -1295,6 +1295,7 @@ static void snd_timer_user_tinterrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
 	}
 	if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)) &&
 	    tu->last_resolution != resolution) {
+		memset(&r1, 0, sizeof(r1));
 		r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION;
 		r1.tstamp = tstamp;
 		r1.val = resolution;
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 22/24] sched: panic on corrupted stack end

[Amit Pundir]

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

commit 29d6455178a09e1dc340380c582b13356227e8df upstream.

Until now, hitting this BUG_ON caused a recursive oops (because oops
handling involves do_exit(), which calls into the scheduler, which in
turn raises an oops), which caused stuff below the stack to be
overwritten until a panic happened (e.g.  via an oops in interrupt
context, caused by the overwritten CPU index in the thread_info).

Just panic directly.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[AmitP: Minor refactoring of upstream changes for linux-3.18.y]
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 kernel/sched/core.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 5f4c71c5d38e..a760c9e0353e 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -2709,7 +2709,8 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev)
 static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
-	BUG_ON(unlikely(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev)));
+	if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
+		panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * Test if we are atomic. Since do_exit() needs to call into
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 23/24] xc2028: Fix use-after-free bug properly

[Amit Pundir]

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 22a1e7783e173ab3d86018eb590107d68df46c11 upstream.

The commit 8dfbcc4351a0 ("[media] xc2028: avoid use after free") tried
to address the reported use-after-free by clearing the reference.

However, it's clearing the wrong pointer; it sets NULL to
priv->ctrl.fname, but it's anyway overwritten by the next line
memcpy(&priv->ctrl, p, sizeof(priv->ctrl)).

OTOH, the actual code accessing the freed string is the strcmp() call
with priv->fname:
	if (!firmware_name[0] && p->fname &&
	    priv->fname && strcmp(p->fname, priv->fname))
		free_firmware(priv);

where priv->fname points to the previous file name, and this was
already freed by kfree().

For fixing the bug properly, this patch does the following:

- Keep the copy of firmware file name in only priv->fname,
  priv->ctrl.fname isn't changed;
- The allocation is done only when the firmware gets loaded;
- The kfree() is called in free_firmware() commonly

Fixes: commit 8dfbcc4351a0 ('[media] xc2028: avoid use after free')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c b/drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c
index 0b54ec2d6eed..9948578df228 100644
--- a/drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c
+++ b/drivers/media/tuners/tuner-xc2028.c
@@ -281,6 +281,14 @@ static void free_firmware(struct xc2028_data *priv)
 	int i;
 	tuner_dbg("%s called\n", __func__);
 
+	/* free allocated f/w string */
+	if (priv->fname != firmware_name)
+		kfree(priv->fname);
+	priv->fname = NULL;
+
+	priv->state = XC2028_NO_FIRMWARE;
+	memset(&priv->cur_fw, 0, sizeof(priv->cur_fw));
+
 	if (!priv->firm)
 		return;
 
@@ -291,9 +299,6 @@ static void free_firmware(struct xc2028_data *priv)
 
 	priv->firm = NULL;
 	priv->firm_size = 0;
-	priv->state = XC2028_NO_FIRMWARE;
-
-	memset(&priv->cur_fw, 0, sizeof(priv->cur_fw));
 }
 
 static int load_all_firmwares(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
@@ -884,9 +889,8 @@ read_not_reliable:
 	return 0;
 
 fail:
-	priv->state = XC2028_NO_FIRMWARE;
+	free_firmware(priv);
 
-	memset(&priv->cur_fw, 0, sizeof(priv->cur_fw));
 	if (retry_count < 8) {
 		msleep(50);
 		retry_count++;
@@ -1332,11 +1336,8 @@ static int xc2028_dvb_release(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
 	mutex_lock(&xc2028_list_mutex);
 
