[PATCH 4.14 00/45] 4.14.42-stable review

[PATCH 4.14 00/45] 4.14.42-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.42 release.
There are 45 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun May 20 08:15:14 UTC 2018.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.42-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.14.42-rc1

Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
    proc: do not access cmdline nor environ from file-backed areas

James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
    l2tp: revert "l2tp: fix missing print session offset info"

Antony Antony <antony@phenome.org>
    xfrm: fix xfrm_do_migrate() with AEAD e.g(AES-GCM)

ethanwu <ethanwu@synology.com>
    btrfs: Take trans lock before access running trans in check_delayed_ref

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    xfrm: Use __skb_queue_tail in xfrm_trans_queue

Dave Carroll <david.carroll@microsemi.com>
    scsi: aacraid: Correct hba_send to include iu_type

Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
    udp: fix SO_BINDTODEVICE

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    nsh: fix infinite loop

Jianbo Liu <jianbol@mellanox.com>
    net/mlx5e: Allow offloading ipv4 header re-write for icmp

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ipv6: fix uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys()

Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
    hv_netvsc: set master device

Talat Batheesh <talatb@mellanox.com>
    net/mlx5: Avoid cleaning flow steering table twice during error flow

Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
    net/mlx5e: TX, Use correct counter in dma_map error flow

Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
    net: sched: fix error path in tcf_proto_create() when modules are not configured

Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
    bonding: send learning packets for vlans on slave

Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
    bonding: do not allow rlb updates to invalid mac

Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
    tg3: Fix vunmap() BUG_ON() triggered from tg3_free_consistent().

Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
    tcp: ignore Fast Open on repair mode

Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
    tcp_bbr: fix to zero idle_restart only upon S/ACKed data

Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
    sctp: use the old asoc when making the cookie-ack chunk in dupcook_d

Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
    sctp: remove sctp_chunk_put from fail_mark err path in sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg

Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
    sctp: handle two v4 addrs comparison in sctp_inet6_cmp_addr

Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
    sctp: fix the issue that the cookie-ack with auth can't get processed

Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
    sctp: delay the authentication for the duplicated cookie-echo chunk

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    rds: do not leak kernel memory to user land

Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
    r8169: fix powering up RTL8168h

Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
    qmi_wwan: do not steal interfaces from class drivers

Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
    openvswitch: Don't swap table in nlattr_set() after OVS_ATTR_NESTED is found

Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>
    net/tls: Fix connection stall on partial tls record

Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
    net/tls: Don't recursively call push_record during tls_write_space callbacks

Lance Richardson <lance.richardson.net@gmail.com>
    net: support compat 64-bit time in {s,g}etsockopt

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net_sched: fq: take care of throttled flows before reuse

Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
    net sched actions: fix refcnt leak in skbmod

Adi Nissim <adin@mellanox.com>
    net/mlx5: E-Switch, Include VF RDMA stats in vport statistics

Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
    net/mlx5e: Err if asked to offload TC match on frag being first

Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com>
    net/mlx4_en: Verify coalescing parameters are in range

Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
    net/mlx4_en: Fix an error handling path in 'mlx4_en_init_netdev()'

Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
    net: ethernet: ti: cpsw: fix packet leaking in dual_mac mode

Rob Taglang <rob@taglang.io>
    net: ethernet: sun: niu set correct packet size in skb

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    llc: better deal with too small mtu

Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
    ipv4: fix memory leaks in udp_sendmsg, ping_v4_sendmsg

Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
    ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    dccp: fix tasklet usage

Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
    bridge: check iface upper dev when setting master via ioctl

Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
    8139too: Use disable_irq_nosync() in rtl8139_poll_controller()


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                          |   4 +-
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c                    |  15 +--
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c                   |   2 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c               |   9 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c   |  16 +++
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c    |   8 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mlx4_en.h      |   7 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c   |   7 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c   |  20 ++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c |  11 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c |  23 +++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139too.c            |   2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c              |   3 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c                    |   5 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c                    |   2 +
 drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c                   |   3 +-
 drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c                        |  12 +++
 drivers/scsi/aacraid/commsup.c                    |   8 +-
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c                            |   7 ++
 fs/proc/base.c                                    |   8 +-
 include/linux/mm.h                                |   1 +
 include/net/bonding.h                             |   1 +
 include/net/tls.h                                 |   1 +
 mm/gup.c                                          |   3 +
 net/bridge/br_if.c                                |   4 +-
 net/compat.c                                      |   6 +-
 net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c                            |  14 ++-
 net/dccp/timer.c                                  |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/ping.c                                   |   7 +-
 net/ipv4/route.c                                  | 118 ++++++++++------------
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                                    |   3 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c                                |   4 +-
 net/ipv4/udp.c                                    |  11 +-
 net/ipv6/route.c                                  |   7 +-
 net/ipv6/udp.c                                    |   4 +-
 net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c                           |   2 -
 net/llc/af_llc.c                                  |   3 +
 net/nsh/nsh.c                                     |   2 +
 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c                    |   9 +-
 net/rds/recv.c                                    |   1 +
 net/sched/act_skbmod.c                            |   5 +-
 net/sched/cls_api.c                               |   2 +-
 net/sched/sch_fq.c                                |  37 ++++---
 net/sctp/associola.c                              |  30 +++++-
 net/sctp/inqueue.c                                |   2 +-
 net/sctp/ipv6.c                                   |   3 +
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c                           |  88 ++++++++--------
 net/sctp/ulpevent.c                               |   1 -
 net/tls/tls_main.c                                |   8 ++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c                             |   2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c                             |   1 +
 51 files changed, 349 insertions(+), 205 deletions(-)

[PATCH 4.14 01/45] 8139too: Use disable_irq_nosync() in rtl8139_poll_controller()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

[ Upstream commit af3e0fcf78879f718c5f73df0814951bd7057d34 ]

Use disable_irq_nosync() instead of disable_irq() as this might be
called in atomic context with netpoll.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139too.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139too.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139too.c
@@ -2224,7 +2224,7 @@ static void rtl8139_poll_controller(stru
 	struct rtl8139_private *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
 	const int irq = tp->pci_dev->irq;
 
-	disable_irq(irq);
+	disable_irq_nosync(irq);
 	rtl8139_interrupt(irq, dev);
 	enable_irq(irq);
 }

[PATCH 4.14 02/45] bridge: check iface upper dev when setting master via ioctl

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit e8238fc2bd7b4c3c7554fa2df067e796610212fc ]

When we set a bond slave's master to bridge via ioctl, we only check
the IFF_BRIDGE_PORT flag. Although we will find the slave's real master
at netdev_master_upper_dev_link() later, it already does some settings
and allocates some resources. It would be better to return as early
as possible.

v1 -> v2:
use netdev_master_upper_dev_get() instead of netdev_has_any_upper_dev()
to check if we have a master, because not all upper devs are masters,
e.g. vlan device.

Reported-by: syzbot+de73361ee4971b6e6f75@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/bridge/br_if.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bridge/br_if.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_if.c
@@ -503,8 +503,8 @@ int br_add_if(struct net_bridge *br, str
 	if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_start_xmit == br_dev_xmit)
 		return -ELOOP;
 
-	/* Device is already being bridged */
-	if (br_port_exists(dev))
+	/* Device has master upper dev */
+	if (netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev))
 		return -EBUSY;
 
 	/* No bridging devices that dislike that (e.g. wireless) */

[PATCH 4.14 03/45] dccp: fix tasklet usage

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit a8d7aa17bbc970971ccdf71988ea19230ab368b1 ]

syzbot reported a crash in tasklet_action_common() caused by dccp.

dccp needs to make sure socket wont disappear before tasklet handler
has completed.

This patch takes a reference on the socket when arming the tasklet,
and moves the sock_put() from dccp_write_xmit_timer() to dccp_write_xmitlet()

kernel BUG at kernel/softirq.c:514!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 17 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #30
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:tasklet_action_common.isra.19+0x6db/0x700 kernel/softirq.c:515
RSP: 0018:ffff8801d9b3faf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
RAX: 1ffff1003b367f6b RBX: ffff8801daf1f3f0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8801cf895498 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff8801d9b3fc40 R08: ffffed0039f12a95 R09: ffffed0039f12a94
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
R10: ffffed0039f12a94 R11: ffff8801cf8954a3 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8801d9b3fc18 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801cf895490
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2bc28000 CR3: 00000001a08a9000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 tasklet_action+0x1d/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:533
 __do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
 run_ksoftirqd+0x86/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:646
 smpboot_thread_fn+0x417/0x870 kernel/smpboot.c:164
 kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:238
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412
Code: 48 8b 85 e8 fe ff ff 48 8b 95 f0 fe ff ff e9 94 fb ff ff 48 89 95 f0 fe ff ff e8 81 53 6e 00 48 8b 95 f0 fe ff ff e9 62 fb ff ff <0f> 0b 48 89 cf 48 89 8d e8 fe ff ff e8 64 53 6e 00 48 8b 8d e8
RIP: tasklet_action_common.isra.19+0x6db/0x700 kernel/softirq.c:515 RSP: ffff8801d9b3faf8

Fixes: dc841e30eaea ("dccp: Extend CCID packet dequeueing interface")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Cc: dccp@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 net/dccp/timer.c       |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c
@@ -126,6 +126,16 @@ static void ccid2_change_l_seq_window(st
 						  DCCPF_SEQ_WMAX));
 }
 
+static void dccp_tasklet_schedule(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct tasklet_struct *t = &dccp_sk(sk)->dccps_xmitlet;
+
+	if (!test_and_set_bit(TASKLET_STATE_SCHED, &t->state)) {
+		sock_hold(sk);
+		__tasklet_schedule(t);
+	}
+}
+
 static void ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire(unsigned long data)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = (struct sock *)data;
@@ -166,7 +176,7 @@ static void ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire(unsig
 
 	/* if we were blocked before, we may now send cwnd=1 packet */
 	if (sender_was_blocked)
-		tasklet_schedule(&dccp_sk(sk)->dccps_xmitlet);
+		dccp_tasklet_schedule(sk);
 	/* restart backed-off timer */
 	sk_reset_timer(sk, &hc->tx_rtotimer, jiffies + hc->tx_rto);
 out:
@@ -706,7 +716,7 @@ static void ccid2_hc_tx_packet_recv(stru
 done:
 	/* check if incoming Acks allow pending packets to be sent */
 	if (sender_was_blocked && !ccid2_cwnd_network_limited(hc))
-		tasklet_schedule(&dccp_sk(sk)->dccps_xmitlet);
+		dccp_tasklet_schedule(sk);
 	dccp_ackvec_parsed_cleanup(&hc->tx_av_chunks);
 }
 
--- a/net/dccp/timer.c
+++ b/net/dccp/timer.c
@@ -230,12 +230,12 @@ static void dccp_write_xmitlet(unsigned
 	else
 		dccp_write_xmit(sk);
 	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+	sock_put(sk);
 }
 
 static void dccp_write_xmit_timer(unsigned long data)
 {
 	dccp_write_xmitlet(data);
-	sock_put((struct sock *)data);
 }
 
 void dccp_init_xmit_timers(struct sock *sk)

[PATCH 4.14 04/45] ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>

[ Upstream commit 94720e3aee6884d8c8beb678001629da60ec6366 ]

Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe:

1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception.
The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching
routes. Change that to:

1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help
from (2)

1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated
fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0
for unicast destinations.

2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0
to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe.
After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib
result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected
because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU
problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect
local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP)
to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has
64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will
keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change
fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached
local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and
with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+).

