From: David Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org,
Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>,
Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 V2 23/24] ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user()
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2018 11:44:01 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181107164402.9380-24-dave.long@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181107164402.9380-1-dave.long@linaro.org>
From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Commit b1cd0a14806321721aae45f5446ed83a3647c914 upstream.
Fixing __get_user() for spectre variant 1 is not sane: we would have to
add address space bounds checking in order to validate that the location
should be accessed, and then zero the address if found to be invalid.
Since __get_user() is supposed to avoid the bounds check, and this is
exactly what get_user() does, there's no point having two different
implementations that are doing the same thing. So, when the Spectre
workarounds are required, make __get_user() an alias of get_user().
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 17 +++++++++++------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 4a61f36c7397..7b17460127fd 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -280,6 +280,16 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
#define user_addr_max() \
(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS) ? ~0UL : get_fs())
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+/*
+ * When mitigating Spectre variant 1, it is not worth fixing the non-
+ * verifying accessors, because we need to add verification of the
+ * address space there. Force these to use the standard get_user()
+ * version instead.
+ */
+#define __get_user(x, ptr) get_user(x, ptr)
+#else
+
/*
* The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the
* address space - it must have been done previously with a separate
@@ -296,12 +306,6 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
__gu_err; \
})
-#define __get_user_error(x, ptr, err) \
-({ \
- __get_user_err((x), (ptr), err); \
- (void) 0; \
-})
-
#define __get_user_err(x, ptr, err) \
do { \
unsigned long __gu_addr = (unsigned long)(ptr); \
@@ -361,6 +365,7 @@ do { \
#define __get_user_asm_word(x, addr, err) \
__get_user_asm(x, addr, err, ldr)
+#endif
#define __put_user_switch(x, ptr, __err, __fn) \
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-08 2:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-07 16:43 [PATCH 4.9 V2 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 01/24] ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 02/24] ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 03/24] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 04/24] ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 05/24] ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 06/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 07/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 08/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening David Long
2018-11-12 16:54 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-13 14:23 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-13 15:16 ` David Long
2018-11-13 17:36 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-13 17:54 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-13 16:43 ` Tony Lindgren
2018-11-13 18:08 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-11-20 10:59 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-20 11:15 ` Greg KH
2018-11-20 15:30 ` David Long
2018-11-20 16:42 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-20 16:24 ` David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 10/24] ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 11/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17 David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 12/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15 David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 13/24] ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15 David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 14/24] ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 15/24] ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 16/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 17/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 18/24] ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 19/24] ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user() David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 20/24] ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state David Long
2018-11-07 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 21/24] ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user() David Long
2018-11-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 22/24] ARM: use __inttype() in get_user() David Long
2018-11-07 16:44 ` David Long [this message]
2018-11-07 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 24/24] ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses David Long
2018-11-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 4.9 V2 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-21 18:27 ` Greg KH
2018-11-21 19:13 ` David Long
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