[PATCH v4.4] x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation

[PATCH v4.4] x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation

[Maxim Zhukov]

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

commit 2a418cf3f5f1caf911af288e978d61c9844b0695 upstream.

When calling __put_user(foo(), ptr), the __put_user() macro would call
foo() in between __uaccess_begin() and __uaccess_end().  If that code
were buggy, then those bugs would be run without SMAP protection.

Fortunately, there seem to be few instances of the problem in the
kernel. Nevertheless, __put_user() should be fixed to avoid doing this.
Therefore, evaluate __put_user()'s argument before setting AC.

This issue was noticed when an objtool hack by Peter Zijlstra complained
about genregs_get() and I compared the assembly output to the C source.

 [ bp: Massage commit message and fixed up whitespace. ]

Fixes: 11f1a4b9755f ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225125231.845656645@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Zhukov <mussitantesmortem@gmail.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index d788b0cdc0ad..4f4a9fa61b8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ do {									\
 		__put_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "l", "k", "ir", errret);	\
 		break;							\
 	case 8:								\
-		__put_user_asm_u64((__typeof__(*ptr))(x), ptr, retval,	\
+		__put_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval,	\
 				   errret);				\
 		break;							\
 	default:							\
@@ -410,7 +410,9 @@ do {									\
 #define __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size)			\
 ({								\
 	int __pu_err;						\
-	__put_user_size((x), (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT);	\
+	__typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val;				\
+	__pu_val = x;						\
+	__put_user_size(__pu_val, (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT);	\
 	__builtin_expect(__pu_err, 0);				\
 })
 
-- 
2.21.0

Re: [PATCH v4.4] x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation

[Nathan Chancellor]

On Sun, Mar 03, 2019 at 07:07:09PM +0300, Maxim Zhukov wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> 
> commit 2a418cf3f5f1caf911af288e978d61c9844b0695 upstream.
> 
> When calling __put_user(foo(), ptr), the __put_user() macro would call
> foo() in between __uaccess_begin() and __uaccess_end().  If that code
> were buggy, then those bugs would be run without SMAP protection.
> 
> Fortunately, there seem to be few instances of the problem in the
> kernel. Nevertheless, __put_user() should be fixed to avoid doing this.
> Therefore, evaluate __put_user()'s argument before setting AC.
> 
> This issue was noticed when an objtool hack by Peter Zijlstra complained
> about genregs_get() and I compared the assembly output to the C source.
> 
>  [ bp: Massage commit message and fixed up whitespace. ]
> 
> Fixes: 11f1a4b9755f ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses")
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225125231.845656645@infradead.org
> Signed-off-by: Maxim Zhukov <mussitantesmortem@gmail.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 ++++--
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index d788b0cdc0ad..4f4a9fa61b8a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ do {									\
>  		__put_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "l", "k", "ir", errret);	\
>  		break;							\
>  	case 8:								\
> -		__put_user_asm_u64((__typeof__(*ptr))(x), ptr, retval,	\
> +		__put_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval,	\
>  				   errret);				\
>  		break;							\
>  	default:							\
> @@ -410,7 +410,9 @@ do {									\
>  #define __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size)			\
>  ({								\
>  	int __pu_err;						\
> -	__put_user_size((x), (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT);	\
> +	__typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val;				\
> +	__pu_val = x;						\
> +	__put_user_size(__pu_val, (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT);	\
>  	__builtin_expect(__pu_err, 0);				\
>  })
>  
> -- 
> 2.21.0
> 

Did you generate this against a current 4.4 tree? It fails to apply to
4.4.176 because this patch doesn't account for cc8c5450b6d7 ("x86:
reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses"). Odds are you will
only need one patch for 4.4 to 4.20.

Cheers,
Nathan

Re: [PATCH v4.4] x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Sun, Mar 03, 2019 at 08:28:01PM +0300, Maxim Zhukov wrote:
> Whoops, this patch generated on old tree, sorry. I regenerate patch from
> new 4.4 tree. And test for all kernels (its work). Resend one patch for all
> stable branches?

If that is what works and is needed, yes.