3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for
new entries

Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic")
Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif")
Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route")
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/route.c |  118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static void update_or_create_fnhe(struct
 		fnhe->fnhe_daddr = daddr;
 		fnhe->fnhe_gw = gw;
 		fnhe->fnhe_pmtu = pmtu;
-		fnhe->fnhe_expires = expires;
+		fnhe->fnhe_expires = max(1UL, expires);
 
 		/* Exception created; mark the cached routes for the nexthop
 		 * stale, so anyone caching it rechecks if this exception
@@ -1286,6 +1286,36 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_mtu(const struc
 	return mtu - lwtunnel_headroom(dst->lwtstate, mtu);
 }
 
+static void ip_del_fnhe(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr)
+{
+	struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash;
+	struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, __rcu **fnhe_p;
+	u32 hval = fnhe_hashfun(daddr);
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
+
+	hash = rcu_dereference_protected(nh->nh_exceptions,
+					 lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+	hash += hval;
+
+	fnhe_p = &hash->chain;
+	fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(*fnhe_p, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+	while (fnhe) {
+		if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
+			rcu_assign_pointer(*fnhe_p, rcu_dereference_protected(
+				fnhe->fnhe_next, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock)));
+			fnhe_flush_routes(fnhe);
+			kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu);
+			break;
+		}
+		fnhe_p = &fnhe->fnhe_next;
+		fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(fnhe->fnhe_next,
+						 lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
+}
+
 static struct fib_nh_exception *find_exception(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr)
 {
 	struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash = rcu_dereference(nh->nh_exceptions);
@@ -1299,8 +1329,14 @@ static struct fib_nh_exception *find_exc
 
 	for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(hash[hval].chain); fnhe;
 	     fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) {
-		if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr)
+		if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
+			if (fnhe->fnhe_expires &&
+			    time_after(jiffies, fnhe->fnhe_expires)) {
+				ip_del_fnhe(nh, daddr);
+				break;
+			}
 			return fnhe;
+		}
 	}
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -1620,36 +1656,6 @@ static void ip_handle_martian_source(str
 #endif
 }
 
-static void ip_del_fnhe(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr)
-{
-	struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash;
-	struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, __rcu **fnhe_p;
-	u32 hval = fnhe_hashfun(daddr);
-
-	spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
-
-	hash = rcu_dereference_protected(nh->nh_exceptions,
-					 lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
-	hash += hval;
-
-	fnhe_p = &hash->chain;
-	fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(*fnhe_p, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
-	while (fnhe) {
-		if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
-			rcu_assign_pointer(*fnhe_p, rcu_dereference_protected(
-				fnhe->fnhe_next, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock)));
-			fnhe_flush_routes(fnhe);
-			kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu);
-			break;
-		}
-		fnhe_p = &fnhe->fnhe_next;
-		fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(fnhe->fnhe_next,
-						 lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
-	}
-
-	spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
-}
-
 static void set_lwt_redirect(struct rtable *rth)
 {
 	if (lwtunnel_output_redirect(rth->dst.lwtstate)) {
@@ -1716,20 +1722,10 @@ static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buf
 
 	fnhe = find_exception(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
 	if (do_cache) {
-		if (fnhe) {
+		if (fnhe)
 			rth = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
-			if (rth && rth->dst.expires &&
-			    time_after(jiffies, rth->dst.expires)) {
-				ip_del_fnhe(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
-				fnhe = NULL;
-			} else {
-				goto rt_cache;
-			}
-		}
-
-		rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
-
-rt_cache:
+		else
+			rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
 		if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
 			skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
 			goto out;
@@ -2206,39 +2202,31 @@ static struct rtable *__mkroute_output(c
 		 * the loopback interface and the IP_PKTINFO ipi_ifindex will
 		 * be set to the loopback interface as well.
 		 */
-		fi = NULL;
+		do_cache = false;
 	}
 
 	fnhe = NULL;
 	do_cache &= fi != NULL;
-	if (do_cache) {
+	if (fi) {
 		struct rtable __rcu **prth;
 		struct fib_nh *nh = &FIB_RES_NH(*res);
 
 		fnhe = find_exception(nh, fl4->daddr);
+		if (!do_cache)
+			goto add;
 		if (fnhe) {
 			prth = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_output;
-			rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
-			if (rth && rth->dst.expires &&
-			    time_after(jiffies, rth->dst.expires)) {
-				ip_del_fnhe(nh, fl4->daddr);
-				fnhe = NULL;
-			} else {
-				goto rt_cache;
+		} else {
+			if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
+				     FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
+				     !(nh->nh_gw &&
+				       nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
+				do_cache = false;
+				goto add;
 			}
+			prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nh->nh_pcpu_rth_output);
 		}
-
-		if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
-			     FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
-			     !(nh->nh_gw &&
-			       nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
-			do_cache = false;
-			goto add;
-		}
-		prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nh->nh_pcpu_rth_output);
 		rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
-
-rt_cache:
 		if (rt_cache_valid(rth) && dst_hold_safe(&rth->dst))
 			return rth;
 	}

[PATCH 4.14 05/45] ipv4: fix memory leaks in udp_sendmsg, ping_v4_sendmsg

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>

[ Upstream commit 1b97013bfb11d66f041de691de6f0fec748ce016 ]

Fix more memory leaks in ip_cmsg_send() callers. Part of them were fixed
earlier in 919483096bfe.

* udp_sendmsg one was there since the beginning when linux sources were
  first added to git;
* ping_v4_sendmsg one was copy/pasted in c319b4d76b9e.

Whenever return happens in udp_sendmsg() or ping_v4_sendmsg() IP options
have to be freed if they were allocated previously.

Add label so that future callers (if any) can use it instead of kfree()
before return that is easy to forget.

Fixes: c319b4d76b9e (net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind)
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/ping.c |    7 +++++--
 net/ipv4/udp.c  |    7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -775,8 +775,10 @@ static int ping_v4_sendmsg(struct sock *
 	ipc.addr = faddr = daddr;
 
 	if (ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
-		if (!daddr)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!daddr) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_free;
+		}
 		faddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
 	}
 	tos = get_rttos(&ipc, inet);
@@ -842,6 +844,7 @@ back_from_confirm:
 
 out:
 	ip_rt_put(rt);
+out_free:
 	if (free)
 		kfree(ipc.opt);
 	if (!err) {
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -978,8 +978,10 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct
 	sock_tx_timestamp(sk, ipc.sockc.tsflags, &ipc.tx_flags);
 
 	if (ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
-		if (!daddr)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!daddr) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_free;
+		}
 		faddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
 		connected = 0;
 	}
@@ -1087,6 +1089,7 @@ do_append_data:
 
 out:
 	ip_rt_put(rt);
+out_free:
 	if (free)
 		kfree(ipc.opt);
 	if (!err)

[PATCH 4.14 06/45] llc: better deal with too small mtu

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 2c5d5b13c6eb79f5677e206b8aad59b3a2097f60 ]

syzbot loves to set very small mtu on devices, since it brings joy.
We must make llc_ui_sendmsg() fool proof.

usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to wrapped address (offset 0, size 18446612139802320068)!

kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:100!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 17464 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #36
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88
RSP: 0018:ffff8801868bf800 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 000000000000006c RBX: ffffffff87d2fb00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 000000000000006c RSI: ffffffff81610731 RDI: ffffed0030d17ef6
RBP: ffff8801868bf858 R08: ffff88018daa4200 R09: ffffed003b5c4fb0
R10: ffffed003b5c4fb0 R11: ffff8801dae27d87 R12: ffffffff87d2f8e0
R13: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R14: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R15: ffffffff87d2f7a0
FS:  00007f56a14ac700(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2bc21000 CR3: 00000001abeb1000 CR4: 00000000001426f0
DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000030602
Call Trace:
 check_bogus_address mm/usercopy.c:153 [inline]
 __check_object_size+0x5d9/0x5d9 mm/usercopy.c:256
 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:108 [inline]
 check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:139 [inline]
 copy_from_iter_full include/linux/uio.h:121 [inline]
 memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3305 [inline]
 llc_ui_sendmsg+0x4b1/0x1530 net/llc/af_llc.c:941
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x455979
RSP: 002b:00007f56a14abc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f56a14ac6d4 RCX: 0000000000455979
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 00000000200012c0 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000548 R14: 00000000006fbf60 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 55 c0 e8 c0 55 bb ff ff 75 c8 48 8b 55 c0 4d 89 f9 ff 75 d0 4d 89 e8 48 89 d9 4c 89 e6 41 56 48 c7 c7 80 fa d2 87 e8 a0 0b a3 ff <0f> 0b e8 95 55 bb ff e8 c0 a8 f7 ff 8b 95 14 ff ff ff 4d 89 e8
RIP: usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88 RSP: ffff8801868bf800

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/llc/af_llc.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/llc/af_llc.c
+++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c
@@ -930,6 +930,9 @@ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket
 	if (size > llc->dev->mtu)
 		size = llc->dev->mtu;
 	copied = size - hdrlen;
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (copied < 0)
+		goto release;
 	release_sock(sk);
 	skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size, noblock, &rc);
 	lock_sock(sk);

[PATCH 4.14 07/45] net: ethernet: sun: niu set correct packet size in skb

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rob Taglang <rob@taglang.io>

[ Upstream commit 14224923c3600bae2ac4dcae3bf0c3d4dc2812be ]

Currently, skb->len and skb->data_len are set to the page size, not
the packet size. This causes the frame check sequence to not be
located at the "end" of the packet resulting in ethernet frame check
errors. The driver does work currently, but stricter kernel facing
networking solutions like OpenVSwitch will drop these packets as
invalid.

These changes set the packet size correctly so that these errors no
longer occur. The length does not include the frame check sequence, so
that subtraction was removed.

Tested on Oracle/SUN Multithreaded 10-Gigabit Ethernet Network
Controller [108e:abcd] and validated in wireshark.

Signed-off-by: Rob Taglang <rob@taglang.io>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
@@ -3442,7 +3442,7 @@ static int niu_process_rx_pkt(struct nap
 
 		len = (val & RCR_ENTRY_L2_LEN) >>
 			RCR_ENTRY_L2_LEN_SHIFT;
-		len -= ETH_FCS_LEN;
+		append_size = len + ETH_HLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN;
 
 		addr = (val & RCR_ENTRY_PKT_BUF_ADDR) <<
 			RCR_ENTRY_PKT_BUF_ADDR_SHIFT;
@@ -3452,7 +3452,6 @@ static int niu_process_rx_pkt(struct nap
 					 RCR_ENTRY_PKTBUFSZ_SHIFT];
 
 		off = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
-		append_size = rcr_size;
 		if (num_rcr == 1) {
 			int ptype;
 
@@ -3465,7 +3464,7 @@ static int niu_process_rx_pkt(struct nap
 			else
 				skb_checksum_none_assert(skb);
 		} else if (!(val & RCR_ENTRY_MULTI))
-			append_size = len - skb->len;
+			append_size = append_size - skb->len;
 
 		niu_rx_skb_append(skb, page, off, append_size, rcr_size);
 		if ((page->index + rp->rbr_block_size) - rcr_size == addr) {

[PATCH 4.14 08/45] net: ethernet: ti: cpsw: fix packet leaking in dual_mac mode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>

[ Upstream commit 5e5add172ea81152d518b161ec5706503ad3d799 ]

In dual_mac mode packets arrived on one port should not be forwarded by
switch hw to another port. Only Linux Host can forward packets between
ports. The below test case (reported in [1]) shows that packet arrived on
one port can be leaked to anoter (reproducible with dual port evms):
 - connect port 1 (eth0) to linux Host 0 and run tcpdump or Wireshark
 - connect port 2 (eth1) to linux Host 1 with vlan 1 configured
 - ping <IPx> from Host 1 through vlan 1 interface.
ARP packets will be seen on Host 0.

