From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
Xiao Yang <yangx.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>,
David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read()
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2017 13:57:44 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171026205744.105566-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com> (raw)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the
user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length
and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting
userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per
the documentation for keyctl_read().
We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is
slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either
behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior
of the "encrypted" key type.
Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.38+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
security/keys/trusted.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index bd85315cbfeb..98aa89ff7bfd 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1147,20 +1147,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
p = dereference_key_locked(key);
if (!p)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
- return 2 * p->blob_len;
- ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ascii_buf)
- return -ENOMEM;
- bufp = ascii_buf;
- for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
- bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
- if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
+ if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
+ ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ascii_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bufp = ascii_buf;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+ bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {
+ kzfree(ascii_buf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
kzfree(ascii_buf);
- return -EFAULT;
}
- kzfree(ascii_buf);
return 2 * p->blob_len;
}
--
2.15.0.rc2.357.g7e34df9404-goog
next reply other threads:[~2017-10-26 20:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-26 20:57 Eric Biggers [this message]
2017-10-26 23:57 ` [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read() Mimi Zohar
2017-10-27 7:55 ` James Morris
2017-11-01 6:55 ` James Morris
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