From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 21/24] kvm: x86: use correct privilege level for sgdt/sidt/fxsave/fxrstor access
Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 16:05:16 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180614132725.335970183@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180614132724.483802160@linuxfoundation.org>
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
commit 3c9fa24ca7c9c47605672916491f79e8ccacb9e6 upstream.
The functions that were used in the emulation of fxrstor, fxsave, sgdt and
sidt were originally meant for task switching, and as such they did not
check privilege levels. This is very bad when the same functions are used
in the emulation of unprivileged instructions. This is CVE-2018-10853.
The obvious fix is to add a new argument to ops->read_std and ops->write_std,
which decides whether the access is a "system" access or should use the
processor's CPL.
Fixes: 129a72a0d3c8 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 6 ++++--
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 12 ++++++------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -105,11 +105,12 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
* @addr: [IN ] Linear address from which to read.
* @val: [OUT] Value read from memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'.
* @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to read from memory.
+ * @system:[IN ] Whether the access is forced to be at CPL0.
*/
int (*read_std)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long addr, void *val,
unsigned int bytes,
- struct x86_exception *fault);
+ struct x86_exception *fault, bool system);
/*
* read_phys: Read bytes of standard (non-emulated/special) memory.
@@ -127,10 +128,11 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
* @addr: [IN ] Linear address to which to write.
* @val: [OUT] Value write to memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'.
* @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to write to memory.
+ * @system:[IN ] Whether the access is forced to be at CPL0.
*/
int (*write_std)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
- struct x86_exception *fault);
+ struct x86_exception *fault, bool system);
/*
* fetch: Read bytes of standard (non-emulated/special) memory.
* Used for instruction fetch.
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -793,14 +793,14 @@ static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emu
static int linear_read_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear,
void *data, unsigned size)
{
- return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+ return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true);
}
static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
ulong linear, void *data,
unsigned int size)
{
- return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+ return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true);
}
static int segmented_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static int segmented_read_std(struct x86
rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, false, &linear);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
- return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+ return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false);
}
static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static int segmented_write_std(struct x8
rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
- return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+ return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false);
}
/*
@@ -2900,12 +2900,12 @@ static bool emulator_io_port_access_allo
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
base |= ((u64)base3) << 32;
#endif
- r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL);
+ r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL, true);
if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return false;
if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg))
return false;
- r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL);
+ r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL, true);
if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return false;
if ((perm >> bit_idx) & mask)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4258,10 +4258,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_read_guest_virt);
static int emulator_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
- struct x86_exception *exception)
+ struct x86_exception *exception, bool system)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
- return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, 0, exception);
+ u32 access = 0;
+
+ if (!system && kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3)
+ access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
+
+ return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, access, exception);
}
static int kvm_read_guest_phys_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -4305,12 +4310,17 @@ out:
}
static int emulator_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gva_t addr, void *val,
- unsigned int bytes, struct x86_exception *exception)
+ unsigned int bytes, struct x86_exception *exception,
+ bool system)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+ u32 access = PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+
+ if (!system && kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3)
+ access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
return kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu,
- PFERR_WRITE_MASK, exception);
+ access, exception);
}
int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, void *val,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-14 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-14 14:04 [PATCH 4.4 00/24] 4.4.138-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:04 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/24] x86/fpu: Fix early FPU command-line parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:04 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/24] x86: Remove unused function cpu_has_ht_siblings() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:04 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/24] x86/cpufeature: Remove unused and seldomly used cpu_has_xx macros Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:04 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/24] x86/fpu: Disable MPX when eagerfpu is off Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/24] x86/fpu: Disable AVX " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/24] x86/fpu: Default eagerfpu=on on all CPUs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/24] x86/fpu: Fix no387 regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/24] x86/fpu: Revert ("x86/fpu: Disable AVX when eagerfpu is off") Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/24] x86/fpu: Fix eager-FPU handling on legacy FPU machines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/24] x86/fpu: Hard-disable lazy FPU mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-15 4:24 ` Daniel Sangorrin
2018-06-15 4:56 ` 'Greg Kroah-Hartman'
2018-06-15 5:23 ` Daniel Sangorrin
2018-06-15 7:06 ` 'Greg Kroah-Hartman'
2018-06-15 9:49 ` Daniel Sangorrin
2018-06-19 15:02 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/24] x86/fpu: Fix FNSAVE usage in eagerfpu mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/24] x86/fpu: Fix math emulation in eager fpu mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/24] af_key: Always verify length of provided sadb_key Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/24] x86/crypto, x86/fpu: Remove X86_FEATURE_EAGER_FPU #ifdef from the crc32c code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/24] gpio: No NULL owner Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/24] Clarify (and fix) MAX_LFS_FILESIZE macros Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/24] KVM: x86: introduce linear_{read,write}_system Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/24] KVM: x86: pass kvm_vcpu to kvm_read_guest_virt and kvm_write_guest_virt_system Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/24] serial: samsung: fix maxburst parameter for DMA transactions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 20/24] vmw_balloon: fixing double free when batching mode is off Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 22/24] Input: goodix - add new ACPI id for GPD Win 2 touch screen Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 23/24] Input: elan_i2c - add ELAN0612 (Lenovo v330 14IKB) ACPI ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 14:05 ` [PATCH 4.4 24/24] crypto: vmx - Remove overly verbose printk from AES init routines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 16:57 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/24] 4.4.138-stable review Nathan Chancellor
2018-06-14 18:47 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-06-14 22:43 ` Shuah Khan
2018-06-15 0:24 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-06-15 15:18 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-06-19 14:28 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-06-28 4:09 ` Daniel Sangorrin
2018-07-05 16:08 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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