Issue happens because dual_mac mode is implemnted using two vlans: 1 (Port
1+Port 0) and 2 (Port 2+Port 0), so there are vlan records created for for
each vlan. By default, the ALE will find valid vlan record in its table
when vlan 1 tagged packet arrived on Port 2 and so forwards packet to all
ports which are vlan 1 members (like Port.

To avoid such behaviorr the ALE VLAN ID Ingress Check need to be enabled
for each external CPSW port (ALE_PORTCTLn.VID_INGRESS_CHECK) so ALE will
drop ingress packets if Rx port is not VLAN member.

Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c
@@ -1260,6 +1260,8 @@ static inline void cpsw_add_dual_emac_de
 	cpsw_ale_add_ucast(cpsw->ale, priv->mac_addr,
 			   HOST_PORT_NUM, ALE_VLAN |
 			   ALE_SECURE, slave->port_vlan);
+	cpsw_ale_control_set(cpsw->ale, slave_port,
+			     ALE_PORT_DROP_UNKNOWN_VLAN, 1);
 }
 
 static void soft_reset_slave(struct cpsw_slave *slave)

[PATCH 4.14 09/45] net/mlx4_en: Fix an error handling path in mlx4_en_init_netdev()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>

[ Upstream commit a577d868b768a3baf16cdd4841ab8cfb165521d6 ]

If an error occurs, 'mlx4_en_destroy_netdev()' is called.
It then calls 'mlx4_en_free_resources()' which does the needed resources
cleanup.

So, doing some explicit kfree in the error handling path would lead to
some double kfree.

Simplify code to avoid such a case.

Fixes: 67f8b1dcb9ee ("net/mlx4_en: Refactor the XDP forwarding rings scheme")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c |    8 +-------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
@@ -3318,12 +3318,11 @@ int mlx4_en_init_netdev(struct mlx4_en_d
 					   MAX_TX_RINGS, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!priv->tx_ring[t]) {
 			err = -ENOMEM;
-			goto err_free_tx;
+			goto out;
 		}
 		priv->tx_cq[t] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mlx4_en_cq *) *
 					 MAX_TX_RINGS, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!priv->tx_cq[t]) {
-			kfree(priv->tx_ring[t]);
 			err = -ENOMEM;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -3576,11 +3575,6 @@ int mlx4_en_init_netdev(struct mlx4_en_d
 
 	return 0;
 
-err_free_tx:
-	while (t--) {
-		kfree(priv->tx_ring[t]);
-		kfree(priv->tx_cq[t]);
-	}
 out:
 	mlx4_en_destroy_netdev(dev);
 	return err;

[PATCH 4.14 10/45] net/mlx4_en: Verify coalescing parameters are in range

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit 6ad4e91c6d796b38a7f0e724db1de28eeb122bad ]

Add check of coalescing parameters received through ethtool are within
range of values supported by the HW.
Driver gets the coalescing rx/tx-usecs and rx/tx-frames as set by the
users through ethtool. The ethtool support up to 32 bit value for each.
However, mlx4 modify cq limits the coalescing time parameter and
coalescing frames parameters to 16 bits.
Return out of range error if user tries to set these parameters to
higher values.
Change type of sample-interval and adaptive_rx_coal parameters in mlx4
driver to u32 as the ethtool holds them as u32 and these parameters are
not limited due to mlx4 HW.

Fixes: c27a02cd94d6 ('mlx4_en: Add driver for Mellanox ConnectX 10GbE NIC')
Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mlx4_en.h    |    7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c
@@ -1013,6 +1013,22 @@ static int mlx4_en_set_coalesce(struct n
 	if (!coal->tx_max_coalesced_frames_irq)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (coal->tx_coalesce_usecs > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME ||
+	    coal->rx_coalesce_usecs > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME ||
+	    coal->rx_coalesce_usecs_low > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME ||
+	    coal->rx_coalesce_usecs_high > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME) {
+		netdev_info(dev, "%s: maximum coalesce time supported is %d usecs\n",
+			    __func__, MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME);
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
+
+	if (coal->tx_max_coalesced_frames > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_PKTS ||
+	    coal->rx_max_coalesced_frames > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_PKTS) {
+		netdev_info(dev, "%s: maximum coalesced frames supported is %d\n",
+			    __func__, MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_PKTS);
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
+
 	priv->rx_frames = (coal->rx_max_coalesced_frames ==
 			   MLX4_EN_AUTO_CONF) ?
 				MLX4_EN_RX_COAL_TARGET :
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mlx4_en.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mlx4_en.h
@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@
 #define MLX4_EN_TX_COAL_PKTS	16
 #define MLX4_EN_TX_COAL_TIME	0x10
 
+#define MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_PKTS	U16_MAX
+#define MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME	U16_MAX
+
 #define MLX4_EN_RX_RATE_LOW		400000
 #define MLX4_EN_RX_COAL_TIME_LOW	0
 #define MLX4_EN_RX_RATE_HIGH		450000
@@ -547,8 +550,8 @@ struct mlx4_en_priv {
 	u16 rx_usecs_low;
 	u32 pkt_rate_high;
 	u16 rx_usecs_high;
-	u16 sample_interval;
-	u16 adaptive_rx_coal;
+	u32 sample_interval;
+	u32 adaptive_rx_coal;
 	u32 msg_enable;
 	u32 loopback_ok;
 	u32 validate_loopback;

[PATCH 4.14 11/45] net/mlx5e: Err if asked to offload TC match on frag being first

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit f85900c3e13fdb61f040c9feecbcda601e0cdcfb ]

The HW doesn't support matching on frag first/later, return error if we are
asked to offload that.

Fixes: 3f7d0eb42d59 ("net/mlx5e: Offload TC matching on packets being IP fragments")
Signed-off-by: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
@@ -780,6 +780,10 @@ static int __parse_cls_flower(struct mlx
 						  f->mask);
 		addr_type = key->addr_type;
 
+		/* the HW doesn't support frag first/later */
+		if (mask->flags & FLOW_DIS_FIRST_FRAG)
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 		if (mask->flags & FLOW_DIS_IS_FRAGMENT) {
 			MLX5_SET(fte_match_set_lyr_2_4, headers_c, frag, 1);
 			MLX5_SET(fte_match_set_lyr_2_4, headers_v, frag,

[PATCH 4.14 12/45] net/mlx5: E-Switch, Include VF RDMA stats in vport statistics

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adi Nissim <adin@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit 88d725bbb43cd63a40c8ef70dd373f1d38ead2e3 ]

The host side reporting of VF vport statistics didn't include the VF
RDMA traffic.

Fixes: 3b751a2a418a ("net/mlx5: E-Switch, Introduce get vf statistics")
Signed-off-by: Adi Nissim <adin@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Ariel Almog <ariela@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c |   11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c
@@ -2054,26 +2054,35 @@ int mlx5_eswitch_get_vport_stats(struct
 	memset(vf_stats, 0, sizeof(*vf_stats));
 	vf_stats->rx_packets =
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_unicast.packets) +
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_unicast.packets) +
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_multicast.packets) +
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_multicast.packets) +
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_broadcast.packets);
 
 	vf_stats->rx_bytes =
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_unicast.octets) +
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_unicast.octets) +
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_multicast.octets) +
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_multicast.octets) +
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_broadcast.octets);
 
 	vf_stats->tx_packets =
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_unicast.packets) +
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_ib_unicast.packets) +
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_multicast.packets) +
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_ib_multicast.packets) +
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_broadcast.packets);
 
 	vf_stats->tx_bytes =
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_unicast.octets) +
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_ib_unicast.octets) +
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_multicast.octets) +
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_ib_multicast.octets) +
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_broadcast.octets);
 
 	vf_stats->multicast =
-		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_multicast.packets);
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_multicast.packets) +
+		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_multicast.packets);
 
 	vf_stats->broadcast =
 		MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_broadcast.packets);

[PATCH 4.14 13/45] net sched actions: fix refcnt leak in skbmod

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>

[ Upstream commit a52956dfc503f8cc5cfe6454959b7049fddb4413 ]

When application fails to pass flags in netlink TLV when replacing
existing skbmod action, the kernel will leak refcnt:

$ tc actions get action skbmod index 1
total acts 0

        action order 0: skbmod pipe set smac 00:11:22:33:44:55
         index 1 ref 1 bind 0

For example, at this point a buggy application replaces the action with
index 1 with new smac 00:aa:22:33:44:55, it fails because of zero flags,
however refcnt gets bumped:

$ tc actions get actions skbmod index 1
total acts 0

        action order 0: skbmod pipe set smac 00:11:22:33:44:55
         index 1 ref 2 bind 0
$

Tha patch fixes this by calling tcf_idr_release() on existing actions.

Fixes: 86da71b57383d ("net_sched: Introduce skbmod action")
Signed-off-by: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/act_skbmod.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sched/act_skbmod.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_skbmod.c
@@ -131,8 +131,11 @@ static int tcf_skbmod_init(struct net *n
 	if (exists && bind)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (!lflags)
+	if (!lflags) {
+		if (exists)
+			tcf_idr_release(*a, bind);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	if (!exists) {
 		ret = tcf_idr_create(tn, parm->index, est, a,

[PATCH 4.14 14/45] net_sched: fq: take care of throttled flows before reuse

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 7df40c2673a1307c3260aab6f9d4b9bf97ca8fd7 ]

Normally, a socket can not be freed/reused unless all its TX packets
left qdisc and were TX-completed. However connect(AF_UNSPEC) allows
this to happen.

With commit fc59d5bdf1e3 ("pkt_sched: fq: clear time_next_packet for
reused flows") we cleared f->time_next_packet but took no special
action if the flow was still in the throttled rb-tree.

Since f->time_next_packet is the key used in the rb-tree searches,
blindly clearing it might break rb-tree integrity. We need to make
sure the flow is no longer in the rb-tree to avoid this problem.

