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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.13 62/85] KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 15:07:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171024125656.495062898@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171024125654.028122623@linuxfoundation.org>

4.13-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit 363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76 upstream.

Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:

 (1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.

 (2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.

 (3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.

This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.

The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state.  For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state.  You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.

The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated.  The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.

Additionally, barriering is included:

 (1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.

 (2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.

Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.

Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/linux/key.h                      |   47 +++++++++++++++++++------------
 net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c               |    2 -
 security/keys/big_key.c                  |    4 +-
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c |    2 -
 security/keys/gc.c                       |    8 ++---
 security/keys/key.c                      |   31 +++++++++++++-------
 security/keys/keyctl.c                   |    9 ++---
 security/keys/keyring.c                  |   10 +++---
 security/keys/proc.c                     |    7 +++-
 security/keys/process_keys.c             |    2 -
 security/keys/request_key.c              |    7 +---
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c         |    2 -
 security/keys/trusted.c                  |    2 -
 security/keys/user_defined.c             |    4 +-
 14 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -138,6 +138,11 @@ struct key_restriction {
 	struct key_type *keytype;
 };
 
+enum key_state {
+	KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED,
+	KEY_IS_POSITIVE,		/* Positively instantiated */
+};
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * authentication token / access credential / keyring
@@ -169,6 +174,7 @@ struct key {
 						 * - may not match RCU dereferenced payload
 						 * - payload should contain own length
 						 */
+	short			state;		/* Key state (+) or rejection error (-) */
 
 #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
 	unsigned		magic;
@@ -176,18 +182,16 @@ struct key {
 #endif
 
 	unsigned long		flags;		/* status flags (change with bitops) */
-#define KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED	0	/* set if key has been instantiated */
-#define KEY_FLAG_DEAD		1	/* set if key type has been deleted */
-#define KEY_FLAG_REVOKED	2	/* set if key had been revoked */
-#define KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA	3	/* set if key consumes quota */
-#define KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT	4	/* set if key is being constructed in userspace */
-#define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE	5	/* set if key is negative */
-#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR	6	/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
-#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED	7	/* set if key has been invalidated */
-#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN	8	/* set if key is built in to the kernel */
-#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL	9	/* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
-#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP		10	/* set if key should not be removed */
-#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING	11	/* set if key is a user or user session keyring */
+#define KEY_FLAG_DEAD		0	/* set if key type has been deleted */
+#define KEY_FLAG_REVOKED	1	/* set if key had been revoked */
+#define KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA	2	/* set if key consumes quota */
+#define KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT	3	/* set if key is being constructed in userspace */
+#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR	4	/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
+#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED	5	/* set if key has been invalidated */
+#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN	6	/* set if key is built in to the kernel */
+#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL	7	/* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
+#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP		8	/* set if key should not be removed */
+#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING	9	/* set if key is a user or user session keyring */
 
 	/* the key type and key description string
 	 * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -213,7 +217,6 @@ struct key {
 			struct list_head name_link;
 			struct assoc_array keys;
 		};
-		int reject_error;
 	};
 
 	/* This is set on a keyring to restrict the addition of a link to a key
@@ -353,17 +356,27 @@ extern void key_set_timeout(struct key *
 #define	KEY_NEED_SETATTR 0x20	/* Require permission to change attributes */
 #define	KEY_NEED_ALL	0x3f	/* All the above permissions */
 
+static inline short key_read_state(const struct key *key)
+{
+	/* Barrier versus mark_key_instantiated(). */
+	return smp_load_acquire(&key->state);
+}
+
 /**
- * key_is_instantiated - Determine if a key has been positively instantiated
+ * key_is_positive - Determine if a key has been positively instantiated
  * @key: The key to check.
  *
  * Return true if the specified key has been positively instantiated, false
  * otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool key_is_instantiated(const struct key *key)
+static inline bool key_is_positive(const struct key *key)
+{
+	return key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_POSITIVE;
+}
+
+static inline bool key_is_negative(const struct key *key)
 {
-	return test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) &&
-		!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+	return key_read_state(key) < 0;
 }
 
