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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 4.15 38/60] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
Date: Mon,  5 Feb 2018 10:23:11 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180205182215.530222682@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org>

4.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com

commit 304ec1b050310548db33063e567123fae8fd0301

Quoting Linus:

    I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
    the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
    agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
    because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
    but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
    that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
    space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
    accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.

__uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the
limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases
a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h    |    6 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |    6 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |   12 ++++++------
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c        |    4 ++--
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ do {									\
 ({									\
 	int __gu_err;							\
 	__inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val;					\
-	__uaccess_begin();						\
+	__uaccess_begin_nospec();					\
 	__get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT);	\
 	__uaccess_end();						\
 	(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val;			\
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long bu
  *	get_user_ex(...);
  * } get_user_catch(err)
  */
-#define get_user_try		uaccess_try
+#define get_user_try		uaccess_try_nospec
 #define get_user_catch(err)	uaccess_catch(err)
 
 #define get_user_ex(x, ptr)	do {					\
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void)
 	__typeof__(ptr) __uval = (uval);				\
 	__typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old);				\
 	__typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new);				\
-	__uaccess_begin();						\
+	__uaccess_begin_nospec();					\
 	switch (size) {							\
 	case 1:								\
 	{								\
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -29,21 +29,21 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void
 		switch (n) {
 		case 1:
 			ret = 0;
-			__uaccess_begin();
+			__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 			__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)to, from, ret,
 					      "b", "b", "=q", 1);
 			__uaccess_end();
 			return ret;
 		case 2:
 			ret = 0;
-			__uaccess_begin();
+			__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 			__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)to, from, ret,
 					      "w", "w", "=r", 2);
 			__uaccess_end();
 			return ret;
 		case 4:
 			ret = 0;
-			__uaccess_begin();
+			__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 			__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)to, from, ret,
 					      "l", "k", "=r", 4);
 			__uaccess_end();
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -55,31 +55,31 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void
 		return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
 	switch (size) {
 	case 1:
-		__uaccess_begin();
+		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src,
 			      ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 2:
-		__uaccess_begin();
+		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src,
 			      ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 4:
-		__uaccess_begin();
+		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src,
 			      ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 8:
-		__uaccess_begin();
+		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
 			      ret, "q", "", "=r", 8);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 10:
-		__uaccess_begin();
+		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
 			       ret, "q", "", "=r", 10);
 		if (likely(!ret))
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 16:
-		__uaccess_begin();
+		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
 			       ret, "q", "", "=r", 16);
 		if (likely(!ret))
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ do {									\
 
 unsigned long __copy_user_ll(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-	__uaccess_begin();
+	__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 	if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n))
 		__copy_user(to, from, n);
 	else
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll);
 unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from,
 					unsigned long n)
 {
-	__uaccess_begin();
+	__uaccess_begin_nospec();
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
 	if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
 		n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-02-05 18:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-05 18:22 [PATCH 4.15 00/60] 4.15.2-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 01/60] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 02/60] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 03/60] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 04/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 05/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 06/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 07/60] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 08/60] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 09/60] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 10/60] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 11/60] x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 12/60] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 13/60] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 15/60] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 16/60] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 17/60] x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 18/60] auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 19/60] iio: adc/accel: Fix up module licenses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 20/60] pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 21/60] ASoC: pcm512x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 23/60] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 24/60] objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 25/60] objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.15 26/60] objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 27/60] x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 28/60] x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 29/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 30/60] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 31/60] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 32/60] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 33/60] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 34/60] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 35/60] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 36/60] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 37/60] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 39/60] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 40/60] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 41/60] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 42/60] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 44/60] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 45/60] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 47/60] x86/paravirt: Remove noreplace-paravirt cmdline option Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 48/60] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 49/60] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 50/60] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 51/60] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 52/60] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 53/60] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 55/60] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 56/60] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 57/60] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 58/60] KVM/SVM: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 59/60] serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 60/60] fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 22:14 ` [PATCH 4.15 00/60] 4.15.2-stable review Shuah Khan
2018-02-06 10:33   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 23:58 ` Dan Rue
2018-02-06 10:33   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-06 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-06 14:32 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-06 17:00   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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