 	/* only perform final cleanup if this is the last instance */
-	if (hybrid_tuner_report_instance_count(priv) == 1) {
+	if (hybrid_tuner_report_instance_count(priv) == 1)
 		free_firmware(priv);
-		kfree(priv->ctrl.fname);
-		priv->ctrl.fname = NULL;
-	}
 
 	if (priv)
 		hybrid_tuner_release_state(priv);
@@ -1399,19 +1400,8 @@ static int xc2028_set_config(struct dvb_frontend *fe, void *priv_cfg)
 
 	/*
 	 * Copy the config data.
-	 * For the firmware name, keep a local copy of the string,
-	 * in order to avoid troubles during device release.
 	 */
-	kfree(priv->ctrl.fname);
-	priv->ctrl.fname = NULL;
 	memcpy(&priv->ctrl, p, sizeof(priv->ctrl));
-	if (p->fname) {
-		priv->ctrl.fname = kstrdup(p->fname, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (priv->ctrl.fname == NULL) {
-			rc = -ENOMEM;
-			goto unlock;
-		}
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If firmware name changed, frees firmware. As free_firmware will
@@ -1426,10 +1416,15 @@ static int xc2028_set_config(struct dvb_frontend *fe, void *priv_cfg)
 
 	if (priv->state == XC2028_NO_FIRMWARE) {
 		if (!firmware_name[0])
-			priv->fname = priv->ctrl.fname;
+			priv->fname = kstrdup(p->fname, GFP_KERNEL);
 		else
 			priv->fname = firmware_name;
 
+		if (!priv->fname) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto unlock;
+		}
+
 		rc = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1,
 					     priv->fname,
 					     priv->i2c_props.adap->dev.parent,
-- 
2.7.4

[PATCH for-3.18 24/24] mm/huge_memory.c: respect FOLL_FORCE/FOLL_COW for thp

[Amit Pundir]

From: Keno Fischer <keno@juliacomputing.com>

commit 8310d48b125d19fcd9521d83b8293e63eb1646aa upstream.

In commit 19be0eaffa3a ("mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from
__get_user_pages()"), the mm code was changed from unsetting FOLL_WRITE
after a COW was resolved to setting the (newly introduced) FOLL_COW
instead.  Simultaneously, the check in gup.c was updated to still allow
writes with FOLL_FORCE set if FOLL_COW had also been set.

However, a similar check in huge_memory.c was forgotten.  As a result,
remote memory writes to ro regions of memory backed by transparent huge
pages cause an infinite loop in the kernel (handle_mm_fault sets
FOLL_COW and returns 0 causing a retry, but follow_trans_huge_pmd bails
out immidiately because `(flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !pmd_write(*pmd)` is
true.

While in this state the process is stil SIGKILLable, but little else
works (e.g.  no ptrace attach, no other signals).  This is easily
reproduced with the following code (assuming thp are set to always):

    #include <assert.h>
    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <stdint.h>
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <sys/mman.h>
    #include <sys/stat.h>
    #include <sys/types.h>
    #include <sys/wait.h>
    #include <unistd.h>

    #define TEST_SIZE 5 * 1024 * 1024

    int main(void) {
      int status;
      pid_t child;
      int fd = open("/proc/self/mem", O_RDWR);
      void *addr = mmap(NULL, TEST_SIZE, PROT_READ,
                        MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0, 0);
      assert(addr != MAP_FAILED);
      pid_t parent_pid = getpid();
      if ((child = fork()) == 0) {
        void *addr2 = mmap(NULL, TEST_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                           MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, 0, 0);
        assert(addr2 != MAP_FAILED);
        memset(addr2, 'a', TEST_SIZE);
        pwrite(fd, addr2, TEST_SIZE, (uintptr_t)addr);
        return 0;
      }
      assert(child == waitpid(child, &status, 0));
      assert(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
      return 0;
    }

