From: Maxim Zhukov <mussitantesmortem@gmail.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4.9] x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation
Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 19:27:24 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190303162724.30155-1-mussitantesmortem@gmail.com> (raw)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
When calling __put_user(foo(), ptr), the __put_user() macro would call
foo() in between __uaccess_begin() and __uaccess_end(). If that code
were buggy, then those bugs would be run without SMAP protection.
Fortunately, there seem to be few instances of the problem in the
kernel. Nevertheless, __put_user() should be fixed to avoid doing this.
Therefore, evaluate __put_user()'s argument before setting AC.
This issue was noticed when an objtool hack by Peter Zijlstra complained
about genregs_get() and I compared the assembly output to the C source.
[ bp: Massage commit message and fixed up whitespace. ]
Fixes: 11f1a4b9755f ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225125231.845656645@infradead.org
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index a8d85a687cf4..39bbc225558c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ do { \
__put_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "l", "k", "ir", errret); \
break; \
case 8: \
- __put_user_asm_u64((__typeof__(*ptr))(x), ptr, retval, \
+ __put_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval, \
errret); \
break; \
default: \
@@ -427,8 +427,10 @@ do { \
#define __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size) \
({ \
int __pu_err; \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val; \
__uaccess_begin(); \
- __put_user_size((x), (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT); \
+ __pu_val = x; \
+ __put_user_size(__pu_val, (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT); \
__uaccess_end(); \
__builtin_expect(__pu_err, 0); \
})
--
2.21.0
next reply other threads:[~2019-03-03 16:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-03 16:27 Maxim Zhukov [this message]
2019-03-03 16:38 ` [PATCH v4.9] x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation Nathan Chancellor
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