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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
	Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.18 10/22] drm/amdgpu/pm: Fix potential Spectre v1
Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 09:56:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180823074759.821807615@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180823074759.234685844@linuxfoundation.org>

4.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

commit ddf74e79a54070f277ae520722d3bab7f7a6c67a upstream.

idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c:408 amdgpu_set_pp_force_state()
warn: potential spectre issue 'data.states'

Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index data.states

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/power_supply.h>
 #include <linux/hwmon.h>
 #include <linux/hwmon-sysfs.h>
-
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 static int amdgpu_debugfs_pm_init(struct amdgpu_device *adev);
 
@@ -393,6 +393,7 @@ static ssize_t amdgpu_set_pp_force_state
 			count = -EINVAL;
 			goto fail;
 		}
+		idx = array_index_nospec(idx, ARRAY_SIZE(data.states));
 
 		amdgpu_dpm_get_pp_num_states(adev, &data);
 		state = data.states[idx];

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-23 12:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-23  7:56 [PATCH 4.18 00/22] 4.18.5-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 01/22] EDAC: Add missing MEM_LRDDR4 entry in edac_mem_types[] Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 02/22] pty: fix O_CLOEXEC for TIOCGPTPEER Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 03/22] mm: Allow non-direct-map arguments to free_reserved_area() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 04/22] x86/mm/init: Pass unconverted symbol addresses to free_init_pages() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 05/22] x86/mm/init: Add helper for freeing kernel image pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 06/22] x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 07/22] powerpc64s: Show ori31 availability in spectre_v1 sysfs file not v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 08/22] ext4: fix spectre gadget in ext4_mb_regular_allocator() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 09/22] drm/i915/kvmgt: Fix potential Spectre v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 14/22] PCI / ACPI / PM: Resume all bridges on suspend-to-RAM Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 15/22] PCI: hotplug: Dont leak pci_slot on registration failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 16/22] PCI: aardvark: Size bridges before resources allocation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 17/22] PCI: Skip MPS logic for Virtual Functions (VFs) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 18/22] PCI: pciehp: Fix use-after-free on unplug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 19/22] PCI: pciehp: Fix unprotected list iteration in IRQ handler Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 20/22] i2c: core: ACPI: Properly set status byte to 0 for multi-byte writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23  7:56 ` [PATCH 4.18 22/22] reiserfs: fix broken xattr handling (heap corruption, bad retval) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23 19:20 ` [PATCH 4.18 00/22] 4.18.5-stable review Shuah Khan
2018-08-23 20:34   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-23 20:12 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-23 20:52   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-24  5:07 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-08-24  6:18   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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