From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 700DEC433E1 for ; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 20:41:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B27021531 for ; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 20:41:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1592944911; bh=Qvgl9A1UmkXe8yP07mEhSW1mjubiKOSHZWzEfNuVqEE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=sGhOe0DynH+a9VUkLJuGxYYJFY3XZUEiQZ6sD8UYbleaVsGLQidT0S98AQForhrdh nupMDzdj60NLu3L1RdJW4SxDlo2GaHIsnbpJAU74URs27pp+tswrSOPXabzvx5Quf3 EdF0I5xKy8F5PjXwPGISKTd+hNCTszMwTNeG72jc= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2403878AbgFWUlt (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Jun 2020 16:41:49 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:38292 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2403865AbgFWUlp (ORCPT ); Tue, 23 Jun 2020 16:41:45 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B701F20702; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 20:41:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1592944905; bh=Qvgl9A1UmkXe8yP07mEhSW1mjubiKOSHZWzEfNuVqEE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ivwoJWoxhZx0yYvLYCcLsVqyqT/iWEEf0HhzE0FxKHc9inlqensTyH2KdSs5x+X8H xFfNG3Eq+Jvy7cZDLibZlnKIosvIzIK36G1wCKNqJjO81t4WZrzI7rVsESbcgHVEzw Fjid4KouKw40vE4TvJX/KNmHThc3keig5AEAmzhE= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas , James Morse , Luis Machado , Will Deacon , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.19 171/206] arm64: hw_breakpoint: Dont invoke overflow handler on uaccess watchpoints Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 21:58:19 +0200 Message-Id: <20200623195325.437958224@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200623195316.864547658@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200623195316.864547658@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Will Deacon [ Upstream commit 24ebec25fb270100e252b19c288e21bd7d8cc7f7 ] Unprivileged memory accesses generated by the so-called "translated" instructions (e.g. STTR) at EL1 can cause EL0 watchpoints to fire unexpectedly if kernel debugging is enabled. In such cases, the hw_breakpoint logic will invoke the user overflow handler which will typically raise a SIGTRAP back to the current task. This is futile when returning back to the kernel because (a) the signal won't have been delivered and (b) userspace can't handle the thing anyway. Avoid invoking the user overflow handler for watchpoints triggered by kernel uaccess routines, and instead single-step over the faulting instruction as we would if no overflow handler had been installed. (Fixes tag identifies the introduction of unprivileged memory accesses, which exposed this latent bug in the hw_breakpoint code) Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: James Morse Fixes: 57f4959bad0a ("arm64: kernel: Add support for User Access Override") Reported-by: Luis Machado Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c index 7c0611f5d2ce7..9f105fe58595d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c @@ -737,6 +737,27 @@ static u64 get_distance_from_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, u64 val, return 0; } +static int watchpoint_report(struct perf_event *wp, unsigned long addr, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int step = is_default_overflow_handler(wp); + struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info = counter_arch_bp(wp); + + info->trigger = addr; + + /* + * If we triggered a user watchpoint from a uaccess routine, then + * handle the stepping ourselves since userspace really can't help + * us with this. + */ + if (!user_mode(regs) && info->ctrl.privilege == AARCH64_BREAKPOINT_EL0) + step = 1; + else + perf_bp_event(wp, regs); + + return step; +} + static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) { @@ -746,7 +767,6 @@ static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, u64 val; struct perf_event *wp, **slots; struct debug_info *debug_info; - struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info; struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl ctrl; slots = this_cpu_ptr(wp_on_reg); @@ -784,25 +804,13 @@ static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, if (dist != 0) continue; - info = counter_arch_bp(wp); - info->trigger = addr; - perf_bp_event(wp, regs); - - /* Do we need to handle the stepping? */ - if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp)) - step = 1; + step = watchpoint_report(wp, addr, regs); } - if (min_dist > 0 && min_dist != -1) { - /* No exact match found. */ - wp = slots[closest_match]; - info = counter_arch_bp(wp); - info->trigger = addr; - perf_bp_event(wp, regs); - /* Do we need to handle the stepping? */ - if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp)) - step = 1; - } + /* No exact match found? */ + if (min_dist > 0 && min_dist != -1) + step = watchpoint_report(slots[closest_match], addr, regs); + rcu_read_unlock(); if (!step) -- 2.25.1