From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7BDBBC433F5 for ; Mon, 27 Sep 2021 17:28:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66DBF60FC2 for ; Mon, 27 Sep 2021 17:28:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236197AbhI0RaM (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Sep 2021 13:30:12 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:40804 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237720AbhI0R2J (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Sep 2021 13:28:09 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 276F261452; Mon, 27 Sep 2021 17:17:17 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1632763039; bh=XegQGG9ZyGt+uAqrWDY+lVQGoahIuijtmmNkCIEoCps=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ed9530naxf+mHyQRO+erGknfa2azynlPVAyvWVshLI4CrJSMpXqS56P3XB7wpwgy/ bg7TxTN+6SG5k7Eglh3bwOOpsY0aSYhs0XGbZwYqKj+oNlAgOu/dqAAXHHWTFRogic +cwUYEUqq9vwizvuHBRbjS7sW6Hy0OzAuJfUpL2I= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Dan Li , Mark Rutland , Catalin Marinas , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.14 144/162] arm64: Mark __stack_chk_guard as __ro_after_init Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:03:10 +0200 Message-Id: <20210927170238.424364305@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.33.0 In-Reply-To: <20210927170233.453060397@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20210927170233.453060397@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Dan Li [ Upstream commit 9fcb2e93f41c07a400885325e7dbdfceba6efaec ] __stack_chk_guard is setup once while init stage and never changed after that. Although the modification of this variable at runtime will usually cause the kernel to crash (so does the attacker), it should be marked as __ro_after_init, and it should not affect performance if it is placed in the ro_after_init section. Signed-off-by: Dan Li Acked-by: Mark Rutland Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1631612642-102881-1-git-send-email-ashimida@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index c8989b999250..c858b857c1ec 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) && !defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK) #include -unsigned long __stack_chk_guard __read_mostly; +unsigned long __stack_chk_guard __ro_after_init; EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_guard); #endif -- 2.33.0