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Donenfeld" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.4 222/320] random: do not throw away excess input to crng_fast_load Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 19:43:26 +0100 Message-Id: <20220124184001.207698415@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20220124183953.750177707@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220124183953.750177707@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Jason A. Donenfeld [ Upstream commit 73c7733f122e8d0107f88655a12011f68f69e74b ] When crng_fast_load() is called by add_hwgenerator_randomness(), we currently will advance to crng_init==1 once we've acquired 64 bytes, and then throw away the rest of the buffer. Usually, that is not a problem: When add_hwgenerator_randomness() gets called via EFI or DT during setup_arch(), there won't be any IRQ randomness. Therefore, the 64 bytes passed by EFI exactly matches what is needed to advance to crng_init==1. Usually, DT seems to pass 64 bytes as well -- with one notable exception being kexec, which hands over 128 bytes of entropy to the kexec'd kernel. In that case, we'll advance to crng_init==1 once 64 of those bytes are consumed by crng_fast_load(), but won't continue onward feeding in bytes to progress to crng_init==2. This commit fixes the issue by feeding any leftover bytes into the next phase in add_hwgenerator_randomness(). [linux@dominikbrodowski.net: rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/char/random.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 60b39af1279a4..19bfbaf135989 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -975,12 +975,14 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(void) /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service - * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. + * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of + * bytes processed from cp. */ -static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) +static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) { unsigned long flags; char *p; + size_t ret = 0; if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; @@ -991,7 +993,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; - cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; + cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { @@ -1000,7 +1002,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); pr_notice("random: fast init done\n"); } - return 1; + return ret; } /* @@ -1353,7 +1355,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool, - sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) { + sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { fast_pool->count = 0; fast_pool->last = now; } @@ -2501,8 +2503,11 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { - crng_fast_load(buffer, count); - return; + size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count); + count -= ret; + buffer += ret; + if (!count || crng_init == 0) + return; } /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold. -- 2.34.1