Fixes: fc59d5bdf1e3 ("pkt_sched: fq: clear time_next_packet for reused flows")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/sch_fq.c |   37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sched/sch_fq.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_fq.c
@@ -128,6 +128,28 @@ static bool fq_flow_is_detached(const st
 	return f->next == &detached;
 }
 
+static bool fq_flow_is_throttled(const struct fq_flow *f)
+{
+	return f->next == &throttled;
+}
+
+static void fq_flow_add_tail(struct fq_flow_head *head, struct fq_flow *flow)
+{
+	if (head->first)
+		head->last->next = flow;
+	else
+		head->first = flow;
+	head->last = flow;
+	flow->next = NULL;
+}
+
+static void fq_flow_unset_throttled(struct fq_sched_data *q, struct fq_flow *f)
+{
+	rb_erase(&f->rate_node, &q->delayed);
+	q->throttled_flows--;
+	fq_flow_add_tail(&q->old_flows, f);
+}
+
 static void fq_flow_set_throttled(struct fq_sched_data *q, struct fq_flow *f)
 {
 	struct rb_node **p = &q->delayed.rb_node, *parent = NULL;
@@ -155,15 +177,6 @@ static void fq_flow_set_throttled(struct
 
 static struct kmem_cache *fq_flow_cachep __read_mostly;
 
-static void fq_flow_add_tail(struct fq_flow_head *head, struct fq_flow *flow)
-{
-	if (head->first)
-		head->last->next = flow;
-	else
-		head->first = flow;
-	head->last = flow;
-	flow->next = NULL;
-}
 
 /* limit number of collected flows per round */
 #define FQ_GC_MAX 8
@@ -267,6 +280,8 @@ static struct fq_flow *fq_classify(struc
 				     f->socket_hash != sk->sk_hash)) {
 				f->credit = q->initial_quantum;
 				f->socket_hash = sk->sk_hash;
+				if (fq_flow_is_throttled(f))
+					fq_flow_unset_throttled(q, f);
 				f->time_next_packet = 0ULL;
 			}
 			return f;
@@ -438,9 +453,7 @@ static void fq_check_throttled(struct fq
 			q->time_next_delayed_flow = f->time_next_packet;
 			break;
 		}
-		rb_erase(p, &q->delayed);
-		q->throttled_flows--;
-		fq_flow_add_tail(&q->old_flows, f);
+		fq_flow_unset_throttled(q, f);
 	}
 }
 

[PATCH 4.14 15/45] net: support compat 64-bit time in {s,g}etsockopt

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lance Richardson <lance.richardson.net@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 988bf7243e03ef69238381594e0334a79cef74a6 ]

For the x32 ABI, struct timeval has two 64-bit fields. However
the kernel currently interprets the user-space values used for
the SO_RCVTIMEO and SO_SNDTIMEO socket options as having a pair
of 32-bit fields.

When the seconds portion of the requested timeout is less than 2**32,
the seconds portion of the effective timeout is correct but the
microseconds portion is zero.  When the seconds portion of the
requested timeout is zero and the microseconds portion is non-zero,
the kernel interprets the timeout as zero (never timeout).

Fix by using 64-bit time for SO_RCVTIMEO/SO_SNDTIMEO as required
for the ABI.

The code included below demonstrates the problem.

Results before patch:
    $ gcc -m64 -Wall -O2 -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
    recv time: 2.008181 seconds
    send time: 2.015985 seconds

    $ gcc -m32 -Wall -O2 -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
    recv time: 2.016763 seconds
    send time: 2.016062 seconds

    $ gcc -mx32 -Wall -O2 -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
    recv time: 1.007239 seconds
    send time: 1.023890 seconds

Results after patch:
    $ gcc -m64 -O2 -Wall -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
    recv time: 2.010062 seconds
    send time: 2.015836 seconds

    $ gcc -m32 -O2 -Wall -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
    recv time: 2.013974 seconds
    send time: 2.015981 seconds

    $ gcc -mx32 -O2 -Wall -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
    recv time: 2.030257 seconds
    send time: 2.013383 seconds

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>

 void checkrc(char *str, int rc)
 {
         if (rc >= 0)
                 return;

         perror(str);
         exit(1);
 }

 static char buf[1024];
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
         int rc;
         int socks[2];
         struct timeval tv;
         struct timeval start, end, delta;

         rc = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks);
         checkrc("socketpair", rc);

         /* set timeout to 1.999999 seconds */
         tv.tv_sec = 1;
         tv.tv_usec = 999999;
         rc = setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
         rc = setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
         checkrc("setsockopt", rc);

         /* measure actual receive timeout */
         gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
         rc = recv(socks[0], buf, sizeof buf, 0);
         gettimeofday(&end, NULL);
         timersub(&end, &start, &delta);

         printf("recv time: %ld.%06ld seconds\n",
                (long)delta.tv_sec, (long)delta.tv_usec);

         /* fill send buffer */
         do {
                 rc = send(socks[0], buf, sizeof buf, 0);
         } while (rc > 0);

         /* measure actual send timeout */
         gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
         rc = send(socks[0], buf, sizeof buf, 0);
         gettimeofday(&end, NULL);
         timersub(&end, &start, &delta);

         printf("send time: %ld.%06ld seconds\n",
                (long)delta.tv_sec, (long)delta.tv_usec);
         exit(0);
 }

Fixes: 515c7af85ed9 ("x32: Use compat shims for {g,s}etsockopt")
Reported-by: Gopal RajagopalSai <gopalsr83@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lance Richardson <lance.richardson.net@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/compat.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -377,7 +377,8 @@ static int compat_sock_setsockopt(struct
 	    optname == SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_CBPF)
 		return do_set_attach_filter(sock, level, optname,
 					    optval, optlen);
-	if (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO)
+	if (!COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME &&
+	    (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO))
 		return do_set_sock_timeout(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
 
 	return sock_setsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
@@ -442,7 +443,8 @@ static int do_get_sock_timeout(struct so
 static int compat_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
 				char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
 {
-	if (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO)
+	if (!COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME &&
+	    (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO))
 		return do_get_sock_timeout(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
 	return sock_getsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
 }

[PATCH 4.14 16/45] net/tls: Dont recursively call push_record during tls_write_space callbacks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>

[ Upstream commit c212d2c7fc4736d49be102fb7a1a545cdc2f1fea ]

It is reported that in some cases, write_space may be called in
do_tcp_sendpages, such that we recursively invoke do_tcp_sendpages again:

[  660.468802]  ? do_tcp_sendpages+0x8d/0x580
[  660.468826]  ? tls_push_sg+0x74/0x130 [tls]
[  660.468852]  ? tls_push_record+0x24a/0x390 [tls]
[  660.468880]  ? tls_write_space+0x6a/0x80 [tls]
...

tls_push_sg already does a loop over all sending sg's, so ignore
any tls_write_space notifications until we are done sending.
We then have to call the previous write_space to wake up
poll() waiters after we are done with the send loop.

Reported-by: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>
Signed-off-by: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/tls.h  |    1 +
 net/tls/tls_main.c |    7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/include/net/tls.h
+++ b/include/net/tls.h
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct tls_context {
 	struct scatterlist *partially_sent_record;
 	u16 partially_sent_offset;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	bool in_tcp_sendpages;
 
 	u16 pending_open_record_frags;
 	int (*push_pending_record)(struct sock *sk, int flags);
--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ int tls_push_sg(struct sock *sk,
 	size = sg->length - offset;
 	offset += sg->offset;
 
+	ctx->in_tcp_sendpages = true;
 	while (1) {
 		if (sg_is_last(sg))
 			sendpage_flags = flags;
@@ -121,6 +122,8 @@ retry:
 	}
 
 	clear_bit(TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD, &ctx->flags);
+	ctx->in_tcp_sendpages = false;
+	ctx->sk_write_space(sk);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -190,6 +193,10 @@ static void tls_write_space(struct sock
 {
 	struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
 
+	/* We are already sending pages, ignore notification */
+	if (ctx->in_tcp_sendpages)
+		return;
+
 	if (!sk->sk_write_pending && tls_is_pending_closed_record(ctx)) {
 		gfp_t sk_allocation = sk->sk_allocation;
 		int rc;

[PATCH 4.14 17/45] net/tls: Fix connection stall on partial tls record

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>

[ Upstream commit 080324c36ade319f57e505633ab54f6f53289b45 ]

In the case of writing a partial tls record we forgot to clear the
ctx->in_tcp_sendpages flag, causing some connections to stall.

Fixes: c212d2c7fc47 ("net/tls: Don't recursively call push_record during tls_write_space callbacks")
Signed-off-by: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/tls/tls_main.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ retry:
 			offset -= sg->offset;
 			ctx->partially_sent_offset = offset;
 			ctx->partially_sent_record = (void *)sg;
+			ctx->in_tcp_sendpages = false;
 			return ret;
 		}
 

[PATCH 4.14 18/45] openvswitch: Dont swap table in nlattr_set() after OVS_ATTR_NESTED is found

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 72f17baf2352ded6a1d3f4bb2d15da8c678cd2cb ]

If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking
through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively
passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if
different from the current one.

However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we
should continue walking through attributes using the current
table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested
attributes.

For example, given this sequence:

1  OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY
2  OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL
3	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID
4	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC
5	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST
6	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL
7	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC
8	OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST
9  OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT
10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK
11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS

we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3,
and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting
attributes #9 to #11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS
evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is
15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the
wrong table:

[ 7654.586496] ==================================================================
[ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430
[ 7654.610983]
[ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1
[ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
[ 7654.631379] Call Trace:
[ 7654.634108]  [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
[ 7654.639843]  [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290
[ 7654.647129]  [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.654607]  [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330
[ 7654.661406]  [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40
[ 7654.668789]  [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.676076]  [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.684234]  [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
[ 7654.689968]  [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590
[ 7654.696574]  [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch]
[ 7654.705122]  [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0
[ 7654.712503]  [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21
[ 7654.719401]  [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
[ 7654.726298]  [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
[ 7654.733195]  [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
[ 7654.740187]  [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0
[ 7654.746406]  [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 7654.752914]  [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40
[ 7654.758456]  [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch]

[snip]

[ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable:
[ 7655.138226]  ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch]
[ 7655.145507]
[ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 7655.152514]  ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa
[ 7655.160585]  ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa
[ 7655.176701]                                                              ^
[ 7655.184372]  ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05
[ 7655.192431]  ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 7655.200490] ==================================================================

Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Fixes: 982b52700482 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c |    9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
@@ -1404,13 +1404,10 @@ static void nlattr_set(struct nlattr *at
 
 	/* The nlattr stream should already have been validated */
 	nla_for_each_nested(nla, attr, rem) {
-		if (tbl[nla_type(nla)].len == OVS_ATTR_NESTED) {
-			if (tbl[nla_type(nla)].next)
-				tbl = tbl[nla_type(nla)].next;
-			nlattr_set(nla, val, tbl);
-		} else {
+		if (tbl[nla_type(nla)].len == OVS_ATTR_NESTED)
+			nlattr_set(nla, val, tbl[nla_type(nla)].next ? : tbl);
+		else
 			memset(nla_data(nla), val, nla_len(nla));
-		}
 
 		if (nla_type(nla) == OVS_KEY_ATTR_CT_STATE)
 			*(u32 *)nla_data(nla) &= CT_SUPPORTED_MASK;

[PATCH 4.14 20/45] r8169: fix powering up RTL8168h

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 3148dedfe79e422f448a10250d3e2cdf8b7ee617 ]

Since commit a92a08499b1f "r8169: improve runtime pm in general and
suspend unused ports" interfaces w/o link are runtime-suspended after
10s. On systems where drivers take longer to load this can lead to the
situation that the interface is runtime-suspended already when it's
initially brought up.
This shouldn't be a problem because rtl_open() resumes MAC/PHY.
However with at least one chip version the interface doesn't properly
come up, as reported here:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199549

The vendor driver uses a delay to give certain chip versions some
time to resume before starting the PHY configuration. So let's do
the same. I don't know which chip versions may be affected,
therefore apply this delay always.

This patch was reported to fix the issue for RTL8168h.
I was able to reproduce the issue on an Asus H310I-Plus which also
uses a RTL8168h. Also in my case the patch fixed the issue.

