From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:33978 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753581AbeAVIx3 (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Jan 2018 03:53:29 -0500 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Salah Coronya , Milan Broz , Mike Snitzer Subject: [PATCH 4.14 73/89] dm crypt: fix crash by adding missing check for auth key size Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 09:45:53 +0100 Message-Id: <20180122084001.738154663@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20180122083954.683903493@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180122083954.683903493@linuxfoundation.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Milan Broz commit 27c7003697fc2c78f965984aa224ef26cd6b2949 upstream. If dm-crypt uses authenticated mode with separate MAC, there are two concatenated part of the key structure - key(s) for encryption and authentication key. Add a missing check for authenticated key length. If this key length is smaller than actually provided key, dm-crypt now properly fails instead of crashing. Fixes: ef43aa3806 ("dm crypt: add cryptographic data integrity protection (authenticated encryption)") Reported-by: Salah Coronya Signed-off-by: Milan Broz Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c @@ -1954,10 +1954,15 @@ static int crypt_setkey(struct crypt_con /* Ignore extra keys (which are used for IV etc) */ subkey_size = crypt_subkey_size(cc); - if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) + if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) { + if (subkey_size < cc->key_mac_size) + return -EINVAL; + crypt_copy_authenckey(cc->authenc_key, cc->key, subkey_size - cc->key_mac_size, cc->key_mac_size); + } + for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) { if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) r = crypto_aead_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[i],