From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 035D0C2D0D1 for ; Thu, 19 Dec 2019 19:09:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C795B227BF for ; Thu, 19 Dec 2019 19:09:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1576782552; bh=k/Vn97eY/o48QnUPvrMfmIs4W8FZyzJ3R15DAh3PVyY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=f4Ad6w1FnzmZAX1DS/cUSrrI1V/1DH2fQoT2DXl5ELb24yzstvwfbtSfCcBuMlM4b VCvC17MAFXiJChNX38zZhPKeBO/P0WPAFwlETJ1/FreFr2zquPh7+aD5tdAAIRQYqj CGMfyluKfokRfefMFXD7caeQR33bd4tWK9kgL2xI= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727465AbfLSTJE (ORCPT ); Thu, 19 Dec 2019 14:09:04 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60010 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727574AbfLSSlH (ORCPT ); Thu, 19 Dec 2019 13:41:07 -0500 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 381EF206D7; Thu, 19 Dec 2019 18:41:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1576780865; bh=k/Vn97eY/o48QnUPvrMfmIs4W8FZyzJ3R15DAh3PVyY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=0hQfjfk6h5VNbnEdhKf17EsIIyHyZhugZdCKAvoZH9bfeswTcB+UKvuSTYVq1TiPh Saeai+OOqSEMdiGeICw6RXRTzP4VH3KxfWTaCP557aqXnc25myLHMrqtA3itkFmb4g 8+CeeUoTZmLTx9ut84aWn/rKD7d5glwKF6TGFwW4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Guillaume Nault , Eric Dumazet , "David S. Miller" Subject: [PATCH 4.4 148/162] tcp: tighten acceptance of ACKs not matching a child socket Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2019 19:34:16 +0100 Message-Id: <20191219183216.782494552@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.1 In-Reply-To: <20191219183150.477687052@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20191219183150.477687052@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Guillaume Nault [ Upstream commit cb44a08f8647fd2e8db5cc9ac27cd8355fa392d8 ] When no synflood occurs, the synflood timestamp isn't updated. Therefore it can be so old that time_after32() can consider it to be in the future. That's a problem for tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() as it may report that a recent overflow occurred while, in fact, it's just that jiffies has grown past 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID + 2^31. Spurious detection of recent overflows lead to extra syncookie verification in cookie_v[46]_check(). At that point, the verification should fail and the packet dropped. But we should have dropped the packet earlier as we didn't even send a syncookie. Let's refine tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() to report a recent overflow only if jiffies is within the [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval. This way, no spurious recent overflow is reported when jiffies wraps and 'last_overflow' becomes in the future from the point of view of time_after32(). However, if jiffies wraps and enters the [last_overflow, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID] interval (with 'last_overflow' being a stale synflood timestamp), then tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() still erroneously reports an overflow. In such cases, we have to rely on syncookie verification to drop the packet. We unfortunately have no way to differentiate between a fresh and a stale syncookie timestamp. In practice, using last_overflow as lower bound is problematic. If the synflood timestamp is concurrently updated between the time we read jiffies and the moment we store the timestamp in 'last_overflow', then 'now' becomes smaller than 'last_overflow' and tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() returns true, potentially dropping a valid syncookie. Reading jiffies after loading the timestamp could fix the problem, but that'd require a memory barrier. Let's just accommodate for potential timestamp growth instead and extend the interval using 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/tcp.h | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -514,7 +514,15 @@ static inline bool tcp_synq_no_recent_ov { unsigned long last_overflow = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp; - return time_after(jiffies, last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID); + /* If last_overflow <= jiffies <= last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID, + * then we're under synflood. However, we have to use + * 'last_overflow - HZ' as lower bound. That's because a concurrent + * tcp_synq_overflow() could update .ts_recent_stamp after we read + * jiffies but before we store .ts_recent_stamp into last_overflow, + * which could lead to rejecting a valid syncookie. + */ + return !time_between32(jiffies, last_overflow - HZ, + last_overflow + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID); } static inline u32 tcp_cookie_time(void)