Reported-by: Slava Kardakov <ojab@ojab.ru>
Tested-by: Slava Kardakov <ojab@ojab.ru>
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
@@ -4886,6 +4886,9 @@ static void rtl_pll_power_down(struct rt
 static void rtl_pll_power_up(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
 {
 	rtl_generic_op(tp, tp->pll_power_ops.up);
+
+	/* give MAC/PHY some time to resume */
+	msleep(20);
 }
 
 static void rtl_init_pll_power_ops(struct rtl8169_private *tp)

[PATCH 4.14 21/45] rds: do not leak kernel memory to user land

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit eb80ca476ec11f67a62691a93604b405ffc7d80c ]

syzbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in put_cmsg(), originating
from rds_cmsg_recv().

Simply clear the structure, since we have holes there, or since
rx_traces might be smaller than RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in put_cmsg+0x600/0x870 net/core/scm.c:242
CPU: 0 PID: 4459 Comm: syz-executor582 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x135/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1157
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
 put_cmsg+0x600/0x870 net/core/scm.c:242
 rds_cmsg_recv net/rds/recv.c:570 [inline]
 rds_recvmsg+0x2db5/0x3170 net/rds/recv.c:657
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:803 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg+0x1d0/0x230 net/socket.c:810
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x3fb/0x810 net/socket.c:2205
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2250 [inline]
 SYSC_recvmsg+0x298/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2262
 SyS_recvmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2257
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Fixes: 3289025aedc0 ("RDS: add receive message trace used by application")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-rdma <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/rds/recv.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/rds/recv.c
+++ b/net/rds/recv.c
@@ -558,6 +558,7 @@ static int rds_cmsg_recv(struct rds_inco
 		struct rds_cmsg_rx_trace t;
 		int i, j;
 
+		memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
 		inc->i_rx_lat_trace[RDS_MSG_RX_CMSG] = local_clock();
 		t.rx_traces =  rs->rs_rx_traces;
 		for (i = 0; i < rs->rs_rx_traces; i++) {

[PATCH 4.14 22/45] sctp: delay the authentication for the duplicated cookie-echo chunk

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 59d8d4434f429b4fa8a346fd889058bda427a837 ]

Now sctp only delays the authentication for the normal cookie-echo
chunk by setting chunk->auth_chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(). But
for the duplicated one with auth, in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(), it does
authentication first based on the old asoc, which will definitely
fail due to the different auth info in the old asoc.

The duplicated cookie-echo chunk will create a new asoc with the
auth info from this chunk, and the authentication should also be
done with the new asoc's auth info for all of the collision 'A',
'B' and 'D'. Otherwise, the duplicated cookie-echo chunk with auth
will never pass the authentication and create the new connection.

This issue exists since very beginning, and this fix is to make
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() follow the way sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() does
for the normal cookie-echo chunk to delay the authentication.

While at it, remove the unused params from sctp_sf_authenticate()
and define sctp_auth_chunk_verify() used for all the places that
do the delayed authentication.

v1->v2:
  fix the typo in changelog as Marcelo noticed.

Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/associola.c    |   30 ++++++++++++++++
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c |   86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
@@ -1025,8 +1025,9 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct wor
 	struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
 	struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
 	struct sctp_inq *inqueue;
-	int state;
+	int first_time = 1;	/* is this the first time through the loop */
 	int error = 0;
+	int state;
 
 	/* The association should be held so we should be safe. */
 	ep = asoc->ep;
@@ -1037,6 +1038,30 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct wor
 		state = asoc->state;
 		subtype = SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type);
 
+		/* If the first chunk in the packet is AUTH, do special
+		 * processing specified in Section 6.3 of SCTP-AUTH spec
+		 */
+		if (first_time && subtype.chunk == SCTP_CID_AUTH) {
+			struct sctp_chunkhdr *next_hdr;
+
+			next_hdr = sctp_inq_peek(inqueue);
+			if (!next_hdr)
+				goto normal;
+
+			/* If the next chunk is COOKIE-ECHO, skip the AUTH
+			 * chunk while saving a pointer to it so we can do
+			 * Authentication later (during cookie-echo
+			 * processing).
+			 */
+			if (next_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO) {
+				chunk->auth_chunk = skb_clone(chunk->skb,
+							      GFP_ATOMIC);
+				chunk->auth = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+normal:
 		/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
 		 *    The receiver has a list of chunk types which it expects
 		 *    to be received only after an AUTH-chunk.  This list has
@@ -1075,6 +1100,9 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct wor
 		/* If there is an error on chunk, discard this packet. */
 		if (error && chunk)
 			chunk->pdiscard = 1;
+
+		if (first_time)
+			first_time = 0;
 	}
 	sctp_association_put(asoc);
 }
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -150,10 +150,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_vio
 					struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands);
 
 static enum sctp_ierror sctp_sf_authenticate(
-					struct net *net,
-					const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 					const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-					const union sctp_subtype type,
 					struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
 
 static enum sctp_disposition __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(
@@ -618,6 +615,38 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ac
 	return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
 }
 
+static bool sctp_auth_chunk_verify(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+				   const struct sctp_association *asoc)
+{
+	struct sctp_chunk auth;
+
+	if (!chunk->auth_chunk)
+		return true;
+
+	/* SCTP-AUTH:  auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
+	 * is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
+	 * authentication.  We've just recreated the association using
+	 * the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
+	 * do the authentication.
+	 */
+
+	/* Make sure that we and the peer are AUTH capable */
+	if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !asoc->peer.auth_capable)
+		return false;
+
+	/* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
+	auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
+	auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
+	auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
+	auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)
+				skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
+					 sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+	skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+	auth.transport = chunk->transport;
+
+	return sctp_sf_authenticate(asoc, &auth) == SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
+}
+
 /*
  * Respond to a normal COOKIE ECHO chunk.
  * We are the side that is being asked for an association.
@@ -755,37 +784,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce
 	if (error)
 		goto nomem_init;
 
-	/* SCTP-AUTH:  auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
-	 * is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
-	 * authentication.  We've just recreated the association using
-	 * the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
-	 * do the authentication.
-	 */
-	if (chunk->auth_chunk) {
-		struct sctp_chunk auth;
-		enum sctp_ierror ret;
-
-		/* Make sure that we and the peer are AUTH capable */
-		if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !new_asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
-			sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
-			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-		}
-
-		/* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
-		auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
-		auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
-		auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
-		auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)
-					skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
-						 sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
-		skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
-		auth.transport = chunk->transport;
-
-		ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, new_asoc, type, &auth);
-		if (ret != SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR) {
-			sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
-			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-		}
+	if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc)) {
+		sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 	}
 
 	repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
@@ -1755,13 +1756,15 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
 			       GFP_ATOMIC))
 		goto nomem;
 
+	if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc))
+		return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
 	/* Make sure no new addresses are being added during the
 	 * restart.  Though this is a pretty complicated attack
 	 * since you'd have to get inside the cookie.
 	 */
-	if (!sctp_sf_check_restart_addrs(new_asoc, asoc, chunk, commands)) {
+	if (!sctp_sf_check_restart_addrs(new_asoc, asoc, chunk, commands))
 		return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
-	}
 
 	/* If the endpoint is in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state and recognizes
 	 * the peer has restarted (Action A), it MUST NOT setup a new
@@ -1867,6 +1870,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
 			       GFP_ATOMIC))
 		goto nomem;
 
+	if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc))
+		return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
 	/* Update the content of current association.  */
 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
@@ -1961,6 +1967,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
 	 * a COOKIE ACK.
 	 */
 
+	if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, asoc))
+		return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
 	/* Don't accidentally move back into established state. */
 	if (asoc->state < SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) {
 		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
@@ -4111,10 +4120,7 @@ gen_shutdown:
  * The return value is the disposition of the chunk.
  */
 static enum sctp_ierror sctp_sf_authenticate(
-					struct net *net,
-					const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 					const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-					const union sctp_subtype type,
 					struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
 {
 	struct sctp_authhdr *auth_hdr;
@@ -4212,7 +4218,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_eat_auth(s
 						  commands);
 
 	auth_hdr = (struct sctp_authhdr *)chunk->skb->data;
-	error = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, asoc, type, chunk);
+	error = sctp_sf_authenticate(asoc, chunk);
 	switch (error) {
 	case SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_HMAC:
 		/* Generate the ERROR chunk and discard the rest

[PATCH 4.14 23/45] sctp: fix the issue that the cookie-ack with auth cant get processed

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit ce402f044e4e432c296f90eaabb8dbe8f3624391 ]

When auth is enabled for cookie-ack chunk, in sctp_inq_pop, sctp
processes auth chunk first, then continues to the next chunk in
this packet if chunk_end + chunk_hdr size < skb_tail_pointer().
Otherwise, it will go to the next packet or discard this chunk.

However, it missed the fact that cookie-ack chunk's size is equal
to chunk_hdr size, which couldn't match that check, and thus this
chunk would not get processed.

This patch fixes it by changing the check to chunk_end + chunk_hdr
size <= skb_tail_pointer().

Fixes: 26b87c788100 ("net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/inqueue.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ new_skb:
 	skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(*ch));
 	chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid.  */
 
-	if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) < skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
+	if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) <= skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
 		/* This is not a singleton */
 		chunk->singleton = 0;
 	} else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {

[PATCH 4.14 24/45] sctp: handle two v4 addrs comparison in sctp_inet6_cmp_addr

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit d625329b06e46bd20baf9ee40847d11982569204 ]

Since sctp ipv6 socket also supports v4 addrs, it's possible to
compare two v4 addrs in pf v6 .cmp_addr, sctp_inet6_cmp_addr.

However after Commit 1071ec9d453a ("sctp: do not check port in
sctp_inet6_cmp_addr"), it no longer calls af1->cmp_addr, which
in this case is sctp_v4_cmp_addr, but calls __sctp_v6_cmp_addr
where it handles them as two v6 addrs. It would cause a out of
bounds crash.

syzbot found this crash when trying to bind two v4 addrs to a
v6 socket.

This patch fixes it by adding the process for two v4 addrs in
sctp_inet6_cmp_addr.

Fixes: 1071ec9d453a ("sctp: do not check port in sctp_inet6_cmp_addr")
Reported-by: syzbot+cd494c1dd681d4d93ebb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/ipv6.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -865,6 +865,9 @@ static int sctp_inet6_cmp_addr(const uni
 	if (sctp_is_any(sk, addr1) || sctp_is_any(sk, addr2))
 		return 1;
 
+	if (addr1->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && addr2->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+		return addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr == addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
+
 	return __sctp_v6_cmp_addr(addr1, addr2);
 }
 

[PATCH 4.14 25/45] sctp: remove sctp_chunk_put from fail_mark err path in sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 6910e25de2257e2c82c7a2d126e3463cd8e50810 ]

In Commit 1f45f78f8e51 ("sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too"),
it held the chunk in sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg to access it safely later
in recvmsg. However, it also added sctp_chunk_put in fail_mark err path,
which is only triggered before holding the chunk.

syzbot reported a use-after-free crash happened on this err path, where
it shouldn't call sctp_chunk_put.

This patch simply removes this call.

Fixes: 1f45f78f8e51 ("sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too")
Reported-by: syzbot+141d898c5f24489db4aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/ulpevent.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
@@ -717,7 +717,6 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent *sctp_ulpevent_make
 	return event;
 
 fail_mark:
-	sctp_chunk_put(chunk);
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 fail:
 	return NULL;

[PATCH 4.14 26/45] sctp: use the old asoc when making the cookie-ack chunk in dupcook_d

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 46e16d4b956867013e0bbd7f2bad206f4aa55752 ]

When processing a duplicate cookie-echo chunk, for case 'D', sctp will
not process the param from this chunk. It means old asoc has nothing
to be updated, and the new temp asoc doesn't have the complete info.

