From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/7] crypto: salsa20 - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 23:46:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190410064635.11813-3-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190410064635.11813-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
salsa20-generic doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to the alignmask
being removed by commit b62b3db76f73 ("crypto: salsa20-generic - cleanup
and convert to skcipher API").
Since salsa20-generic does not update the IV and does not need any IV
alignment, update it to use req->iv instead of walk.iv.
Fixes: 2407d60872dd ("[CRYPTO] salsa20: Salsa20 stream cipher")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
crypto/salsa20_generic.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/salsa20_generic.c b/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
index 443fba09cbed7..faed244be316f 100644
--- a/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int salsa20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
- salsa20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv);
+ salsa20_init(state, ctx, req->iv);
while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-10 6:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190410064635.11813-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] crypto: lrw - don't access already-freed walk.iv Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 6:46 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2019-04-10 19:18 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] crypto: salsa20 " Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] crypto: gcm - fix incompatibility between "gcm" and "gcm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
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