From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04428C433EF for ; Tue, 18 Jan 2022 03:03:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235646AbiARDDB (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Jan 2022 22:03:01 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35868 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1349456AbiARC4i (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Jan 2022 21:56:38 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B6CAFC02B74B; Mon, 17 Jan 2022 18:44:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8E3C061118; Tue, 18 Jan 2022 02:44:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4BBF4C36AF5; Tue, 18 Jan 2022 02:44:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1642473861; bh=cV0Eo8TVgd1mUIdIGHVJsURHo58Sw8azypconns5YMg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gMq8+bKB1lG8T5/EyQdcxuVK6fllqpt12P1phupWE6Vm8In42Fufn/eUiA7oXefBh lpS4MceqgtCS+vTrnxCK3kZTt9V1FPpFQHn6tOqWUS8pphgm/4JCBFYylFruSr9KaZ 84EENTjnTP73sJQn/vCyZ+gh+w/FPRi1k2wbwTo103EjxKX27aPXEonsE4pyG5PJP/ MuUVeZ6uuXy5nsFVC/81EBzwwKDSfCLK0jOl++jMyfw9TThCEviJGJ2xKolwpG2Yhd 0jO2svlPKe8nHBXi8lbbM0orAgK4grWiQBgSYD1RkjXej6zzT7uf9JFNbQIguW0cDq lK4UKOFxzcz3A== From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Dominik Brodowski , Sasha Levin , tytso@mit.edu Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 112/116] random: do not throw away excess input to crng_fast_load Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 21:40:03 -0500 Message-Id: <20220118024007.1950576-112-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20220118024007.1950576-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20220118024007.1950576-1-sashal@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" [ Upstream commit 73c7733f122e8d0107f88655a12011f68f69e74b ] When crng_fast_load() is called by add_hwgenerator_randomness(), we currently will advance to crng_init==1 once we've acquired 64 bytes, and then throw away the rest of the buffer. Usually, that is not a problem: When add_hwgenerator_randomness() gets called via EFI or DT during setup_arch(), there won't be any IRQ randomness. Therefore, the 64 bytes passed by EFI exactly matches what is needed to advance to crng_init==1. Usually, DT seems to pass 64 bytes as well -- with one notable exception being kexec, which hands over 128 bytes of entropy to the kexec'd kernel. In that case, we'll advance to crng_init==1 once 64 of those bytes are consumed by crng_fast_load(), but won't continue onward feeding in bytes to progress to crng_init==2. This commit fixes the issue by feeding any leftover bytes into the next phase in add_hwgenerator_randomness(). [linux@dominikbrodowski.net: rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/char/random.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 340ad21491e28..aff499535fb02 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -873,12 +873,14 @@ static void numa_crng_init(void) {} /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service - * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. + * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of + * bytes processed from cp. */ -static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) +static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; char *p; + size_t ret = 0; if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; @@ -889,7 +891,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; - cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; + cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { @@ -897,7 +899,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) crng_init = 1; pr_notice("fast init done\n"); } - return 1; + return ret; } /* @@ -1281,7 +1283,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool, - sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) { + sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = now; } @@ -2299,8 +2301,11 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - crng_fast_load(buffer, count); - return; + size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count); + count -= ret; + buffer += ret; + if (!count || crng_init == 0) + return; } /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold. -- 2.34.1