From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Xiao Guangrong" <xiaoguangrong@tencent.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Ben Hutchings" <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 4/9] KVM: nVMX: fix EPT permissions as reported in exit qualification
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 19:08:22 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220127180257.361803246@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220127180257.225641300@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
commit 0780516a18f87e881e42ed815f189279b0a1743c upstream.
This fixes the new ept_access_test_read_only and ept_access_test_read_write
testcases from vmx.flat.
The problem is that gpte_access moves bits around to switch from EPT
bit order (XWR) to ACC_*_MASK bit order (RWX). This results in an
incorrect exit qualification. To fix this, make pt_access and
pte_access operate on raw PTE values (only with NX flipped to mean
"can execute") and call gpte_access at the end of the walk. This
lets us use pte_access to compute the exit qualification with XWR
bit order.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- There's no support for EPT accessed/dirty bits, so do not use
have_ad flag
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -285,9 +285,11 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(stru
pt_element_t pte;
pt_element_t __user *uninitialized_var(ptep_user);
gfn_t table_gfn;
- unsigned index, pt_access, pte_access, accessed_dirty, pte_pkey;
+ u64 pt_access, pte_access;
+ unsigned index, accessed_dirty, pte_pkey;
gpa_t pte_gpa;
int offset;
+ u64 walk_nx_mask = 0;
const int write_fault = access & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
const int user_fault = access & PFERR_USER_MASK;
const int fetch_fault = access & PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
@@ -301,6 +303,7 @@ retry_walk:
pte = mmu->get_cr3(vcpu);
#if PTTYPE == 64
+ walk_nx_mask = 1ULL << PT64_NX_SHIFT;
if (walker->level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) {
pte = mmu->get_pdptr(vcpu, (addr >> 30) & 3);
trace_kvm_mmu_paging_element(pte, walker->level);
@@ -312,15 +315,14 @@ retry_walk:
walker->max_level = walker->level;
ASSERT(!(is_long_mode(vcpu) && !is_pae(vcpu)));
- accessed_dirty = PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK;
- pt_access = pte_access = ACC_ALL;
+ pte_access = ~0;
++walker->level;
do {
gfn_t real_gfn;
unsigned long host_addr;
- pt_access &= pte_access;
+ pt_access = pte_access;
--walker->level;
index = PT_INDEX(addr, walker->level);
@@ -363,6 +365,12 @@ retry_walk:
trace_kvm_mmu_paging_element(pte, walker->level);
+ /*
+ * Inverting the NX it lets us AND it like other
+ * permission bits.
+ */
+ pte_access = pt_access & (pte ^ walk_nx_mask);
+
if (unlikely(!FNAME(is_present_gpte)(pte)))
goto error;
@@ -371,14 +379,16 @@ retry_walk:
goto error;
}
- accessed_dirty &= pte;
- pte_access = pt_access & FNAME(gpte_access)(vcpu, pte);
-
walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte;
} while (!is_last_gpte(mmu, walker->level, pte));
pte_pkey = FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(vcpu, pte);
- errcode = permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, pte_access, pte_pkey, access);
+ accessed_dirty = pte_access & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK;
+
+ /* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */
+ walker->pt_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(vcpu, pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
+ walker->pte_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(vcpu, pte_access ^ walk_nx_mask);
+ errcode = permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, walker->pte_access, pte_pkey, access);
if (unlikely(errcode))
goto error;
@@ -395,7 +405,7 @@ retry_walk:
walker->gfn = real_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (!write_fault)
- FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(&pte_access, pte);
+ FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(&walker->pte_access, pte);
else
/*
* On a write fault, fold the dirty bit into accessed_dirty.
@@ -413,10 +423,8 @@ retry_walk:
goto retry_walk;
}
- walker->pt_access = pt_access;
- walker->pte_access = pte_access;
pgprintk("%s: pte %llx pte_access %x pt_access %x\n",
- __func__, (u64)pte, pte_access, pt_access);
+ __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, walker->pt_access);
return 1;
error:
@@ -444,7 +452,7 @@ error:
*/
if (!(errcode & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)) {
vcpu->arch.exit_qualification &= 0x187;
- vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= ((pt_access & pte) & 0x7) << 3;
+ vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= (pte_access & 0x7) << 3;
}
#endif
walker->fault.address = addr;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-27 18:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-27 18:08 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.299-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-27 18:08 ` [PATCH 4.9 1/9] drm/i915: Flush TLBs before releasing backing store Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-27 18:08 ` [PATCH 4.9 2/9] media: firewire: firedtv-avc: fix a buffer overflow in avc_ca_pmt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-27 18:08 ` [PATCH 4.9 3/9] NFSv4: Initialise connection to the server in nfs4_alloc_client() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-27 18:08 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-01-27 18:08 ` [PATCH 4.9 5/9] KVM: X86: MMU: Use the correct inherited permissions to get shadow page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-27 18:08 ` [PATCH 4.9 6/9] ARM: 8800/1: use choice for kernel unwinders Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-27 18:08 ` [PATCH 4.9 7/9] ion: Fix use after free during ION_IOC_ALLOC Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-27 18:08 ` [PATCH 4.9 8/9] ion: Protect kref from userspace manipulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-27 18:08 ` [PATCH 4.9 9/9] ion: Do not put ION handle until after its final use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-01-27 18:35 ` [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.299-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-01-28 1:18 ` Shuah Khan
2022-01-28 11:19 ` Jon Hunter
2022-01-29 1:04 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-01-29 9:30 ` Naresh Kamboju
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