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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.7 20/24] x86/cpu: Add table argument to cpu_matches()
Date: Tue,  9 Jun 2020 19:45:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200609174150.962886517@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200609174149.255223112@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>

commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

 [ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c |   25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1075,9 +1075,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{}
 };
 
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
 {
-	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
 
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
@@ -1097,31 +1097,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
 	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
-		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
 	}
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
 	/*
@@ -1139,7 +1142,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1148,7 +1151,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-09 17:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-09 17:45 [PATCH 5.7 00/24] 5.7.2-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 01/24] USB: serial: qcserial: add DW5816e QDL support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 02/24] USB: serial: usb_wwan: do not resubmit rx urb on fatal errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 03/24] USB: serial: option: add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 04/24] USB: serial: ch341: add basis for quirk detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 05/24] USB: serial: ch341: fix lockup of devices with limited prescaler Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 06/24] iio:chemical:sps30: Fix timestamp alignment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 07/24] iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 08/24] iio:chemical:pms7003: Fix timestamp alignment and prevent data leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 09/24] iio: adc: stm32-adc: fix a wrong error message when probing interrupts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 10/24] usb: musb: start session in resume for host port Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 11/24] usb: musb: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 12/24] usb: musb: jz4740: Prevent lockup when CONFIG_SMP is set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 13/24] serial: 8250: Enable 16550A variants by default on non-x86 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 14/24] vt: keyboard: avoid signed integer overflow in k_ascii Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 15/24] tty: hvc_console, fix crashes on parallel open/close Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 16/24] staging: rtl8712: Fix IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 17/24] CDC-ACM: heed quirk also in error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 18/24] nvmem: qfprom: remove incorrect write support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 19/24] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 21/24] x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 22/24] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 23/24] x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-09 17:45 ` [PATCH 5.7 24/24] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-10  6:17 ` [PATCH 5.7 00/24] 5.7.2-rc1 review Naresh Kamboju
2020-06-10 18:39   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-10 11:30 ` Jon Hunter
2020-06-10 11:50   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-10 13:13 ` Shuah Khan
2020-06-10 19:11 ` Guenter Roeck
2020-06-11  7:20   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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