From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
groeck@chromium.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, songliubraving@fb.com,
ast@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [v4.14.y] bpf: fix use after free in prog symbol exposure
Date: Sat, 5 Oct 2019 20:20:14 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191006002014.GF25255@sasha-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191004174112.32217-1-zsm@chromium.org>
On Fri, Oct 04, 2019 at 10:41:12AM -0700, Zubin Mithra wrote:
>From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
>
>commit c751798aa224fadc5124b49eeb38fb468c0fa039 upstream.
>
>syzkaller managed to trigger the warning in bpf_jit_free() which checks via
>bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off() for potentially unlinked JITed BPF progs
>in kallsyms, and subsequently trips over GPF when walking kallsyms entries:
>
> [...]
> 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
> 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9869 at kernel/bpf/core.c:810 bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0
> Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
> CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #1
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
> Call Trace:
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> dump_stack+0x113/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:113
> panic+0x212/0x40b kernel/panic.c:214
> __warn.cold.8+0x1b/0x38 kernel/panic.c:571
> report_bug+0x1a4/0x200 lib/bug.c:186
> fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline]
> do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271
> do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290
> invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973
> RIP: 0010:bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0
> Code: 02 4c 89 e2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 86 00 00 00 48 ba 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de 0f b6 43 02 49 39 d6 0f 84 5f fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 58 fe ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1
> RSP: 0018:ffff888092f67cd8 EFLAGS: 00010202
> RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffffc90001947000 RCX: ffffffff816e9d88
> RDX: dead000000000200 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88808769f7f0
> RBP: ffff888092f67d00 R08: fffffbfff1394059 R09: fffffbfff1394058
> R10: fffffbfff1394058 R11: ffffffff89ca02c7 R12: ffffc90001947002
> R13: ffffc90001947020 R14: ffffffff881eca80 R15: ffff88808769f7e8
> BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbfff400d000
> #PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
> PGD 21ffee067 P4D 21ffee067 PUD 21ffed067 PMD 9f942067 PTE 0
> Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #1
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
> RIP: 0010:bpf_get_prog_addr_region kernel/bpf/core.c:495 [inline]
> RIP: 0010:bpf_tree_comp kernel/bpf/core.c:558 [inline]
> RIP: 0010:__lt_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:115 [inline]
> RIP: 0010:latch_tree_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:208 [inline]
> RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_kallsyms_find+0x107/0x2e0 kernel/bpf/core.c:632
> Code: 00 f0 ff ff 44 38 c8 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 fa 00 00 00 41 f6 45 02 01 75 02 0f 0b 48 39 da 0f 82 92 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 30 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 45 01 00 00 8b 03 48 c1 e0
> [...]
>
>Upon further debugging, it turns out that whenever we trigger this
>issue, the kallsyms removal in bpf_prog_ksym_node_del() was /skipped/
>but yet bpf_jit_free() reported that the entry is /in use/.
>
>Problem is that symbol exposure via bpf_prog_kallsyms_add() but also
>perf_event_bpf_event() were done /after/ bpf_prog_new_fd(). Once the
>fd is exposed to the public, a parallel close request came in right
>before we attempted to do the bpf_prog_kallsyms_add().
>
>Given at this time the prog reference count is one, we start to rip
>everything underneath us via bpf_prog_release() -> bpf_prog_put().
>The memory is eventually released via deferred free, so we're seeing
>that bpf_jit_free() has a kallsym entry because we added it from
>bpf_prog_load() but /after/ bpf_prog_put() from the remote CPU.
>
>Therefore, move both notifications /before/ we install the fd. The
>issue was never seen between bpf_prog_alloc_id() and bpf_prog_new_fd()
>because upon bpf_prog_get_fd_by_id() we'll take another reference to
>the BPF prog, so we're still holding the original reference from the
>bpf_prog_load().
>
>Fixes: 6ee52e2a3fe4 ("perf, bpf: Introduce PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT")
>Fixes: 74451e66d516 ("bpf: make jited programs visible in traces")
>Reported-by: syzbot+bd3bba6ff3fcea7a6ec6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
>Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
>Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
>---
>Notes:
>* Syzkaller triggered a WARNING on 4.14 kernels with the following
>stacktrace:
>Call Trace:
> dump_stack+0x81/0xb3
> panic+0x14a/0x2ad
> ? refcount_error_report+0xf6/0xf6
> ? set_fs+0x1a/0x29
> ? bpf_jit_free+0x8b/0xce
> __warn+0xde/0x112
> ? bpf_jit_free+0x8b/0xce
> report_bug+0x91/0xda
> fixup_bug+0x2c/0x4c
> do_error_trap+0xda/0x192
> ? fixup_bug+0x4c/0x4c
> ? hlock_class+0x6d/0x8b
> ? mark_lock+0x3a/0x26d
> ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0xf2/0xfb
> ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
> invalid_op+0x1b/0x40
> ? bpf_jit_binary_free+0x15/0x20
> ? bpf_jit_free+0x7b/0xce
> process_one_work+0x484/0x793
> ? wq_calc_node_cpumask.constprop.37+0x25/0x25
> ? worker_clr_flags+0x52/0x88
> worker_thread+0x2b8/0x3d1
> ? rescuer_thread+0x425/0x425
> kthread+0x192/0x1a2
> ? __list_del_entry+0x41/0x41
> ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
>
>* The commit is not present in linux-4.19.y. A backport has been sent
>separately.
>
>* The patch resolves conflicts inside bpf_prog_load that arise due to
>trace_bpf_prog_load() not being present upstream when c751798aa224 was
>applied and perf_event_bpf_event() not being present in linux-4.14.y.
>
>* Tests run: Chrome OS tryjobs, Syzkaller reproducer
I've queued this and the 4.14 one, thanks!
A side note: the patch claims to fix 6ee52e2a3fe4 ("perf, bpf: Introduce
PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT"), but since you've reproduced it on 4.19 which
doesn't have that commit I've ignored that annotation.
--
Thanks,
Sasha
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-06 0:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-04 17:41 [v4.14.y] bpf: fix use after free in prog symbol exposure Zubin Mithra
2019-10-06 0:20 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
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