[PATCH 5.4 29/34] x86/cpu: Add table argument to cpu_matches()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>

commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

 [ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c |   25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1093,9 +1093,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{}
 };
 
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
 {
-	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
 
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
@@ -1115,31 +1115,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
 	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
-		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
 	}
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
 	/*
@@ -1157,7 +1160,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1166,7 +1169,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);