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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 22/27] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2
Date: Fri,  1 Apr 2022 08:36:32 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220401063624.860794754@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220401063624.232282121@linuxfoundation.org>

From: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>

commit dee435be76f4117410bbd90573a881fd33488f37 upstream.

Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
make use of branch history to influence future speculation as part of
a spectre-v2 attack. This is not mitigated by CSV2, meaning CPUs that
previously reported 'Not affected' are now moderately mitigated by CSV2.

Update the value in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
to also show the state of the BHB mitigation.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[ code move to cpu_errata.c for backport ]
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |    8 +++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -495,6 +495,14 @@ static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(v
 
 void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state);
 
+/* Watch out, ordering is important here. */
+enum mitigation_state {
+	SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED,
+	SPECTRE_MITIGATED,
+	SPECTRE_VULNERABLE,
+};
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -730,14 +730,39 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic
 	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 }
 
+static const char *get_bhb_affected_string(enum mitigation_state bhb_state)
+{
+	switch (bhb_state) {
+	case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
+		return "";
+	default:
+	case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
+		return ", but not BHB";
+	case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+		return ", BHB";
+	}
+}
+
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		char *buf)
 {
-	if (__spectrev2_safe)
-		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+	enum mitigation_state bhb_state = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state();
+	const char *bhb_str = get_bhb_affected_string(bhb_state);
+	const char *v2_str = "Branch predictor hardening";
+
+	if (__spectrev2_safe) {
+		if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
+			return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+		/*
+		 * Platforms affected by Spectre-BHB can't report
+		 * "Not affected" for Spectre-v2.
+		 */
+		v2_str = "CSV2";
+	}
 
 	if (__hardenbp_enab)
-		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s%s\n", v2_str, bhb_str);
 
 	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 }
@@ -758,3 +783,10 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struc
 
 	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 }
+
+static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state;
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void)
+{
+	return spectre_bhb_state;
+}



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-04-01  6:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-01  6:36 [PATCH 4.14 00/27] 4.14.275-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/27] arm64: arch_timer: Add workaround for ARM erratum 1188873 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/27] arm64: arch_timer: avoid unused function warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/27] arm64: Add silicon-errata.txt entry for ARM erratum 1188873 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/27] arm64: Make ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 depend on COMPAT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/27] arm64: Add part number for Neoverse N1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/27] arm64: Add part number for Arm Cortex-A77 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/27] arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/27] arm64: Add Cortex-X2 " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/27] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/27] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/27] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/27] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/27] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/27] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/27] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/27] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/27] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/27] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/27] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/27] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/27] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/27] KVM: arm64: Add templates for BHB mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/27] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/27] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/27] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01  6:36 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/27] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-04-01 10:43 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/27] 4.14.275-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-04-01 18:26 ` Naresh Kamboju

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