From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>,
Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 10/20] x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 14:20:39 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191115062011.249075861@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191115062006.854443935@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit c2955f270a84762343000f103e0640d29c7a96f3 upstream.
Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain
processors as part of a speculative side channel attack. A microcode
update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will
add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the
option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations.
The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones
which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those
CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all
CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well.
[ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also
support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ]
Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits.
TSX has two sub-features:
1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature
where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions.
2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of
"old" style locks are used by software.
Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the
IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR.
There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
XBEGIN instruction).
Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
(i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).
The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is
unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated
as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by
IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -71,10 +71,15 @@
* Microarchitectural Data
* Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR BIT(7) /* MSR for TSX control is available. */
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
+#define MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL 0x00000122
+#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0) /* Disable RTM feature */
+#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */
+
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-15 6:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/20] kvm: mmu: Dont read PDPTEs when paging is not enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/20] MIPS: BCM63XX: fix switch core reset on BCM6368 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/20] powerpc/Makefile: Use cflags-y/aflags-y for setting endian options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/20] powerpc: Fix compiling a BE kernel with a powerpc64le toolchain Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/20] powerpc/boot: Request no dynamic linker for boot wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/20] KVM: Introduce kvm_get_arch_capabilities() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/20] KVM: x86: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES on AMD hosts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/20] kvm: x86: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is always supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/20] KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/20] x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/20] x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/20] kvm/x86: Export MDS_NO=0 to guests when TSX is enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/20] x86/tsx: Add "auto" option to the tsx= cmdline parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/20] x86/tsx: Add config options to set tsx=on|off|auto Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/20] x86/speculation/taa: Fix printing of TAA_MSG_SMT on IBRS_ALL CPUs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 20/20] x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 12:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review kernelci.org bot
2019-11-15 13:50 ` Jon Hunter
2019-11-15 13:55 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-11-15 15:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
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