From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/19] s390 spectre mititgation for 4.14
Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2018 12:09:49 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180427100949.GA14739@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180427053643.56777-1-schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
On Fri, Apr 27, 2018 at 07:36:24AM +0200, Martin Schwidefsky wrote:
> Greetings,
>
> this series is the backport of 19 upstream patches to add the
> current s390 spectre mitigation to kernel version 4.14.
>
> It follows the x86 approach with array_index_nospec for the v1
> spectre attack and retpoline/expoline for v2. As a fallback
> there is the ppa-12/ppa-13 based defense which requires an
> micro-code update.
>
All now applied, thanks!
greg k-h
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-27 10:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-27 5:36 [PATCH 00/19] s390 spectre mititgation for 4.14 Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 01/19] s390: introduce CPU alternatives Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 02/19] s390: enable CPU alternatives unconditionally Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 03/19] KVM: s390: wire up bpb feature Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 04/19] s390: scrub registers on kernel entry and KVM exit Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 05/19] s390: add optimized array_index_mask_nospec Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 06/19] s390/alternative: use a copy of the facility bit mask Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 07/19] s390: add options to change branch prediction behaviour for the kernel Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 08/19] s390: run user space and KVM guests with modified branch prediction Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 09/19] s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 10/19] KVM: s390: force bp isolation for VSIE Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 11/19] s390: Replace IS_ENABLED(EXPOLINE_*) with IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXPOLINE_*) Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 12/19] s390: do not bypass BPENTER for interrupt system calls Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 13/19] s390/entry.S: fix spurious zeroing of r0 Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 14/19] s390: move nobp parameter functions to nospec-branch.c Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 15/19] s390: add automatic detection of the spectre defense Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 16/19] s390: report spectre mitigation via syslog Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 17/19] s390: add sysfs attributes for spectre Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 18/19] s390: correct nospec auto detection init order Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 5:36 ` [PATCH 19/19] s390: correct module section names for expoline code revert Martin Schwidefsky
2018-04-27 10:09 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
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