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From: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia@oracle.com>
To: Dan Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Cc: dledford@redhat.com, jgg@mellanox.com,
	linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	ddutile@redhat.com, stable@vger.kernel.org, leon@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH rdma-rc v3] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 09:08:22 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171129070821.GA4237@yuvallap> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1511906481-92114-1-git-send-email-danielj@mellanox.com>

On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 12:01:21AM +0200, Dan Jurgens wrote:
> From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> 
> For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is
> specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types.
> This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because
> querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL.
> 
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
> Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
> Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
> Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
> ---
> Changelog:
> v2->v3: Fix build warning
> v1->v2: Fixed build errors
> v0->v1: Added proper SElinux patch
> ---
>  drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> index 209d057..5bc323f 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
> @@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
>  
>  int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev)
>  {
> +	u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev);
> +	bool is_ib = false;
>  	int ret;
>  
> +	while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib)
> +		is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++);
> +
> +	/* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */
> +	if (!is_ib)
> +		return 0;
> +
>  	qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (!qp->qp_sec)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev)
>  
>  void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
>  {
> +	/* Return if not IB */
> +	if (!sec)
> +		return;
> +

If we do the check here then suggesting to remove it from ib_destroy_qp.

>  	mutex_lock(&sec->mutex);
>  
>  	/* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to
> @@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
>  	int ret;
>  	int i;
>  
> +	/* Return if not IB */
> +	if (!sec)
> +		return;
> +
>  	/* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this
>  	 * QP security could be marked for an error state
>  	 * transition.  Wait for this to complete.
> @@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec)
>  {
>  	int i;
>  
> +	/* Return if not IB */
> +	if (!sec)
> +		return;
> +

Ditto.

>  	/* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must
>  	 * wait until this QP security structure is processed
>  	 * in the QP to error flow before destroying it because
> @@ -557,7 +578,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
>  {
>  	int ret = 0;
>  	struct ib_ports_pkeys *tmp_pps;
> -	struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps;
> +	struct ib_ports_pkeys *new_pps = NULL;
>  	struct ib_qp *real_qp = qp->real_qp;
>  	bool special_qp = (real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI ||
>  			   real_qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_GSI ||
> @@ -565,17 +586,25 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
>  	bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) ||
>  			   (qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH));
>  
> +	WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT &&
> +		   rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) &&
> +		   !real_qp->qp_sec),
> +		   "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n",
> +		   __func__, real_qp->qp_num);
> +
>  	/* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open
>  	 * handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When
>  	 * enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be
>  	 * checked as well.
>  	 */
>  
> -	if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
> +	if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {
>  		mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex);
>  		new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp,
>  				      qp_attr,
>  				      qp_attr_mask);
> +		if (!new_pps)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
>  
>  		/* Add this QP to the lists for the new port
>  		 * and pkey settings before checking for permission
> @@ -600,7 +629,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp,
>  						 qp_attr_mask,
>  						 udata);
>  
> -	if (pps_change && !special_qp) {
> +	if (new_pps) {
>  		/* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
>  		 * ports_pkeys structure.
>  		 */
> @@ -630,6 +659,9 @@ static int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev,
>  	u16 pkey;
>  	int ret;
>  
> +	if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num))
> +		return 0;
> +
>  	ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
> @@ -663,6 +695,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>  {
>  	int ret;
>  
> +	if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
> +		return 0;
> +
>  	ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
> @@ -688,6 +723,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,
>  
>  void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
>  {
> +	if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))
> +		return;
> +
>  	security_ib_free_security(agent->security);
>  	if (agent->lsm_nb_reg)
>  		unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);
> @@ -695,6 +733,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)
>  
>  int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index)
>  {
> +	if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
> +		return 0;
> +
>  	if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
>  		return -EACCES;
>  
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1
> 
> --
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  reply	other threads:[~2017-11-29  7:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-11-28 22:01 [PATCH rdma-rc v3] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand Dan Jurgens
2017-11-29  7:08 ` Yuval Shaia [this message]
2017-11-29 13:49   ` Daniel Jurgens

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