From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>,
Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH for-stable-4.14 42/48] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection
Date: Sat, 26 Oct 2019 10:01:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191026080121.GB554748@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu-2LXayWyP=3Eur_toGo4xqhENWeK6n+TCDcEy8xrKmXQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Oct 25, 2019 at 05:39:44PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Fri, 25 Oct 2019 at 17:28, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, 25 Oct 2019 at 17:25, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, Oct 24, 2019 at 04:37:12PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > >On Thu, 24 Oct 2019 at 16:34, Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> Hi,
> > > >>
> > > >> On 10/24/19 1:48 PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > >> > From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> > > >> >
> > > >> > [ Upstream commit 8c1e3d2bb44cbb998cb28ff9a18f105fee7f1eb3 ]
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected
> > > >> > by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> > > >> > Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
> > > >> > Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> > > >> > Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
> > > >> > Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> > > >> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> > > >> > ---
> > > >> > arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 15 ++++++++-------
> > > >> > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> > > >> >
> > > >> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> > > >> > index bf6d8aa9b45a..647c533cfd90 100644
> > > >> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> > > >> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> > > >> > @@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
> > > >> > config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_UCT, 0);
> > > >> > }
> > > >> >
> > > >> > -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> > > >> > #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
> > > >> > #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
> > > >> >
> > > >> > @@ -217,11 +216,11 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
> > > >> > ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
> > > >> > cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;
> > > >> >
> > > >> > - install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
> > > >> > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
> > > >> > + install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
> > > >> >
> > > >> > return 1;
> > > >> > }
> > > >> > -#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
> > > >> >
> > > >> > DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
> > > >> >
> > > >> > @@ -457,7 +456,6 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> > > >> > .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \
> > > >> > CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
> > > >> >
> > > >> > -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> > > >> > /*
> > > >> > * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
> > > >> > */
> > > >> > @@ -489,6 +487,12 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
> > > >> > if (!need_wa)
> > > >> > return false;
> > > >> >
> > > >> > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
> > > >> > + pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
> > > >> > + __hardenbp_enab = false;
> > > >>
> > > >> This breaks when building, because __hardenbp_enab is declared in the next patch:
> > > >>
> > > >> $ make -j32 defconfig && make -j32
> > > >>
> > > >> [..]
> > > >> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c: In function ‘check_branch_predictor’:
> > > >> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c:492:3: error: ‘__hardenbp_enab’ undeclared (first
> > > >> use in this function)
> > > >> __hardenbp_enab = false;
> > > >> ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > > >> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c:492:3: note: each undeclared identifier is reported
> > > >> only once for each function it appears in
> > > >> make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:326: arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.o] Error 1
> > > >> make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >Indeed, but as discussed, this matches the state of both mainline and
> > > >v4.19, which carry these patches in the same [wrong] order as well.
> > > >
> > > >Greg should confirm, but as I understand it, it is preferred to be
> > > >bug-compatible with mainline rather than fixing problems when spotting
> > > >them while doing the backport.
> > >
> > > Is it just patch ordering? If so I'd rather fix it, there's no reason to
> > > carry this issue into the stable trees.
> > >
> > > We reserve "bug compatibility" for functional issues that are not yet
> > > fixed upstream, it doesn't seem to be the case here.
> > >
> >
> > The patches don't apply cleanly in the opposite order.
>
> What we could do is squash the two patches together. That way, we
> avoid the breakage without having to modify the patches in order to be
> able to apply them.
No, don't do that. Just take all of the needed commits.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-26 8:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-24 12:47 [PATCH for-stable-4.14 00/48] arm64 spec mitigation backports Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 01/48] arm64: sysreg: Move to use definitions for all the SCTLR bits Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 02/48] arm64: Expose support for optional ARMv8-A features Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 03/48] arm64: Fix the feature type for ID register fields Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 04/48] arm64: v8.4: Support for new floating point multiplication instructions Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 05/48] arm64: Documentation: cpu-feature-registers: Remove RES0 fields Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 06/48] arm64: Expose Arm v8.4 features Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 07/48] arm64: move SCTLR_EL{1,2} assertions to <asm/sysreg.h> Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 08/48] arm64: add PSR_AA32_* definitions Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 09/48] arm64: Introduce sysreg_clear_set() Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 10/48] arm64: capabilities: Update prototype for enable call back Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 11/48] arm64: capabilities: Move errata work around check on boot CPU Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 12/48] arm64: capabilities: Move errata processing code Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 13/48] arm64: capabilities: Prepare for fine grained capabilities Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:47 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 14/48] arm64: capabilities: Add flags to handle the conflicts on late CPU Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 15/48] arm64: capabilities: Unify the verification Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 16/48] arm64: capabilities: Filter the entries based on a given mask Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 17/48] arm64: capabilities: Prepare for grouping features and errata work arounds Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 18/48] arm64: capabilities: Split the processing of " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 19/48] arm64: capabilities: Allow features based on local CPU scope Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 20/48] arm64: capabilities: Group handling of features and errata workarounds Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 21/48] arm64: capabilities: Introduce weak features based on local CPU Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 22/48] arm64: capabilities: Restrict KPTI detection to boot-time CPUs Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 23/48] arm64: capabilities: Add support for features enabled early Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 24/48] arm64: capabilities: Change scope of VHE to Boot CPU feature Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 25/48] arm64: capabilities: Clean up midr range helpers Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 26/48] arm64: Add helpers for checking CPU MIDR against a range Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 27/48] arm64: Add MIDR encoding for Arm Cortex-A55 and Cortex-A35 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 28/48] arm64: capabilities: Add support for checks based on a list of MIDRs Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 29/48] arm64: KVM: Use SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor BP hardening Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 30/48] arm64: don't zero DIT on signal return Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 31/48] arm64: Get rid of __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_* Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 32/48] arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 33/48] arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 34/48] KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 35/48] arm64: fix SSBS sanitization Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 36/48] arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 37/48] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 38/48] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 39/48] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 40/48] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 41/48] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 42/48] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 14:34 ` Alexandru Elisei
2019-10-24 14:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-25 15:25 ` Sasha Levin
2019-10-25 15:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-25 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-26 8:01 ` Greg KH [this message]
2019-10-26 15:40 ` Sasha Levin
2019-10-26 15:46 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-27 13:39 ` Greg KH
2019-10-27 17:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 43/48] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 44/48] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 45/48] arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 46/48] arm64: Force SSBS on context switch Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 47/48] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-24 12:48 ` [PATCH for-stable-4.14 48/48] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option Ard Biesheuvel
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