So there's no reason to use the new asoc when creating the cookie-ack
chunk. Otherwise, like when auth is enabled for cookie-ack, the chunk
can not be set with auth, and it will definitely be dropped by peer.

This issue is there since very beginning, and we fix it by using the
old asoc instead.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -2009,7 +2009,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
 		}
 	}
 
-	repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
+	repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(asoc, chunk);
 	if (!repl)
 		goto nomem;
 

[PATCH 4.14 27/45] tcp_bbr: fix to zero idle_restart only upon S/ACKed data

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>

[ Upstream commit e6e6a278b1eaffa19d42186bfacd1ffc15a50b3f ]

Previously the bbr->idle_restart tracking was zeroing out the
bbr->idle_restart bit upon ACKs that did not SACK or ACK anything,
e.g. receiving incoming data or receiver window updates. In such
situations BBR would forget that this was a restart-from-idle
situation, and if the min_rtt had expired it would unnecessarily enter
PROBE_RTT (even though we were actually restarting from idle but had
merely forgotten that fact).

The fix is simple: we need to remember we are restarting from idle
until we receive a S/ACK for some data (a S/ACK for the first flight
of data we send as we are restarting).

This commit is a stable candidate for kernels back as far as 4.9.

Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yousuk Seung <ysseung@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c
@@ -802,7 +802,9 @@ static void bbr_update_min_rtt(struct so
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	bbr->idle_restart = 0;
+	/* Restart after idle ends only once we process a new S/ACK for data */
+	if (rs->delivered > 0)
+		bbr->idle_restart = 0;
 }
 
 static void bbr_update_model(struct sock *sk, const struct rate_sample *rs)

[PATCH 4.14 28/45] tcp: ignore Fast Open on repair mode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 16ae6aa1705299789f71fdea59bfb119c1fbd9c0 ]

The TCP repair sequence of operation is to first set the socket in
repair mode, then inject the TCP stats into the socket with repair
socket options, then call connect() to re-activate the socket. The
connect syscall simply returns and set state to ESTABLISHED
mode. As a result Fast Open is meaningless for TCP repair.

However allowing sendto() system call with MSG_FASTOPEN flag half-way
during the repair operation could unexpectedly cause data to be
sent, before the operation finishes changing the internal TCP stats
(e.g. MSS).  This in turn triggers TCP warnings on inconsistent
packet accounting.

The fix is to simply disallow Fast Open operation once the socket
is in the repair mode.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -1194,7 +1194,8 @@ int tcp_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk,
 			uarg->zerocopy = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(flags & MSG_FASTOPEN || inet_sk(sk)->defer_connect)) {
+	if (unlikely(flags & MSG_FASTOPEN || inet_sk(sk)->defer_connect) &&
+	    !tp->repair) {
 		err = tcp_sendmsg_fastopen(sk, msg, &copied_syn, size);
 		if (err == -EINPROGRESS && copied_syn > 0)
 			goto out;

[PATCH 4.14 29/45] tg3: Fix vunmap() BUG_ON() triggered from tg3_free_consistent().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>

[ Upstream commit d89a2adb8bfe6f8949ff389acdb9fa298b6e8e12 ]

tg3_free_consistent() calls dma_free_coherent() to free tp->hw_stats
under spinlock and can trigger BUG_ON() in vunmap() because vunmap()
may sleep.  Fix it by removing the spinlock and relying on the
TG3_FLAG_INIT_COMPLETE flag to prevent race conditions between
tg3_get_stats64() and tg3_free_consistent().  TG3_FLAG_INIT_COMPLETE
is always cleared under tp->lock before tg3_free_consistent()
and therefore tg3_get_stats64() can safely access tp->hw_stats
under tp->lock if TG3_FLAG_INIT_COMPLETE is set.

Fixes: f5992b72ebe0 ("tg3: Fix race condition in tg3_get_stats64().")
Reported-by: Zumeng Chen <zumeng.chen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
@@ -8723,14 +8723,15 @@ static void tg3_free_consistent(struct t
 	tg3_mem_rx_release(tp);
 	tg3_mem_tx_release(tp);
 
-	/* Protect tg3_get_stats64() from reading freed tp->hw_stats. */
-	tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
+	/* tp->hw_stats can be referenced safely:
+	 *     1. under rtnl_lock
+	 *     2. or under tp->lock if TG3_FLAG_INIT_COMPLETE is set.
+	 */
 	if (tp->hw_stats) {
 		dma_free_coherent(&tp->pdev->dev, sizeof(struct tg3_hw_stats),
 				  tp->hw_stats, tp->stats_mapping);
 		tp->hw_stats = NULL;
 	}
-	tg3_full_unlock(tp);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -14167,7 +14168,7 @@ static void tg3_get_stats64(struct net_d
 	struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&tp->lock);
-	if (!tp->hw_stats) {
+	if (!tp->hw_stats || !tg3_flag(tp, INIT_COMPLETE)) {
 		*stats = tp->net_stats_prev;
 		spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
 		return;

[PATCH 4.14 30/45] bonding: do not allow rlb updates to invalid mac

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>

[ Upstream commit 4fa8667ca3989ce14cf66301fa251544fbddbdd0 ]

Make sure multicast, broadcast, and zero mac's cannot be the output of rlb
updates, which should all be directed arps. Receive load balancing will be
collapsed if any of these happen, as the switch will broadcast.

Signed-off-by: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static void rlb_update_client(struct rlb
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if (!client_info->slave)
+	if (!client_info->slave || !is_valid_ether_addr(client_info->mac_dst))
 		return;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < RLB_ARP_BURST_SIZE; i++) {

[PATCH 4.14 31/45] bonding: send learning packets for vlans on slave

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>

[ Upstream commit 21706ee8a47d3ede7fdae0be6d7c0a0e31a83229 ]

There was a regression at some point from the intended functionality of
commit f60c3704e87d ("bonding: Fix alb mode to only use first level
vlans.")

Given the return value vlan_get_encap_level() we need to store the nest
level of the bond device, and then compare the vlan's encap level to
this. Without this, this check always fails and learning packets are
never sent.

In addition, this same commit caused a regression in the behavior of
balance_alb, which requires learning packets be sent for all interfaces
using the slave's mac in order to load balance properly. For vlan's
that have not set a user mac, we can send after checking one bit.
Otherwise we need send the set mac, albeit defeating rx load balancing
for that vlan.

Signed-off-by: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c  |   13 ++++++++-----
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c |    2 ++
 include/net/bonding.h           |    1 +
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
@@ -943,6 +943,10 @@ static void alb_send_lp_vid(struct slave
 	skb->priority = TC_PRIO_CONTROL;
 	skb->dev = slave->dev;
 
+	netdev_dbg(slave->bond->dev,
+		   "Send learning packet: dev %s mac %pM vlan %d\n",
+		   slave->dev->name, mac_addr, vid);
+
 	if (vid)
 		__vlan_hwaccel_put_tag(skb, vlan_proto, vid);
 
@@ -965,14 +969,13 @@ static int alb_upper_dev_walk(struct net
 	u8 *mac_addr = data->mac_addr;
 	struct bond_vlan_tag *tags;
 
-	if (is_vlan_dev(upper) && vlan_get_encap_level(upper) == 0) {
-		if (strict_match &&
-		    ether_addr_equal_64bits(mac_addr,
-					    upper->dev_addr)) {
+	if (is_vlan_dev(upper) &&
+	    bond->nest_level == vlan_get_encap_level(upper) - 1) {
+		if (upper->addr_assign_type == NET_ADDR_STOLEN) {
 			alb_send_lp_vid(slave, mac_addr,
 					vlan_dev_vlan_proto(upper),
 					vlan_dev_vlan_id(upper));
-		} else if (!strict_match) {
+		} else {
 			alb_send_lp_vid(slave, upper->dev_addr,
 					vlan_dev_vlan_proto(upper),
 					vlan_dev_vlan_id(upper));
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -1734,6 +1734,8 @@ int bond_enslave(struct net_device *bond
 	if (bond_mode_uses_xmit_hash(bond))
 		bond_update_slave_arr(bond, NULL);
 
+	bond->nest_level = dev_get_nest_level(bond_dev);
+
 	netdev_info(bond_dev, "Enslaving %s as %s interface with %s link\n",
 		    slave_dev->name,
 		    bond_is_active_slave(new_slave) ? "an active" : "a backup",
--- a/include/net/bonding.h
+++ b/include/net/bonding.h
@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ struct bonding {
 	struct   slave __rcu *primary_slave;
 	struct   bond_up_slave __rcu *slave_arr; /* Array of usable slaves */
 	bool     force_primary;
+	u32      nest_level;
 	s32      slave_cnt; /* never change this value outside the attach/detach wrappers */
 	int     (*recv_probe)(const struct sk_buff *, struct bonding *,
 			      struct slave *);

[PATCH 4.14 32/45] net: sched: fix error path in tcf_proto_create() when modules are not configured

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit d68d75fdc34b0253c2bded7ed18cd60eb5a9599b ]

In case modules are not configured, error out when tp->ops is null
and prevent later null pointer dereference.

Fixes: 33a48927c193 ("sched: push TC filter protocol creation into a separate function")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/cls_api.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sched/cls_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c
@@ -151,8 +151,8 @@ static struct tcf_proto *tcf_proto_creat
 		} else {
 			err = -ENOENT;
 		}
-		goto errout;
 #endif
+		goto errout;
 	}
 	tp->classify = tp->ops->classify;
 	tp->protocol = protocol;

[PATCH 4.14 33/45] net/mlx5e: TX, Use correct counter in dma_map error flow

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit d9a96ec362e3da878c378854e25321c85bac52c2 ]

In case of a dma_mapping_error, do not use wi->num_dma
as a parameter for dma unmap function because it's yet
to be set, and holds an out-of-date value.
Use actual value (local variable num_dma) instead.

Fixes: 34802a42b352 ("net/mlx5e: Do not modify the TX SKB")
Fixes: e586b3b0baee ("net/mlx5: Ethernet Datapath files")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c |   20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(struct mlx5e_txq
 		dma_addr = dma_map_single(sq->pdev, skb_data, headlen,
 					  DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 		if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(sq->pdev, dma_addr)))
-			return -ENOMEM;
+			goto dma_unmap_wqe_err;
 
 		dseg->addr       = cpu_to_be64(dma_addr);
 		dseg->lkey       = sq->mkey_be;
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(struct mlx5e_txq
 		dma_addr = skb_frag_dma_map(sq->pdev, frag, 0, fsz,
 					    DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 		if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(sq->pdev, dma_addr)))
-			return -ENOMEM;
+			goto dma_unmap_wqe_err;
 
 		dseg->addr       = cpu_to_be64(dma_addr);
 		dseg->lkey       = sq->mkey_be;
@@ -264,6 +264,10 @@ mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(struct mlx5e_txq
 	}
 
 	return num_dma;
+
+dma_unmap_wqe_err:
+	mlx5e_dma_unmap_wqe_err(sq, num_dma);
+	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -355,17 +359,15 @@ static netdev_tx_t mlx5e_sq_xmit(struct
 	num_dma = mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(sq, skb, skb_data, headlen,
 					  (struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *)cseg + ds_cnt);
 	if (unlikely(num_dma < 0))
-		goto dma_unmap_wqe_err;
+		goto err_drop;
 
 	mlx5e_txwqe_complete(sq, skb, opcode, ds_cnt + num_dma,
 			     num_bytes, num_dma, wi, cseg);
 
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 
-dma_unmap_wqe_err:
+err_drop:
 	sq->stats.dropped++;
-	mlx5e_dma_unmap_wqe_err(sq, wi->num_dma);
-
 	dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
 
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;
@@ -594,17 +596,15 @@ netdev_tx_t mlx5i_sq_xmit(struct mlx5e_t
 	num_dma = mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(sq, skb, skb_data, headlen,
 					  (struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *)cseg + ds_cnt);
 	if (unlikely(num_dma < 0))
-		goto dma_unmap_wqe_err;
+		goto err_drop;
 
 	mlx5e_txwqe_complete(sq, skb, opcode, ds_cnt + num_dma,
 			     num_bytes, num_dma, wi, cseg);
 
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 
-dma_unmap_wqe_err:
+err_drop:
 	sq->stats.dropped++;
-	mlx5e_dma_unmap_wqe_err(sq, wi->num_dma);
-
 	dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
 
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;

[PATCH 4.14 34/45] net/mlx5: Avoid cleaning flow steering table twice during error flow

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Talat Batheesh <talatb@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit 9c26f5f89d01ca21560c6b8a8e4054c271cc3a9c ]

When we fail to initialize the RX root namespace, we need
to clean only that and not the entire flow steering.

