From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>,
Srinidhi Rao <srinidhir@vmware.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 15/17] fork: unconditionally clear stack on fork
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2018 20:51:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180807172342.911589278@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180807172342.071526922@linuxfoundation.org>
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
commit e01e80634ecdde1dd113ac43b3adad21b47f3957 upstream.
One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated. Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place. In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.
Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.
Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
Mean: 159.12
Std Dev: 1.54
and after:
Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
Mean: 158.46
Std Dev: 1.46
Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.
[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak
I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.
before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean: 221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47
after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean: 217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99
It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy. I'm
open to ideas!
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[ Srivatsa: Backported to 4.9.y ]
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Srinidhi Rao <srinidhir@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/thread_info.h | 7 +------
kernel/fork.c | 3 +--
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/thread_info.h
+++ b/include/linux/thread_info.h
@@ -59,12 +59,7 @@ extern long do_no_restart_syscall(struct
#ifdef __KERNEL__
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK)
-# define THREADINFO_GFP (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOTRACK | \
- __GFP_ZERO)
-#else
-# define THREADINFO_GFP (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOTRACK)
-#endif
+#define THREADINFO_GFP (GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO)
/*
* flag set/clear/test wrappers
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -184,10 +184,9 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack
continue;
this_cpu_write(cached_stacks[i], NULL);
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
-#endif
+
tsk->stack_vm_area = s;
local_irq_enable();
return s->addr;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-07 18:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-07 18:51 [PATCH 4.9 00/17] 4.9.119-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/17] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix ISP recovery on unload Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/17] scsi: qla2xxx: Return error when TMF returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/17] genirq: Make force irq threading setup more robust Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/17] nohz: Fix local_timer_softirq_pending() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/17] netlink: Do not subscribe to non-existent groups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/17] netlink: Dont shift with UB on nlk->ngroups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/17] netlink: Dont shift on 64 for ngroups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/17] ext4: fix false negatives *and* false positives in ext4_check_descriptors() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/17] ACPI / PCI: Bail early in acpi_pci_add_bus() if there is no ACPI handle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/17] ring_buffer: tracing: Inherit the tracing setting to next ring buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/17] Btrfs: fix file data corruption after cloning a range and fsync Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/17] tcp: add tcp_ooo_try_coalesce() helper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/17] kmemleak: clear stale pointers from task stacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/17] IB/hfi1: Fix incorrect mixing of ERR_PTR and NULL return values Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 18:51 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/17] jfs: Fix inconsistency between memory allocation and ea_buf->max_size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-07 22:32 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/17] 4.9.119-stable review Nathan Chancellor
2018-08-08 2:56 ` Shuah Khan
2018-08-08 5:22 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-08-08 15:47 ` Guenter Roeck
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