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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] fscrypt: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 12:30:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171024193003.58499-3-ebiggers3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171024193003.58499-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

commit d60b5b7854c3d135b869f74fb93eaf63cbb1991a upstream.  Please apply
to 4.4-stable.

When an fscrypt-encrypted file is opened, we request the file's master
key from the keyrings service as a logon key, then access its payload.
However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for
this.  request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.

Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.

Fixes: 88bd6ccdcdd6 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>    [v4.1+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 fs/ext4/crypto_key.c | 6 ++++++
 fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
index 505f8afde57c..9a1bc638abce 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
@@ -204,6 +204,12 @@ int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
 	}
 	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
 	ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
+	if (!ukp) {
+		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
+		res = -EKEYREVOKED;
+		up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
+		goto out;
+	}
 	if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_key)) {
 		res = -EINVAL;
 		up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
index ae49be377b60..7e62889a1d3d 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
 	}
 	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
 	ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
+	if (!ukp) {
+		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
+		res = -EKEYREVOKED;
+		up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
+		goto out;
+	}
 	if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct f2fs_encryption_key)) {
 		res = -EINVAL;
 		up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
-- 
2.15.0.rc0.271.g36b669edcc-goog

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-10-24 19:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-24 19:30 [PATCH 1/3] f2fs crypto: replace some BUG_ON()'s with error checks Eric Biggers
2017-10-24 19:30 ` [PATCH 2/3] f2fs crypto: add missing locking for keyring_key access Eric Biggers
2017-10-24 19:30 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2017-10-25  9:39 ` [PATCH 1/3] f2fs crypto: replace some BUG_ON()'s with error checks Greg KH

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