Fix this by updating follow_trans_huge_pmd in huge_memory.c analogously
to the update in gup.c in the original commit.  The same pattern exists
in follow_devmap_pmd.  However, we should not be able to reach that
check with FOLL_COW set, so add WARN_ONCE to make sure we notice if we
ever do.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106015025.GA38411@juliacomputing.com
Signed-off-by: Keno Fischer <keno@juliacomputing.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[AmitP: Minor refactoring of upstream changes for linux-3.18.y,
        where follow_devmap_pmd() doesn't exist.]
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
---
 mm/huge_memory.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 2e39d4e0ff09..8c9cbd0e4f3f 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1205,6 +1205,16 @@ out_unlock:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
+ * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
+ */
+static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return pmd_write(pmd) ||
+	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+}
+
 struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				   unsigned long addr,
 				   pmd_t *pmd,
@@ -1215,7 +1225,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 
 	assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
 
-	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !pmd_write(*pmd))
+	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
-- 
2.7.4

Re: [PATCH for-3.18 00/24] Security fixes from 2015 and 2016 android security bulletins

[Amit Pundir]

On 9 May 2017 at 20:12, Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> wrote:
> Hi Greg,
>
> Please consider following security fixes for linux-3.18.y. This
> is a follow up on my previous submission of similar security fixes,
> https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg169868.html, picked up from
> android security bulletins published in year 2017 so far.
>
> Following are the fixes published in 2015 and 2016 monthly Android
> Security Bulletins https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/,
> and/or related follow-up fixes from upstream. Cherry-picked and build
> tested on v3.18.52 for ARCH=arm/arm64/x86/x86_64/mips + allmodconfig.
>

Also, for the record following are the upstream fixes listed in
security bulletins but they didn't apply on linux-3.18.y cleanly and
seem to have non-trivial conflicts. So I skipped them. In one case it
is explicitly targeted for 3.19, so I skipped that one as well though
it applied and built fine on 3.18.y.

f2b2c582e824 ("tcp: mitigate ACK loops for connections as tcp_sock")
083ae308280d ("tcp: enable per-socket rate limiting of all 'challenge acks'")
4de930efc23b ("net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in
sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom")
1c90308e7a77 ("pagemap: hide physical addresses from non-privileged users")
c58d6c93680f ("netfilter: nfnetlink: correctly validate length of
batch messages")
8b8addf891de ("x86/mm/32: Enable full randomization on i386 and X86_32")
38740a5b87d5 ("usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free")

Regards,
Amit Pundir

Re: [PATCH for-3.18 00/24] Security fixes from 2015 and 2016 android security bulletins

[Greg KH]

On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 08:12:24PM +0530, Amit Pundir wrote:
> Hi Greg,
> 
> Please consider following security fixes for linux-3.18.y. This
> is a follow up on my previous submission of similar security fixes,
> https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg169868.html, picked up from
> android security bulletins published in year 2017 so far.
> 
> Following are the fixes published in 2015 and 2016 monthly Android
> Security Bulletins https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/,
> and/or related follow-up fixes from upstream. Cherry-picked and build
> tested on v3.18.52 for ARCH=arm/arm64/x86/x86_64/mips + allmodconfig.

Thanks for these, I've applied all but 3, and will wait for those for
the next round of stable kernel releases (because they are needed in
other trees as well...)

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH for-3.18 00/24] Security fixes from 2015 and 2016 android security bulletins

[Greg KH]

On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 02:22:41PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 08:12:24PM +0530, Amit Pundir wrote:
> > Hi Greg,
> > 
> > Please consider following security fixes for linux-3.18.y. This
> > is a follow up on my previous submission of similar security fixes,
> > https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg169868.html, picked up from
> > android security bulletins published in year 2017 so far.
> > 
> > Following are the fixes published in 2015 and 2016 monthly Android
> > Security Bulletins https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/,
> > and/or related follow-up fixes from upstream. Cherry-picked and build
> > tested on v3.18.52 for ARCH=arm/arm64/x86/x86_64/mips + allmodconfig.
> 
> Thanks for these, I've applied all but 3, and will wait for those for
> the next round of stable kernel releases (because they are needed in
> other trees as well...)

These other 3 now applied, thanks!

greg k-h