From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, jeyu@kernel.org,
arjan@linux.intel.com, David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 38/92] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2018 14:39:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180209133933.910708237@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180209133931.211869118@linuxfoundation.org>
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit caf7501a1b4ec964190f31f9c3f163de252273b8)
There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes
vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the
right compiler or the right option.
To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info
string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with
retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source
or prebuilt object files are not checked.
If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at
load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: jeyu@kernel.org
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/module.h | 9 +++++++++
kernel/module.c | 11 +++++++++++
scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 +++++++++
4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -92,6 +93,19 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[]
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
+ return true;
+
+ pr_err("System may be vunerable to spectre v2\n");
+ spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
{
@@ -277,6 +291,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "");
}
#endif
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -791,6 +791,15 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(c
static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline);
+#else
+static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module)
{
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2817,6 +2817,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struc
}
#endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */
+static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
+{
+ if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline")))
+ return;
+
+ pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n",
+ mod->name);
+}
+
/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
struct load_info *info)
@@ -2969,6 +2978,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
+ check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info);
+
if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) {
add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality "
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -2130,6 +2130,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffe
buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n");
}
+/* Cannot check for assembler */
+static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b)
+{
+ buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n");
+ buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n");
+ buf_printf(b, "#endif\n");
+}
+
static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name)
{
static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging";
@@ -2474,6 +2482,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
add_header(&buf, mod);
add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module);
+ add_retpoline(&buf);
add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name);
err |= add_versions(&buf, mod);
add_depends(&buf, mod, modules);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-09 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 113+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-09 13:38 [PATCH 4.9 00/92] 4.9.81-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/92] powerpc/pseries: Add H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags & wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/92] powerpc/64: Add macros for annotating the destination of rfid/hrfid Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/92] powerpc/64: Convert fast_exception_return to use RFI_TO_USER/KERNEL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/92] powerpc/64: Convert the syscall exit path " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/92] powerpc/64s: Convert slb_miss_common " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/92] powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/92] powerpc/64s: Support disabling RFI flush with no_rfi_flush and nopti Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/92] powerpc/pseries: Query hypervisor for RFI flush settings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/92] powerpc/powernv: Check device-tree " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/92] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_meltdown() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/92] powerpc/64s: Allow control of RFI flush via debugfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/92] auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/92] pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/92] ASoC: pcm512x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/92] x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/92] kaiser: allocate pgd with order 0 when pti=off Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/92] serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/92] ip6mr: fix stale iterator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/92] net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/92] qlcnic: fix deadlock bug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/92] r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/92] tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/92] vhost_net: stop device during reset owner Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/92] tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/92] cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/92] ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/92] x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/92] x86/microcode/AMD: Do not load when running on a hypervisor Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/92] media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/92] b43: Add missing MODULE_FIRMWARE() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/92] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/92] x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/92] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/92] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 39/92] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 40/92] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 41/92] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 42/92] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 43/92] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-13 13:34 ` Nick Lowe
2018-02-13 15:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-13 15:09 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-02-13 15:27 ` Nick Lowe
2018-02-13 16:32 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-16 13:15 ` Nick Lowe
2018-02-16 16:56 ` Nick Lowe
2018-02-13 15:56 ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-13 16:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-13 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-13 16:18 ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 44/92] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 45/92] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 46/92] x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 22:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-10 7:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-10 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-10 19:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-13 9:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 47/92] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 48/92] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 50/92] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 51/92] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 52/92] x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 53/92] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 54/92] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 55/92] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 56/92] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 57/92] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 58/92] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 59/92] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 60/92] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 61/92] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 62/92] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 63/92] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 64/92] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 65/92] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 66/92] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 67/92] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 68/92] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 69/92] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 70/92] x86/paravirt: Remove noreplace-paravirt cmdline option Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 71/92] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 72/92] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 73/92] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 74/92] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 75/92] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 76/92] KVM: nVMX: kmap() cant fail Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 77/92] KVM: nVMX: vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 80/92] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 81/92] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 82/92] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 83/92] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 84/92] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 85/92] KVM/SVM: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 87/92] ASoC: simple-card: Fix misleading error message Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 88/92] ASoC: rsnd: dont call free_irq() on Parent SSI Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 89/92] ASoC: rsnd: avoid duplicate free_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 90/92] drm: rcar-du: Use the VBK interrupt for vblank events Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 91/92] drm: rcar-du: Fix race condition when disabling planes at CRTC stop Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 92/92] x86/microcode: Do the family check first Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 20:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/92] 4.9.81-stable review Shuah Khan
2018-02-09 21:32 ` Dan Rue
2018-02-10 15:46 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-13 9:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-13 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-13 15:29 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-17 13:31 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-02-17 13:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-17 17:35 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-18 17:25 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-02-20 10:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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