From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 85/92] KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2018 14:39:54 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180209133937.264485880@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180209133931.211869118@linuxfoundation.org>
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
(cherry picked from commit b2ac58f90540e39324e7a29a7ad471407ae0bf48)
[ Based on a patch from Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> ]
... basically doing exactly what we do for VMX:
- Passthrough SPEC_CTRL to guests (if enabled in guest CPUID)
- Save and restore SPEC_CTRL around VMExit and VMEntry only if the guest
actually used it.
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517669783-20732-1-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 88 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
u64 gs_base;
} host;
+ u64 spec_ctrl;
+
u32 *msrpm;
ulong nmi_iret_rip;
@@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_ms
{ .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true },
{ .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
#endif
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
@@ -863,6 +866,25 @@ static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 inde
return false;
}
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned msr)
+{
+ u8 bit_write;
+ unsigned long tmp;
+ u32 offset;
+ u32 *msrpm;
+
+ msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm:
+ to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm;
+
+ offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
+ bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
+ tmp = msrpm[offset];
+
+ BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
+
+ return !!test_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
+}
+
static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr,
int read, int write)
{
@@ -1537,6 +1559,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vc
u32 dummy;
u32 eax = 1;
+ svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
+
if (!init_event) {
svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
@@ -3520,6 +3544,13 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
case MSR_VM_CR:
msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
break;
@@ -3611,6 +3642,33 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
+ if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
+ return 1;
+
+ svm->spec_ctrl = data;
+
+ if (!data)
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * For non-nested:
+ * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+ * it through.
+ *
+ * For nested:
+ * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+ * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm.
+ * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up
+ * touching the MSR anyway now.
+ */
+ set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
if (!msr->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(vcpu))
@@ -4854,6 +4912,15 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
local_irq_enable();
+ /*
+ * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+ * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+ * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+ * being speculatively taken.
+ */
+ if (svm->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+
asm volatile (
"push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
"mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
@@ -4946,6 +5013,27 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
#endif
);
+ /*
+ * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
+ * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
+ * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
+ * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
+ * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
+ *
+ * For non-nested case:
+ * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ *
+ * For nested case:
+ * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+ * save it.
+ */
+ if (!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+
+ if (svm->spec_ctrl)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+
/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
vmexit_fill_RSB();
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-09 13:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 113+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-09 13:38 [PATCH 4.9 00/92] 4.9.81-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/92] powerpc/pseries: Add H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags & wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/92] powerpc/64: Add macros for annotating the destination of rfid/hrfid Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/92] powerpc/64: Convert fast_exception_return to use RFI_TO_USER/KERNEL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/92] powerpc/64: Convert the syscall exit path " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/92] powerpc/64s: Convert slb_miss_common " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/92] powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/92] powerpc/64s: Support disabling RFI flush with no_rfi_flush and nopti Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/92] powerpc/pseries: Query hypervisor for RFI flush settings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/92] powerpc/powernv: Check device-tree " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/92] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_meltdown() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/92] powerpc/64s: Allow control of RFI flush via debugfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/92] auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/92] pinctrl: pxa: pxa2xx: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/92] ASoC: pcm512x: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/92] x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/92] kaiser: allocate pgd with order 0 when pti=off Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/92] serial: core: mark port as initialized after successful IRQ change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/92] ip6mr: fix stale iterator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/92] net: igmp: add a missing rcu locking section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/92] qlcnic: fix deadlock bug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/92] r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/92] tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/92] vhost_net: stop device during reset owner Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/92] tcp_bbr: fix pacing_gain to always be unity when using lt_bw Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/92] cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/92] ipv6: Fix SO_REUSEPORT UDP socket with implicit sk_ipv6only Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/92] x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/92] x86/microcode/AMD: Do not load when running on a hypervisor Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/92] media: soc_camera: soc_scale_crop: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/92] b43: Add missing MODULE_FIRMWARE() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/92] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/92] x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/92] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/92] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/92] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 39/92] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 40/92] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 41/92] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 42/92] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 43/92] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-13 13:34 ` Nick Lowe
2018-02-13 15:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-13 15:09 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-02-13 15:27 ` Nick Lowe
2018-02-13 16:32 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-16 13:15 ` Nick Lowe
2018-02-16 16:56 ` Nick Lowe
2018-02-13 15:56 ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-13 16:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-13 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-13 16:18 ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 44/92] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 45/92] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 46/92] x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 22:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-10 7:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-10 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-10 19:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-13 9:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 47/92] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 48/92] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 50/92] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 51/92] x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 52/92] x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 53/92] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 54/92] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 55/92] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 56/92] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 57/92] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 58/92] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 59/92] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 60/92] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 61/92] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 62/92] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 63/92] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 64/92] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 65/92] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 66/92] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 67/92] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 68/92] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 69/92] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 70/92] x86/paravirt: Remove noreplace-paravirt cmdline option Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 71/92] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 72/92] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 73/92] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 74/92] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 75/92] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 76/92] KVM: nVMX: kmap() cant fail Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 77/92] KVM: nVMX: vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 80/92] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 81/92] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 82/92] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 83/92] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 84/92] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 87/92] ASoC: simple-card: Fix misleading error message Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 88/92] ASoC: rsnd: dont call free_irq() on Parent SSI Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 89/92] ASoC: rsnd: avoid duplicate free_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 90/92] drm: rcar-du: Use the VBK interrupt for vblank events Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 91/92] drm: rcar-du: Fix race condition when disabling planes at CRTC stop Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 13:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 92/92] x86/microcode: Do the family check first Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-09 20:18 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/92] 4.9.81-stable review Shuah Khan
2018-02-09 21:32 ` Dan Rue
2018-02-10 15:46 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-13 9:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-13 14:30 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-13 15:29 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-17 13:31 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-02-17 13:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-17 17:35 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-02-18 17:25 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2018-02-20 10:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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