 #define dereference_key_rcu(KEY)					\
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int dns_resolver_match_preparse(s
 static void dns_resolver_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
 {
 	seq_puts(m, key->description);
-	if (key_is_instantiated(key)) {
+	if (key_is_positive(key)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(key->payload.data[dns_key_error]);
 
 		if (err)
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
 
 	/* clear the quota */
 	key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
-	if (key_is_instantiated(key) &&
+	if (key_is_positive(key) &&
 	    (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
 		vfs_truncate(path, 0);
 }
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *
 
 	seq_puts(m, key->description);
 
-	if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
 		seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
 			   datalen,
 			   datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *
 	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+	if (key_is_negative(key))
 		return -ENOKEY;
 	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
 		return -EINVAL;
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -129,15 +129,15 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(
 	while (!list_empty(keys)) {
 		struct key *key =
 			list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
+		short state = key->state;
+
 		list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
 
 		kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
 		key_check(key);
 
 		/* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */
-		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) &&
-		    !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) &&
-		    key->type->destroy)
+		if (state == KEY_IS_POSITIVE && key->type->destroy)
 			key->type->destroy(key);
 
 		security_key_free(key);
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(
 		}
 
 		atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
-		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+		if (state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
 			atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
 
 		key_user_put(key->user);
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -402,6 +402,18 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve);
 
 /*
+ * Change the key state to being instantiated.
+ */
+static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, int reject_error)
+{
+	/* Commit the payload before setting the state; barrier versus
+	 * key_read_state().
+	 */
+	smp_store_release(&key->state,
+			  (reject_error < 0) ? reject_error : KEY_IS_POSITIVE);
+}
+
+/*
  * Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically.  Must be
  * called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked.  The target key's
  * semaphore need not be locked as instantiation is serialised by
@@ -424,14 +436,14 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(st
 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
 	/* can't instantiate twice */
-	if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
+	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
 		/* instantiate the key */
 		ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep);
 
 		if (ret == 0) {
 			/* mark the key as being instantiated */
 			atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
-			set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
+			mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
 
 			if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
 				awaken = 1;
@@ -577,13 +589,10 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
 	/* can't instantiate twice */
-	if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
+	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
 		/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
 		atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
-		key->reject_error = -error;
-		smp_wmb();
-		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
-		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
+		mark_key_instantiated(key, -error);
 		now = current_kernel_time();
 		key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
 		key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
@@ -752,8 +761,8 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key
 
 	ret = key->type->update(key, prep);
 	if (ret == 0)
-		/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
-		clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+		/* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
+		mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
 
 	up_write(&key->sem);
 
@@ -986,8 +995,8 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const
 
 	ret = key->type->update(key, &prep);
 	if (ret == 0)
-		/* updating a negative key instantiates it */
-		clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+		/* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
+		mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
 
 	up_write(&key->sem);
 
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -766,10 +766,9 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid,
 
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
-	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
-		ret = -ENOKEY;
-		goto error2;
-	}
+	ret = key_read_state(key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error2; /* Negatively instantiated */
 
 	/* see if we can read it directly */
 	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
@@ -901,7 +900,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, u
 		atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
 		atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
 
-		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
+		if (key->state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
 			atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
 			atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
 		}
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struc
 	else
 		seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
 
-	if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) {
+	if (key_is_positive(keyring)) {
 		if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0)
 			seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree);
 		else
@@ -553,7 +553,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const
 {
 	struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
 	const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
-	unsigned long kflags = key->flags;
+	unsigned long kflags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
+	short state = READ_ONCE(key->state);
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
@@ -597,9 +598,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const
 
 	if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
 		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
-		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
-			smp_rmb();
-			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error);
+		if (state < 0) {
+			ctx->result = ERR_PTR(state);
 			kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret);
 			goto skipped;
 		}
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_fil
 	unsigned long timo;
 	key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
 	char xbuf[16];
+	short state;
 	int rc;
 
 	struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
@@ -240,17 +241,19 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_fil
 			sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7));
 	}
 
