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From: David Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>,
	Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 18/24] ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 09:57:07 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181031135713.2873-19-dave.long@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181031135713.2873-1-dave.long@linaro.org>

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 10573ae547c85b2c61417ff1a106cffbfceada35 upstream.

Prevent speculation at the syscall table decoding by clamping the index
used to zero on invalid system call numbers, and using the csdb
speculative barrier.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 18 +++++++-----------
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index 10c3283d6c19..56be67ecf0fa 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -223,9 +223,7 @@ local_restart:
 	tst	r10, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK		@ are we tracing syscalls?
 	bne	__sys_trace
 
-	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
-	badr	lr, ret_fast_syscall		@ return address
-	ldrcc	pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2]		@ call sys_* routine
+	invoke_syscall tbl, scno, r10, ret_fast_syscall
 
 	add	r1, sp, #S_OFF
 2:	cmp	scno, #(__ARM_NR_BASE - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE)
@@ -258,14 +256,8 @@ __sys_trace:
 	mov	r1, scno
 	add	r0, sp, #S_OFF
 	bl	syscall_trace_enter
-
-	badr	lr, __sys_trace_return		@ return address
-	mov	scno, r0			@ syscall number (possibly new)
-	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
-	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
-	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ have to reload r0 - r6
-	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ and update the stack args
-	ldrcc	pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2]		@ call sys_* routine
+	mov	scno, r0
+	invoke_syscall tbl, scno, r10, __sys_trace_return, reload=1
 	cmp	scno, #-1			@ skip the syscall?
 	bne	2b
 	add	sp, sp, #S_OFF			@ restore stack
@@ -317,6 +309,10 @@ sys_syscall:
 		bic	scno, r0, #__NR_OABI_SYSCALL_BASE
 		cmp	scno, #__NR_syscall - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE
 		cmpne	scno, #NR_syscalls	@ check range
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+		movhs	scno, #0
+		csdb
+#endif
 		stmloia	sp, {r5, r6}		@ shuffle args
 		movlo	r0, r1
 		movlo	r1, r2
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S
index e056c9a9aa9d..fa7c6e5c17e7 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S
@@ -377,6 +377,31 @@
 #endif
 	.endm
 
+	.macro	invoke_syscall, table, nr, tmp, ret, reload=0
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	mov	\tmp, \nr
+	cmp	\tmp, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
+	movcs	\tmp, #0
+	csdb
+	badr	lr, \ret			@ return address
+	.if	\reload
+	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ reload r0-r6
+	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ update stack arguments
+	.endif
+	ldrcc	pc, [\table, \tmp, lsl #2]	@ call sys_* routine
+#else
+	cmp	\nr, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
+	badr	lr, \ret			@ return address
+	.if	\reload
+	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ reload r0-r6
+	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ update stack arguments
+	.endif
+	ldrcc	pc, [\table, \nr, lsl #2]	@ call sys_* routine
+#endif
+	.endm
+
 /*
  * These are the registers used in the syscall handler, and allow us to
  * have in theory up to 7 arguments to a function - r0 to r6.
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-31 22:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-31 13:56 [PATCH 4.9 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/24] ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/24] ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/24] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/24] ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/24] ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening David Long
2018-11-06 10:40   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-06 10:55     ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-06 16:19       ` Mark Brown
2018-11-06 16:30         ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-06 16:53           ` Mark Brown
2018-11-06 16:20     ` David Long
2018-11-06 16:23       ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/24] ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17 David Long
2018-11-05  9:13   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-07  2:22     ` David Long
2018-11-07  2:23     ` David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15 David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/24] ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15 David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/24] ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/24] ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` David Long [this message]
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/24] ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/24] ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/24] ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/24] ARM: use __inttype() in get_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/24] ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/24] ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses David Long
2018-10-31 21:23 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches Florian Fainelli
2018-11-02  1:18 ` David Long
2018-11-02  8:54   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-02 17:22     ` David Long
2018-11-02 11:28   ` Russell King - ARM Linux

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