From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 93958C433F5 for ; Mon, 18 Apr 2022 12:52:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S240090AbiDRMzN (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 Apr 2022 08:55:13 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42302 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S240368AbiDRMyu (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 Apr 2022 08:54:50 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0B281140D3; Mon, 18 Apr 2022 05:35:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B85EAB80EDD; Mon, 18 Apr 2022 12:35:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E252DC385A1; Mon, 18 Apr 2022 12:35:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1650285308; bh=v6yuNXdoFIyZYpzpbSX09Y32GwEic8VWpyIkKO0cXjQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=i6VlJjY1RvLLFAMXaF1ng8NlGJ1ZyUpBKtvR4u3Lit4IF7fU7wBZmCICsj1umkI9l /WsAB2LGGqb/bZ2xercg6oLBpDwCAd1vOM0fC1gx+xMvFse25cmchMisWahhIbaTKX UEp+SMfXw1juT2P7WMLW3srckStgr8MDEahfBjKg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Marcin Kozlowski , "David S. Miller" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.15 130/189] net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 14:12:30 +0200 Message-Id: <20220418121204.791949082@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.3 In-Reply-To: <20220418121200.312988959@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220418121200.312988959@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Marcin Kozlowski [ Upstream commit afb8e246527536848b9b4025b40e613edf776a9d ] aqc111_rx_fixup() contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular: - The metadata array (desc_offset..desc_offset+2*pkt_count) can be out of bounds, causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips. - A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already been handed off into the network stack. - A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end, causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's data. Found doing variant analysis. Tested it with another driver (ax88179_178a), since I don't have a aqc111 device to test it, but the code looks very similar. Signed-off-by: Marcin Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c b/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c index 73b97f4cc1ec..e8d49886d695 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c @@ -1102,10 +1102,15 @@ static int aqc111_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) if (start_of_descs != desc_offset) goto err; - /* self check desc_offset from header*/ - if (desc_offset >= skb_len) + /* self check desc_offset from header and make sure that the + * bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB + */ + if (pkt_count * 2 + desc_offset >= skb_len) goto err; + /* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */ + skb_trim(skb, desc_offset); + if (pkt_count == 0) goto err; -- 2.35.1