From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9627C433EF for ; Mon, 1 Nov 2021 09:27:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B08106136F for ; Mon, 1 Nov 2021 09:27:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231980AbhKAJaF (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Nov 2021 05:30:05 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:36832 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232836AbhKAJ2D (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Nov 2021 05:28:03 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9040661167; Mon, 1 Nov 2021 09:22:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1635758560; bh=2cybuqC6d8IWv2/TAWzQQHVLDcpqRg6KvUfIRgfDyJM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=lCHYtc3a8oaYTWsF1lcV23fMaGyKpxgUPxIYv4QqUh6sOlQ1qxgnFPJ8CGo9uSDRg yUmHbwn+GLFtSuUuTDLHbdYJecdLTPnZqG44nYZFwBnvsiJA13MEurBHMEWUR1sccW LrVroRMJQvXKFgi1LlEN1eD3GjOQVWxDY4BVS9Y4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, syzbot+b187b77c8474f9648fae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, Daniel Jordan , "David S. Miller" Subject: [PATCH 5.4 14/51] net/tls: Fix flipped sign in tls_err_abort() calls Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2021 10:17:18 +0100 Message-Id: <20211101082503.950349367@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.33.1 In-Reply-To: <20211101082500.203657870@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20211101082500.203657870@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Daniel Jordan commit da353fac65fede6b8b4cfe207f0d9408e3121105 upstream. sk->sk_err appears to expect a positive value, a convention that ktls doesn't always follow and that leads to memory corruption in other code. For instance, [kworker] tls_encrypt_done(..., err=) tls_err_abort(.., err) sk->sk_err = err; [task] splice_from_pipe_feed ... tls_sw_do_sendpage if (sk->sk_err) { ret = -sk->sk_err; // ret is positive splice_from_pipe_feed (continued) ret = actor(...) // ret is still positive and interpreted as bytes // written, resulting in underflow of buf->len and // sd->len, leading to huge buf->offset and bogus // addresses computed in later calls to actor() Fix all tls_err_abort() callers to pass a negative error code consistently and centralize the error-prone sign flip there, throwing in a warning to catch future misuse and uninlining the function so it really does only warn once. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c46234ebb4d1e ("tls: RX path for ktls") Reported-by: syzbot+b187b77c8474f9648fae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/tls.h | 9 ++------- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) --- a/include/net/tls.h +++ b/include/net/tls.h @@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ int tls_sk_query(struct sock *sk, int op int __user *optlen); int tls_sk_attach(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen); +void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err); int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx); void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx); @@ -465,12 +466,6 @@ static inline bool tls_is_sk_tx_device_o #endif } -static inline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err) -{ - sk->sk_err = err; - sk->sk_error_report(sk); -} - static inline bool tls_bigint_increment(unsigned char *seq, int len) { int i; @@ -499,7 +494,7 @@ static inline void tls_advance_record_sn struct cipher_context *ctx) { if (tls_bigint_increment(ctx->rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size)) - tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG); + tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION) tls_bigint_increment(ctx->iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE, --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ * SOFTWARE. */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -43,6 +44,14 @@ #include #include +noinline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err) +{ + WARN_ON_ONCE(err >= 0); + /* sk->sk_err should contain a positive error code. */ + sk->sk_err = -err; + sk->sk_error_report(sk); +} + static int __skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len, unsigned int recursion_level) { @@ -416,7 +425,7 @@ int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int tx_err: if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN) - tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG); + tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); return rc; } @@ -761,7 +770,7 @@ static int tls_push_record(struct sock * msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i); if (rc < 0) { if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) { - tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG); + tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); if (split) { tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true; tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end); @@ -1822,7 +1831,7 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter, &chunk, &zc, async_capable); if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) { - tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG); + tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); goto recv_end; } @@ -2002,7 +2011,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket } if (err < 0) { - tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG); + tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); goto splice_read_end; } ctx->decrypted = true;