Currently the code may try to clean the flow steering twice
on error witch leads to null pointer deference.
Make sure we clean correctly.

Fixes: fba53f7b5719 ("net/mlx5: Introduce mlx5_flow_steering structure")
Signed-off-by: Talat Batheesh <talatb@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c |   23 +++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ static void del_flow_group(struct fs_nod
 static void del_fte(struct fs_node *node);
 static bool mlx5_flow_dests_cmp(struct mlx5_flow_destination *d1,
 				struct mlx5_flow_destination *d2);
+static void cleanup_root_ns(struct mlx5_flow_root_namespace *root_ns);
 static struct mlx5_flow_rule *
 find_flow_rule(struct fs_fte *fte,
 	       struct mlx5_flow_destination *dest);
@@ -2041,23 +2042,27 @@ static int create_anchor_flow_table(stru
 
 static int init_root_ns(struct mlx5_flow_steering *steering)
 {
+	int err;
+
 	steering->root_ns = create_root_ns(steering, FS_FT_NIC_RX);
 	if (!steering->root_ns)
-		goto cleanup;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (init_root_tree(steering, &root_fs, &steering->root_ns->ns.node))
-		goto cleanup;
+	err = init_root_tree(steering, &root_fs, &steering->root_ns->ns.node);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_err;
 
 	set_prio_attrs(steering->root_ns);
-
-	if (create_anchor_flow_table(steering))
-		goto cleanup;
+	err = create_anchor_flow_table(steering);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_err;
 
 	return 0;
 
-cleanup:
-	mlx5_cleanup_fs(steering->dev);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+out_err:
+	cleanup_root_ns(steering->root_ns);
+	steering->root_ns = NULL;
+	return err;
 }
 
 static void clean_tree(struct fs_node *node)

[PATCH 4.14 35/45] hv_netvsc: set master device

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>

[ Upstream commit 97f3efb64323beb0690576e9d74e94998ad6e82a ]

The hyper-v transparent bonding should have used master_dev_link.
The netvsc device should look like a master bond device not
like the upper side of a tunnel.

This makes the semantics the same so that userspace applications
looking at network devices see the correct master relationshipship.

Fixes: 0c195567a8f6 ("netvsc: transparent VF management")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
@@ -1742,7 +1742,8 @@ static int netvsc_vf_join(struct net_dev
 		goto rx_handler_failed;
 	}
 
-	ret = netdev_upper_dev_link(vf_netdev, ndev);
+	ret = netdev_master_upper_dev_link(vf_netdev, ndev,
+					   NULL, NULL);
 	if (ret != 0) {
 		netdev_err(vf_netdev,
 			   "can not set master device %s (err = %d)\n",

[PATCH 4.14 36/45] ipv6: fix uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit cea67a2dd6b2419dcc13a39309b9a79a1f773193 ]

syzbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys(),
root caused to a bad assumption of ICMP header being already
pulled in skb->head

ip_multipath_l3_keys() does the correct thing, so it is an IPv6 only bug.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys net/ipv6/route.c:1830 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rt6_multipath_hash+0x5c4/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:1858
CPU: 0 PID: 4507 Comm: syz-executor661 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
 ip6_multipath_l3_keys net/ipv6/route.c:1830 [inline]
 rt6_multipath_hash+0x5c4/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:1858
 ip6_route_input+0x65a/0x920 net/ipv6/route.c:1884
 ip6_rcv_finish+0x413/0x6e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
 ipv6_rcv+0x1e16/0x2340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:208
 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x47df/0x4a90 net/core/dev.c:4562
 __netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4627 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x49d/0x630 net/core/dev.c:4701
 netif_receive_skb+0x230/0x240 net/core/dev.c:4725
 tun_rx_batched drivers/net/tun.c:1555 [inline]
 tun_get_user+0x740f/0x7c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1962
 tun_chr_write_iter+0x1d4/0x330 drivers/net/tun.c:1990
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1782 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline]
 __vfs_write+0x7fb/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:482
 vfs_write+0x463/0x8d0 fs/read_write.c:544
 SYSC_write+0x172/0x360 fs/read_write.c:589
 SyS_write+0x55/0x80 fs/read_write.c:581
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Fixes: 23aebdacb05d ("ipv6: Compute multipath hash for ICMP errors from offending packet")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/route.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1222,11 +1222,16 @@ static void ip6_multipath_l3_keys(const
 	const struct ipv6hdr *inner_iph;
 	const struct icmp6hdr *icmph;
 	struct ipv6hdr _inner_iph;
+	struct icmp6hdr _icmph;
 
 	if (likely(outer_iph->nexthdr != IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
 		goto out;
 
-	icmph = icmp6_hdr(skb);
+	icmph = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
+				   sizeof(_icmph), &_icmph);
+	if (!icmph)
+		goto out;
+
 	if (icmph->icmp6_type != ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH &&
 	    icmph->icmp6_type != ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG &&
 	    icmph->icmp6_type != ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED &&

[PATCH 4.14 37/45] net/mlx5e: Allow offloading ipv4 header re-write for icmp

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jianbo Liu <jianbol@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit 1ccef350db2f13715040a10df77ae672206004cf ]

For ICMPv4, the checksum is calculated from the ICMP headers and data.
Since the ICMPv4 checksum doesn't cover the IP header, we can allow to
do L3 header re-write for this protocol.

Fixes: bdd66ac0aeed ('net/mlx5e: Disallow TC offloading of unsupported match/action combinations')
Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu <jianbol@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
@@ -1387,7 +1387,8 @@ static bool modify_header_match_supporte
 	}
 
 	ip_proto = MLX5_GET(fte_match_set_lyr_2_4, headers_v, ip_protocol);
-	if (modify_ip_header && ip_proto != IPPROTO_TCP && ip_proto != IPPROTO_UDP) {
+	if (modify_ip_header && ip_proto != IPPROTO_TCP &&
+	    ip_proto != IPPROTO_UDP && ip_proto != IPPROTO_ICMP) {
 		pr_info("can't offload re-write of ip proto %d\n", ip_proto);
 		return false;
 	}

[PATCH 4.14 38/45] nsh: fix infinite loop

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit af50e4ba34f4c45e92535364133d4deb5931c1c5 ]

syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().

Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
 #0:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #1:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #2:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #3:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #4:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #5:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #6:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #7:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #8:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #9:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #10:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #11:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #12:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #13:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #14:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #15:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #16:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #17:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #18:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #19:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #20:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #21:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #22:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #23:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #24:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #25:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #26:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #27:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #28:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #29:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #30:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #31:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #32:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #33:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #34:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #35:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #36:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #37:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #38:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #39:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #40:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #41:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #42:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #43:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #44:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #45:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #46:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
 #47:         (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
 __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/nsh/nsh.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/nsh/nsh.c
+++ b/net/nsh/nsh.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(s
 	if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, NSH_BASE_HDR_LEN)))
 		goto out;
 	nsh_len = nsh_hdr_len(nsh_hdr(skb));
+	if (nsh_len < NSH_BASE_HDR_LEN)
+		goto out;
 	if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, nsh_len)))
 		goto out;
 

[PATCH 4.14 39/45] udp: fix SO_BINDTODEVICE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 69678bcd4d2dedbc3e8fcd6d7d99f283d83c531a ]

Damir reported a breakage of SO_BINDTODEVICE for UDP sockets.
In absence of VRF devices, after commit fb74c27735f0 ("net:
ipv4: add second dif to udp socket lookups") the dif mismatch
isn't fatal anymore for UDP socket lookup with non null
sk_bound_dev_if, breaking SO_BINDTODEVICE semantics.

This changeset addresses the issue making the dif match mandatory
again in the above scenario.

Reported-by: Damir Mansurov <dnman@oktetlabs.ru>
Fixes: fb74c27735f0 ("net: ipv4: add second dif to udp socket lookups")
Fixes: 1801b570dd2a ("net: ipv6: add second dif to udp socket lookups")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/udp.c |    4 ++--
 net/ipv6/udp.c |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -413,9 +413,9 @@ static int compute_score(struct sock *sk
 		bool dev_match = (sk->sk_bound_dev_if == dif ||
 				  sk->sk_bound_dev_if == sdif);
 
-		if (exact_dif && !dev_match)
+		if (!dev_match)
 			return -1;
-		if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev_match)
+		if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
 			score += 4;
 	}
 
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -164,9 +164,9 @@ static int compute_score(struct sock *sk
 		bool dev_match = (sk->sk_bound_dev_if == dif ||
 				  sk->sk_bound_dev_if == sdif);
 
-		if (exact_dif && !dev_match)
+		if (!dev_match)
 			return -1;
-		if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev_match)
+		if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
 			score++;
 	}
 

[PATCH 4.14 40/45] scsi: aacraid: Correct hba_send to include iu_type

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Carroll <david.carroll@microsemi.com>

commit 7d3af7d96af7b9f51e1ef67b6f4725f545737da2 upstream.

commit b60710ec7d7a ("scsi: aacraid: enable sending of TMFs from
aac_hba_send()") allows aac_hba_send() to send scsi commands, and TMF
requests, but the existing code only updates the iu_type for scsi
commands. For TMF requests we are sending an unknown iu_type to
firmware, which causes a fault.

