From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: John S Gruber <JohnSGruber@gmail.com>
Cc: john.hubbard@gmail.com, hpa@zytor.com, jhubbard@nvidia.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] x86/boot: Fix regression--secure boot info loss from bootparam sanitizing
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2019 09:23:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190902072310.GA9605@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPotdmSPExAuQcy9iAHqX3js_fc4mMLQOTr5RBGvizyCOPcTQQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Sep 02, 2019 at 12:00:54AM +0200, John S Gruber wrote:
> From: "John S. Gruber" <JohnSGruber@gmail.com>
>
> commit a90118c445cc ("x86/boot: Save fields explicitly, zero out everything
> else") now zeros the secure boot information passed by the boot loader or
> by the kernel's efi handover mechanism. Include boot-params.secure_boot
> in the preserve field list.
>
> I noted a change in my computers between running signed 5.3-rc4 and 5.3-rc6
> with signed kernels using the efi handoff protocol with grub. The kernel
> log message "Secure boot enabled" becomes "Secure boot could not be
> determined". The efi_main function in arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c sets
> this field early but it is subsequently zeroed by the above referenced
> commit in the file arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
>
> Fixes: commit a90118c445cc ("x86/boot: Save fields explicitly, zero
> out everything else")
> Signed-off-by: John S. Gruber <JohnSGruber@gmail.com>
> ---
>
> Adjusted the patch for John Hubbard's comments.
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
> index 9e5f3c7..981fe92 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
> @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct boot_params
> *boot_params)
gmail has managed to chew this patch:
checking file arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
patch: **** malformed patch at line 48: *boot_params)
See: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/email-clients.html#gmail-web-gui
You might find a better client in there if you wanna send more patches
in the future.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-02 7:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190731054627.5627-2-jhubbard@nvidia.com>
[not found] ` <CAPotdmTa-cAeTVkHkRWj0x27b0ME0X7=YMkfdGkBRoEk5zUw+w@mail.gmail.com>
2019-09-01 18:36 ` [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix regression--secure boot info loss from bootparam sanitizing John Hubbard
2019-09-01 22:00 ` [PATCH V2] " John S Gruber
2019-09-02 7:23 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2019-09-02 8:17 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/boot: Preserve boot_params.secure_boot from sanitizing tip-bot2 for John S. Gruber
2019-09-21 1:06 ` [PATCH] x86/boot: v4.4 stable and v4.9 stable boot failure due to dropped patch line John S Gruber
2019-09-21 1:38 ` John Hubbard
2019-09-21 4:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20190902072310.GA9605@zn.tnic \
--to=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=JohnSGruber@gmail.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jhubbard@nvidia.com \
--cc=john.hubbard@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).