From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 4/7] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 23:46:32 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190410064635.11813-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190410064635.11813-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and unconditionally accessing walk.iv has caused a
real problem in other algorithms. Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to start
checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt().
Fixes: 1abee99eafab ("crypto: arm64/aes - reimplement bit-sliced ARM/NEON implementation for arm64")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
index 4737b6c6c5cf5..5144551177334 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ static int __xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req,
int err;
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
kernel_neon_begin();
neon_aes_ecb_encrypt(walk.iv, walk.iv, ctx->twkey, ctx->key.rounds, 1);
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-10 6:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190410064635.11813-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] crypto: lrw - don't access already-freed walk.iv Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] crypto: salsa20 " Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2019-04-10 19:18 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] crypto: gcm - fix incompatibility between "gcm" and "gcm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20190410064635.11813-5-ebiggers@kernel.org \
--to=ebiggers@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).