Include iu_type prior to determining the validity of the command

Reported-by: Noah Misner <nmisner@us.ibm.com>
Fixes: b60710ec7d7ab ("aacraid: enable sending of TMFs from aac_hba_send()")
Fixes: 423400e64d377 ("aacraid: Include HBA direct interface")
Tested-by: Noah Misner <nmisner@us.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Carroll <david.carroll@microsemi.com>
Reviewed-by: Raghava Aditya Renukunta <RaghavaAditya.Renukunta@microsemi.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian King <brking@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/aacraid/commsup.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/commsup.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/commsup.c
@@ -752,6 +752,8 @@ int aac_hba_send(u8 command, struct fib
 	int wait;
 	unsigned long flags = 0;
 	unsigned long mflags = 0;
+	struct aac_hba_cmd_req *hbacmd = (struct aac_hba_cmd_req *)
+			fibptr->hw_fib_va;
 
 	fibptr->flags = (FIB_CONTEXT_FLAG | FIB_CONTEXT_FLAG_NATIVE_HBA);
 	if (callback) {
@@ -762,11 +764,9 @@ int aac_hba_send(u8 command, struct fib
 		wait = 1;
 
 
-	if (command == HBA_IU_TYPE_SCSI_CMD_REQ) {
-		struct aac_hba_cmd_req *hbacmd =
-			(struct aac_hba_cmd_req *)fibptr->hw_fib_va;
+	hbacmd->iu_type = command;
 
-		hbacmd->iu_type = command;
+	if (command == HBA_IU_TYPE_SCSI_CMD_REQ) {
 		/* bit1 of request_id must be 0 */
 		hbacmd->request_id =
 			cpu_to_le32((((u32)(fibptr - dev->fibs)) << 2) + 1);

[PATCH 4.14 41/45] xfrm: Use __skb_queue_tail in xfrm_trans_queue

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

commit d16b46e4fd8bc6063624605f25b8c0835bb1fbe3 upstream.

We do not need locking in xfrm_trans_queue because it is designed
to use per-CPU buffers.  However, the original code incorrectly
used skb_queue_tail which takes the lock.  This patch switches
it to __skb_queue_tail instead.

Reported-and-tested-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
Fixes: acf568ee859f ("xfrm: Reinject transport-mode packets...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Strachan <astrachan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ int xfrm_trans_queue(struct sk_buff *skb
 		return -ENOBUFS;
 
 	XFRM_TRANS_SKB_CB(skb)->finish = finish;
-	skb_queue_tail(&trans->queue, skb);
+	__skb_queue_tail(&trans->queue, skb);
 	tasklet_schedule(&trans->tasklet);
 	return 0;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 42/45] btrfs: Take trans lock before access running trans in check_delayed_ref

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: ethanwu <ethanwu@synology.com>

commit 998ac6d21cfd6efd58f5edf420bae8839dda9f2a upstream.

In preivous patch:
Btrfs: kill trans in run_delalloc_nocow and btrfs_cross_ref_exist
We avoid starting btrfs transaction and get this information from
fs_info->running_transaction directly.

When accessing running_transaction in check_delayed_ref, there's a
chance that current transaction will be freed by commit transaction
after the NULL pointer check of running_transaction is passed.

After looking all the other places using fs_info->running_transaction,
they are either protected by trans_lock or holding the transactions.

Fix this by using trans_lock and increasing the use_count.

Fixes: e4c3b2dcd144 ("Btrfs: kill trans in run_delalloc_nocow and btrfs_cross_ref_exist")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: ethanwu <ethanwu@synology.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
@@ -3171,7 +3171,11 @@ static noinline int check_delayed_ref(st
 	struct btrfs_transaction *cur_trans;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	spin_lock(&root->fs_info->trans_lock);
 	cur_trans = root->fs_info->running_transaction;
+	if (cur_trans)
+		refcount_inc(&cur_trans->use_count);
+	spin_unlock(&root->fs_info->trans_lock);
 	if (!cur_trans)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -3180,6 +3184,7 @@ static noinline int check_delayed_ref(st
 	head = btrfs_find_delayed_ref_head(delayed_refs, bytenr);
 	if (!head) {
 		spin_unlock(&delayed_refs->lock);
+		btrfs_put_transaction(cur_trans);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -3196,6 +3201,7 @@ static noinline int check_delayed_ref(st
 		mutex_lock(&head->mutex);
 		mutex_unlock(&head->mutex);
 		btrfs_put_delayed_ref(&head->node);
+		btrfs_put_transaction(cur_trans);
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&delayed_refs->lock);
@@ -3223,6 +3229,7 @@ static noinline int check_delayed_ref(st
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&head->lock);
 	mutex_unlock(&head->mutex);
+	btrfs_put_transaction(cur_trans);
 	return ret;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.14 43/45] xfrm: fix xfrm_do_migrate() with AEAD e.g(AES-GCM)

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Antony Antony <antony@phenome.org>

commit 75bf50f4aaa1c78d769d854ab3d975884909e4fb upstream.

copy geniv when cloning the xfrm state.

x->geniv was not copied to the new state and migration would fail.

xfrm_do_migrate
  ..
  xfrm_state_clone()
   ..
   ..
   esp_init_aead()
   crypto_alloc_aead()
    crypto_alloc_tfm()
     crypto_find_alg() return EAGAIN and failed

Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony@phenome.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -1345,6 +1345,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_clo
 
 	if (orig->aead) {
 		x->aead = xfrm_algo_aead_clone(orig->aead);
+		x->geniv = orig->geniv;
 		if (!x->aead)
 			goto error;
 	}

[PATCH 4.14 44/45] l2tp: revert "l2tp: fix missing print session offset info"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>

commit de3b58bc359a861d5132300f53f95e83f71954b3 upstream.

Revert commit 820da5357572 ("l2tp: fix missing print session offset
info").  The peer_offset parameter is removed.

Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c
@@ -765,8 +765,6 @@ static int l2tp_nl_session_send(struct s
 
 	if ((session->ifname[0] &&
 	     nla_put_string(skb, L2TP_ATTR_IFNAME, session->ifname)) ||
-	    (session->offset &&
-	     nla_put_u16(skb, L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET, session->offset)) ||
 	    (session->cookie_len &&
 	     nla_put(skb, L2TP_ATTR_COOKIE, session->cookie_len,
 		     &session->cookie[0])) ||

[PATCH 4.14 45/45] proc: do not access cmdline nor environ from file-backed areas

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

commit 7f7ccc2ccc2e70c6054685f5e3522efa81556830 upstream.

proc_pid_cmdline_read() and environ_read() directly access the target
process' VM to retrieve the command line and environment. If this
process remaps these areas onto a file via mmap(), the requesting
process may experience various issues such as extra delays if the
underlying device is slow to respond.

Let's simply refuse to access file-backed areas in these functions.
For this we add a new FOLL_ANON gup flag that is passed to all calls
to access_remote_vm(). The code already takes care of such failures
(including unmapped areas). Accesses via /proc/pid/mem were not
changed though.

This was assigned CVE-2018-1120.

Note for stable backports: the patch may apply to kernels prior to 4.11
but silently miss one location; it must be checked that no call to
access_remote_vm() keeps zero as the last argument.

Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/proc/base.c     |    8 ++++----
 include/linux/mm.h |    1 +
 mm/gup.c           |    3 +++
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_cmdline_read(str
 	 * Inherently racy -- command line shares address space
 	 * with code and data.
 	 */
-	rv = access_remote_vm(mm, arg_end - 1, &c, 1, 0);
+	rv = access_remote_vm(mm, arg_end - 1, &c, 1, FOLL_ANON);
 	if (rv <= 0)
 		goto out_free_page;
 
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_cmdline_read(str
 			int nr_read;
 
 			_count = min3(count, len, PAGE_SIZE);
-			nr_read = access_remote_vm(mm, p, page, _count, 0);
+			nr_read = access_remote_vm(mm, p, page, _count, FOLL_ANON);
 			if (nr_read < 0)
 				rv = nr_read;
 			if (nr_read <= 0)
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_cmdline_read(str
 				bool final;
 
 				_count = min3(count, len, PAGE_SIZE);
-				nr_read = access_remote_vm(mm, p, page, _count, 0);
+				nr_read = access_remote_vm(mm, p, page, _count, FOLL_ANON);
 				if (nr_read < 0)
 					rv = nr_read;
 				if (nr_read <= 0)
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file
 		max_len = min_t(size_t, PAGE_SIZE, count);
 		this_len = min(max_len, this_len);
 
-		retval = access_remote_vm(mm, (env_start + src), page, this_len, 0);
+		retval = access_remote_vm(mm, (env_start + src), page, this_len, FOLL_ANON);
 
 		if (retval <= 0) {
 			ret = retval;
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2383,6 +2383,7 @@ static inline struct page *follow_page(s
 #define FOLL_MLOCK	0x1000	/* lock present pages */
 #define FOLL_REMOTE	0x2000	/* we are working on non-current tsk/mm */
 #define FOLL_COW	0x4000	/* internal GUP flag */
+#define FOLL_ANON	0x8000	/* don't do file mappings */
 
 static inline int vm_fault_to_errno(int vm_fault, int foll_flags)
 {
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -544,6 +544,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_are
 	if (vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	if (gup_flags & FOLL_ANON && !vma_is_anonymous(vma))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	if (write) {
 		if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
 			if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))

Re: [PATCH 4.14 00/45] 4.14.42-stable review

[Guenter Roeck]

On 05/18/2018 01:15 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.42 release.
> There are 45 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun May 20 08:15:14 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

For v4.14.41-46-g879085a:

Build results:
	total: 146 pass: 146 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 141 pass: 141 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders/.

Guenter

Re: [PATCH 4.14 00/45] 4.14.42-stable review

[Naresh Kamboju]

On 18 May 2018 at 13:45, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.42 release.
> There are 45 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun May 20 08:15:14 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.42-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.14.42-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.14.y
git commit: 879085a4c525940c6c3b08d6a2f49fc064bf02a8
git describe: v4.14.41-46-g879085a4c525
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.14-oe/build/v4.14.41-46-g879085a4c525


No regressions (compared to build v4.14.41-44-g1134b348cdb5)

Boards, architectures and test suites:
-------------------------------------

dragonboard-410c
* boot - pass: 20
* kselftest - skip: 27, pass: 41
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 6, pass: 57
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 1, pass: 21
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 14
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 134, pass: 1016
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13

hi6220-hikey - arm64
* boot - pass: 20
* kselftest - skip: 23, pass: 44
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 6, pass: 57
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 1, pass: 21
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 4, pass: 10
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 135, pass: 1015
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13

juno-r2 - arm64
* boot - pass: 20
* kselftest - skip: 25, pass: 43
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 6, pass: 57
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 4, pass: 10
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 134, pass: 1016
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13

qemu_arm
* boot - pass: 21
* kselftest - fail: 2, skip: 29, pass: 37
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 2
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 18, pass: 63
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 5, pass: 58
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 1, pass: 21
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 7, pass: 7
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-syscalls-tests - fail: 3, skip: 92, pass: 1055
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13

qemu_arm64
* boot - pass: 21
* kselftest - skip: 29, pass: 41
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 6, pass: 57
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 6, pass: 8
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-syscalls-tests - fail: 2, skip: 156, pass: 992
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13

qemu_x86_64
* boot - pass: 20
* kselftest - skip: 30, pass: 50
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 6, pass: 57
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 1, pass: 13
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 152, pass: 998
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13

x15 - arm
* boot - pass: 20
* kselftest - fail: 2, skip: 26, pass: 36
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 87
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 18, pass: 63
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 5, pass: 58
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 2, pass: 20
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 1, pass: 13
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 75, pass: 1075
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13

x86_64
* boot - pass: 22
* kselftest - skip: 22, pass: 54
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native - fail: 1, skip: 22, pass: 53
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none - skip: 21, pass: 54
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-containers-tests - skip: 17, pass: 64
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 5, pass: 58
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 5, pass: 9
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 116, pass: 1034
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13

-- 
Linaro QA (BETA)
https://qa-reports.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH 4.14 00/45] 4.14.42-stable review

[Shuah Khan]

On 05/18/2018 02:15 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.42 release.
> There are 45 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun May 20 08:15:14 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.42-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah