From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 62/64] KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 10:23:21 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180205182141.124780894@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180205182138.571333346@linuxfoundation.org>
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de
commit b2ac58f90540e39324e7a29a7ad471407ae0bf48
[ Based on a patch from Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> ]
... basically doing exactly what we do for VMX:
- Passthrough SPEC_CTRL to guests (if enabled in guest CPUID)
- Save and restore SPEC_CTRL around VMExit and VMEntry only if the guest
actually used it.
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517669783-20732-1-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 88 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
u64 gs_base;
} host;
+ u64 spec_ctrl;
+
u32 *msrpm;
ulong nmi_iret_rip;
@@ -249,6 +251,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_ms
{ .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true },
{ .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
#endif
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
@@ -882,6 +885,25 @@ static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 inde
return false;
}
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr)
+{
+ u8 bit_write;
+ unsigned long tmp;
+ u32 offset;
+ u32 *msrpm;
+
+ msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm:
+ to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm;
+
+ offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
+ bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
+ tmp = msrpm[offset];
+
+ BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
+
+ return !!test_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
+}
+
static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr,
int read, int write)
{
@@ -1587,6 +1609,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vc
u32 dummy;
u32 eax = 1;
+ svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
+
if (!init_event) {
svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
@@ -3591,6 +3615,13 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
case MSR_VM_CR:
msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ return 1;
+
+ msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
break;
@@ -3682,6 +3713,33 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
+ if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
+ return 1;
+
+ svm->spec_ctrl = data;
+
+ if (!data)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * For non-nested:
+ * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+ * it through.
+ *
+ * For nested:
+ * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+ * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm.
+ * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up
+ * touching the MSR anyway now.
+ */
+ set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
if (!msr->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
@@ -4950,6 +5008,15 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
local_irq_enable();
+ /*
+ * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+ * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+ * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+ * being speculatively taken.
+ */
+ if (svm->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+
asm volatile (
"push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
"mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
@@ -5042,6 +5109,27 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
#endif
);
+ /*
+ * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
+ * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
+ * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
+ * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
+ *
+ * For non-nested case:
+ * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ *
+ * For nested case:
+ * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ */
+ if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+
+ if (svm->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
vmexit_fill_RSB();
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-05 18:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-05 18:22 [PATCH 4.14 00/64] 4.14.18-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/64] scripts/faddr2line: fix CROSS_COMPILE unset error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/64] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_meltdown() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/64] powerpc/64s: Allow control of RFI flush via debugfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/64] x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/64] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/64] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/64] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/64] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/64] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/64] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/64] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/64] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/64] x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/64] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/64] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/64] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/64] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/64] x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/64] auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/64] iio: adc/accel: Fix up module licenses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/64] pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/64] ASoC: pcm512x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/64] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/64] objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/64] objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/64] objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/64] x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/64] x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/64] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/64] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/64] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/64] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/64] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/64] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/64] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/64] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/64] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/64] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/64] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/64] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/64] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/64] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/64] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 48/64] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 49/64] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 51/64] x86/paravirt: Remove noreplace-paravirt cmdline option Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 52/64] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 53/64] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 54/64] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 55/64] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 56/64] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 57/64] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 59/64] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 60/64] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 61/64] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 63/64] serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 64/64] fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 22:13 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/64] 4.14.18-stable review Shuah Khan
2018-02-05 23:55 ` Dan Rue
2018-02-06 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
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