+	state = key_read_state(key);
+
 #define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \
 	(test_bit(FLAG,	&(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')
 
 	seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ",
 		   key->serial,
-		   showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED),
+		   state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED ? 'I' : '-',
 		   showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),
 		   showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),
 		   showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),
 		   showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
-		   showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),
+		   state < 0 ? 'N' : '-',
 		   showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
 		   refcount_read(&key->usage),
 		   xbuf,
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ try_again:
 
 	ret = -EIO;
 	if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
-	    !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+	    key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
 		goto invalid_key;
 
 	/* check the permissions */
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -595,10 +595,9 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key
 			  intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
 	if (ret)
 		return -ERESTARTSYS;
-	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
-		smp_rmb();
-		return key->reject_error;
-	}
+	ret = key_read_state(key);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
 	return key_validate(key);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(co
 
 	seq_puts(m, "key:");
 	seq_puts(m, key->description);
-	if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
 		seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
 }
 
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke
 	char *datablob;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+	if (key_is_negative(key))
 		return -ENOKEY;
 	p = key->payload.data[0];
 	if (!p->migratable)
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct
 
 	/* attach the new data, displacing the old */
 	key->expiry = prep->expiry;
-	if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
 		zap = dereference_key_locked(key);
 	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]);
 	prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
 void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
 {
 	seq_puts(m, key->description);
-	if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
 		seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
 }
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-10-24 13:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-24 13:06 [PATCH 4.13 00/85] 4.13.10-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 01/85] staging: bcm2835-audio: Fix memory corruption Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 02/85] USB: devio: Revert "USB: devio: Dont corrupt user memory" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 03/85] USB: core: fix out-of-bounds access bug in usb_get_bos_descriptor() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 04/85] USB: serial: metro-usb: add MS7820 device id Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 05/85] usb: cdc_acm: Add quirk for Elatec TWN3 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 07/85] usb: hub: Allow reset retry for USB2 devices on connect bounce Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 08/85] ALSA: usb-audio: Add native DSD support for Pro-Ject Pre Box S2 Digital Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 09/85] can: gs_usb: fix busy loop if no more TX context is available Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 10/85] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix uninitialized work element Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 11/85] nbd: dont set the device size until were connected Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 12/85] s390/cputime: fix guest/irq/softirq times after CPU hotplug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 13/85] parisc: Fix double-word compare and exchange in LWS code on 32-bit kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 14/85] parisc: Fix detection of nonsynchronous cr16 cycle counters Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 15/85] iio: dummy: events: Add missing break Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 16/85] usb: musb: sunxi: Explicitly release USB PHY on exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 17/85] USB: musb: fix session-bit runtime-PM quirk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 18/85] USB: musb: fix late external abort on suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 19/85] usb: musb: musb_cppi41: Fix the address of teardown and autoreq registers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 20/85] usb: musb: musb_cppi41: Fix cppi41_set_dma_mode() for DA8xx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 21/85] usb: musb: musb_cppi41: Configure the number of channels " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 22/85] usb: musb: Check for host-mode using is_host_active() on reset interrupt Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 23/85] xhci: Identify USB 3.1 capable hosts by their port protocol capability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 24/85] xhci: Cleanup current_cmd in xhci_cleanup_command_queue() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:06 ` [PATCH 4.13 25/85] usb: xhci: Reset halted endpoint if trb is noop Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 26/85] usb: xhci: Handle error condition in xhci_stop_device() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 28/85] can: af_can: can_pernet_init(): add missing error handling for kzalloc returning NULL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 29/85] can: flexcan: fix state transition regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 30/85] can: flexcan: rename legacy error state quirk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 31/85] can: flexcan: implement error passive " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 32/85] can: flexcan: fix i.MX6 state transition issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 33/85] can: flexcan: fix i.MX28 " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 34/85] can: flexcan: fix p1010 " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 35/85] KEYS: encrypted: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 36/85] mmc: sdhci-pci: Fix default d3_retune for Intel host controllers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 38/85] drm/nouveau/kms/nv50: fix oops during DP IRQ handling on non-MST boards Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 39/85] drm/nouveau/bsp/g92: disable by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 40/85] drm/nouveau/mmu: flush tlbs before deleting page tables Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 41/85] media: s5p-cec: add NACK detection support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 42/85] media: cec: Respond to unregistered initiators, when applicable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 43/85] media: dvb: i2c transfers over usb cannot be done from stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 44/85] tracing/samples: Fix creation and deletion of simple_thread_fn creation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-30 19:57   ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-30 21:17     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 45/85] ALSA: seq: Enable use locking in all configurations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 46/85] ALSA: hda: Remove superfluous - added by printk conversion Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 47/85] ALSA: hda: Abort capability probe at invalid register read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 48/85] i2c: ismt: Separate I2C block read from SMBus block read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 50/85] Revert "tools/power turbostat: stop migrating, unless -m" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 51/85] Input: stmfts - fix setting ABS_MT_POSITION_* maximum size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 52/85] brcmfmac: Add check for short event packets Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 53/85] brcmsmac: make some local variables static const to reduce stack size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 54/85] ARM: dts: sun6i: Fix endpoint IDs in second display pipeline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 55/85] bus: mbus: fix window size calculation for 4GB windows Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 56/85] clockevents/drivers/cs5535: Improve resilience to spurious interrupts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 57/85] rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix connection lost problem Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 58/85] x86/microcode/intel: Disable late loading on model 79 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 59/85] lib/digsig: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 60/85] fscrypt: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 61/85] ecryptfs: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 63/85] FS-Cache: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 64/85] KEYS: dont let add_key() update an uninstantiated key Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 65/85] pkcs7: Prevent NULL pointer dereference, since sinfo is not always set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 66/85] arm64: dts: rockchip: correct vqmmc voltage for rk3399 platforms Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 67/85] ALSA: hda - Fix incorrect TLV callback check introduced during set_fs() removal Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 68/85] iomap_dio_rw: Allocate AIO completion queue before submitting dio Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 69/85] xfs: dont unconditionally clear the reflink flag on zero-block files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 70/85] xfs: evict CoW fork extents when performing finsert/fcollapse Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 71/85] fs/xfs: Use %pS printk format for direct addresses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 72/85] xfs: report zeroed or not correctly in xfs_zero_range() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 73/85] xfs: update i_size after unwritten conversion in dio completion Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 74/85] xfs: perag initialization should only touch m_ag_max_usable for AG 0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 75/85] xfs: Capture state of the right inode in xfs_iflush_done Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 76/85] xfs: always swap the cow forks when swapping extents Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 77/85] xfs: handle racy AIO in xfs_reflink_end_cow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 78/85] xfs: Dont log uninitialised fields in inode structures Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 79/85] xfs: move more RT specific code under CONFIG_XFS_RT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 80/85] xfs: dont change inode mode if ACL update fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 81/85] xfs: reinit btree pointer on attr tree inactivation walk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 82/85] xfs: handle error if xfs_btree_get_bufs fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 83/85] xfs: cancel dirty pages on invalidation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 84/85] xfs: trim writepage mapping to within eof Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 13:07 ` [PATCH 4.13 85/85] xfs: move two more RT specific functions into CONFIG_XFS_RT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-25 21:09   ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-10-26  7:09     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-10-24 21:28 ` [PATCH 4.13 00/85] 4.13.10-stable review Guenter Roeck
2017-10-25  6:48   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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