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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>, "# 3.4.x" <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: WTF: patch "[PATCH] efi: Make it possible to disable efivar_ssdt entirely" was seriously submitted to be applied to the 5.7-stable tree?
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 16:10:31 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200707141031.GD4064836@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXFFPO=csSXhxJ5gEpbzKi4r5q2XeLEJvvTfxFh37PhJDQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 08:30:21PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Mon, 29 Jun 2020 at 17:48, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 05:18:08PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > On Mon, 29 Jun 2020 at 11:32, <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > The patch below was submitted to be applied to the 5.7-stable tree.
> > > >
> > > > I fail to see how this patch meets the stable kernel rules as found at
> > > > Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst.
> > > >
> > > > I could be totally wrong, and if so, please respond to
> > > > <stable@vger.kernel.org> and let me know why this patch should be
> > > > applied.  Otherwise, it is now dropped from my patch queues, never to be
> > > > seen again.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Without this patch, there is no way to disable sideloading of SSDTs
> > > via EFI variables, which is a security hole. The fact that this is not
> > > governed by the existing ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE Kconfig option was an
> > > oversight, and so distros currently have this functionality enabled
> > > inadvertently (although most of them have the lockdown check
> > > incorporated as well)
> > >
> > > SSDTs can manipulate any memory (even kernel memory that has been
> > > mapped read-only) by using SystemMemory OpRegions in _INI AML methods,
> > > and setting an EFI variable once will make this persist across
> > > reboots.
> >
> > All of this was not in the description of the patch at all, how were we
> > supposed to know this?
> >
> 
> Good point. This patch was the result of same off-list discussion, so
> it was obvious to those involved but not for anyone else.
> 
> > And this really looks like a new feature now that you are supporting
> > something that we previously could not do.  To know that this is a "fix"
> > is not obvious :(
> >
> > I'll go queue it up, but how far back should it go?
> >
> 
> The feature was added in v4.8, so as close as we can get to that please.

Ok, got it applied back to 4.9 now, thanks.

greg k-h

  reply	other threads:[~2020-07-07 14:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-29  9:23 WTF: patch "[PATCH] efi: Make it possible to disable efivar_ssdt entirely" was seriously submitted to be applied to the 5.7-stable tree? gregkh
2020-06-29 15:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-06-29 15:48   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-29 18:30     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-07-07 14:10       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2020-07-07 14:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel

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