From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:56562 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751629AbdKFJPF (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Nov 2017 04:15:05 -0500 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Ben Hutchings , Eric Biggers , David Howells , Mimi Zohar , James Morris Subject: [PATCH 4.13 05/36] KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read() Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2017 10:12:18 +0100 Message-Id: <20171106085047.239355379@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20171106085047.005824077@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20171106085047.005824077@linuxfoundation.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.13-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric Biggers commit a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 upstream. When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per the documentation for keyctl_read(). We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior of the "encrypted" key type. Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Reported-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/keys/trusted.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1147,20 +1147,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct ke p = dereference_key_locked(key); if (!p) return -EINVAL; - if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) - return 2 * p->blob_len; - ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - bufp = ascii_buf; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { + kzfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; } - kzfree(ascii_buf); return 2 * p->blob_len; }