From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 39/87] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits
Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 23:11:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180521210424.131361504@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180521210420.222671977@linuxfoundation.org>
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
commit 1b86883ccb8d5d9506529d42dbe1a5257cb30b18 upstream
The 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf refers to all
the other bits as reserved. The Intel SDM glossary defines reserved as
implementation specific - aka unknown.
As such at bootup this must be taken it into account and proper masking for
the bits in use applied.
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
[ tglx: Made x86_spec_ctrl_base __ro_after_init ]
Suggested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
+/*
+ * The Intel specification for the SPEC_CTRL MSR requires that we
+ * preserve any already set reserved bits at boot time (e.g. for
+ * future additions that this kernel is not currently aware of).
+ * We then set any additional mitigation bits that we want
+ * ourselves and always use this as the base for SPEC_CTRL.
+ * We also use this when handling guest entry/exit as below.
+ */
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
+extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void);
+
extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
@@ -254,8 +265,9 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int
static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
{
- alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB,
- X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+ u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
+
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
}
/*
@@ -266,14 +278,18 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
*/
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
do { \
+ u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_get_default() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \
+ \
preempt_disable(); \
- alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, \
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
} while (0)
#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
do { \
- alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, \
+ u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(); \
+ \
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
preempt_enable(); \
} while (0)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+/*
+ * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
+ * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
+ */
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -36,6 +42,13 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
}
+ /*
+ * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
+ * have unknown values.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
@@ -94,6 +107,21 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[]
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val)
+{
+ if (val & ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS)
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "SPEC_CTRL MSR value 0x%16llx is unknown.\n", val);
+ else
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base | val);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set);
+
+u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
+{
+ return x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
+
#ifdef RETPOLINE
static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-21 21:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/87] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/87] usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/87] usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/87] ALSA: usb: mixer: volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/87] ALSA: hda: Add Lenovo C50 All in one to the power_save blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/87] ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/87] spi: pxa2xx: Allow 64-bit DMA Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Avoid setting MSPI_CDRAM_PCS for spi-nor master Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Always read and set BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/87] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/87] powerpc: Dont preempt_disable() in show_cpuinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/87] signals: avoid unnecessary taking of sighand->siglock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/87] tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/87] netfilter: nf_tables: cant fail after linking rule into active rule list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/87] i2c: designware: fix poll-after-enable regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/87] powerpc/powernv: Fix NVRAM sleep in invalid context when crashing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/87] mm: dont allow deferred pages with NEED_PER_CPU_KM Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/87] s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/87] s390/cpum_sf: ensure sample frequency of perf event attributes is non-zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/87] s390/qdio: dont release memory in qdio_setup_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/87] s390: remove indirect branch from do_softirq_own_stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/87] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/87] x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/87] efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32 definition for mixed mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/87] ARM: 8771/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/87] tick/broadcast: Use for_each_cpu() specially on UP kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/87] ARM: 8769/1: kprobes: Fix to use get_kprobe_ctlblk after irq-disabed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/87] ARM: 8770/1: kprobes: Prohibit probing on optimized_callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/87] ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/87] Btrfs: fix xattr loss after power failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/87] btrfs: fix crash when trying to resume balance without the resume flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/87] x86/amd: dont set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/87] btrfs: fix reading stale metadata blocks after degraded raid1 mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/87] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 40/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 41/87] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 42/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 43/87] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 44/87] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 45/87] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 46/87] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 48/87] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 49/87] prctl: Add speculation control prctls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 50/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 51/87] x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 52/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF_NOTSC switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 53/87] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 54/87] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 55/87] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 56/87] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 57/87] seccomp: Enable " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 58/87] x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 59/87] prctl: Add force disable speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 60/87] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 61/87] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 62/87] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 63/87] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 64/87] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 65/87] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 66/87] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 67/87] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 68/87] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 69/87] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 70/87] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 71/87] KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 73/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 74/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 75/87] x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 76/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 77/87] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 78/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 79/87] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 80/87] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 81/87] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 82/87] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 83/87] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 84/87] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 85/87] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 86/87] KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 87/87] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-22 11:08 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Naresh Kamboju
2018-05-22 13:28 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-05-22 20:41 ` Shuah Khan
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