From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C417CC43381 for ; Mon, 1 Apr 2019 17:56:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 950B42084B for ; Mon, 1 Apr 2019 17:56:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1554141392; bh=rkMbvPlw/Deo2TEUlhdRNQAwXnCGiQtBJv648V/uWlw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=hS9JZ4+SIhehvqXftGzZZ0x3VoB1k+K5XZFXxKTl/dyMirhOCx7db4/ls8DDN/5lF aPpA4RsCC42p01XZ7UmxB/EA0hs2kT7TYVL/qwrN/YFok8Ylgost04ZBSnM//s4yvk vDg47sgS/d8F80w8uNO9vvuJNFqCiDpB4b13UI5w= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731189AbfDARV2 (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Apr 2019 13:21:28 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:50070 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731546AbfDARV0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Apr 2019 13:21:26 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 076392133D; Mon, 1 Apr 2019 17:21:24 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1554139285; bh=rkMbvPlw/Deo2TEUlhdRNQAwXnCGiQtBJv648V/uWlw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fmdHvY18fLpr/y67LXjZQLrmP3hyKmerOeX0YtSeSwmHvIKxTBwIJywlfMjxSk1Nw xMxFyLftrZsj9YdC2fMMv7yJy4KrG9j7UjZhgrzAOAEpCwdL7PsajzxVmmJ9Qs0vAT mzWPS0rxixsoPsGtVQZUhBWEzD31IW/QkDOJBS14= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman Subject: [PATCH 4.14 030/107] powerpc64s: Show ori31 availability in spectre_v1 sysfs file not v2 Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 19:01:45 +0200 Message-Id: <20190401170048.471975042@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190401170045.246405031@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190401170045.246405031@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Michael Ellerman commit 6d44acae1937b81cf8115ada8958e04f601f3f2e upstream. When I added the spectre_v2 information in sysfs, I included the availability of the ori31 speculation barrier. Although the ori31 barrier can be used to mitigate v2, it's primarily intended as a spectre v1 mitigation. Spectre v2 is mitigated by hardware changes. So rework the sysfs files to show the ori31 information in the spectre_v1 file, rather than v2. Currently we display eg: $ grep . spectre_v* spectre_v1:Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization spectre_v2:Mitigation: Indirect branch cache disabled, ori31 speculation barrier enabled After: $ grep . spectre_v* spectre_v1:Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization, ori31 speculation barrier enabled spectre_v2:Mitigation: Indirect branch cache disabled Fixes: d6fbe1c55c55 ("powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+ Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c @@ -117,25 +117,35 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR)) - return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + struct seq_buf s; + + seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1); + + if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR)) { + if (barrier_nospec_enabled) + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization"); + else + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable"); - if (barrier_nospec_enabled) - return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); + if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31)) + seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n"); + } else + seq_buf_printf(&s, "Not affected\n"); + + return s.len; } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - bool bcs, ccd, ori; struct seq_buf s; + bool bcs, ccd; seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1); bcs = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED); ccd = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED); - ori = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31); if (bcs || ccd) { seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: "); @@ -151,9 +161,6 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic } else seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable"); - if (ori) - seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled"); - seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n"); return s.len;