[PATCH 5.17 088/111] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit a4b5c26b79ffdfcfb816c198f2fc2b1e7b5b580f upstream.

There are no code changes here; this is just a reordering of functions,
so that in subsequent commits, the timer entropy functions can call into
the interrupt ones.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |  238 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 119 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -854,13 +854,13 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbit
  * the above entropy accumulation routines:
  *
  *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
- *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- *	                          unsigned int value);
- *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
  *					size_t entropy);
  *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ *	                          unsigned int value);
+ *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *
  * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
  * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
@@ -870,19 +870,6 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbit
  * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
  * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
  *
- * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
- * as the event type information from the hardware.
- *
- * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
- * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
- * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
- * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
- * times are usually fairly consistent.
- *
- * The above two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
- * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
- * order deltas of the event timings.
- *
  * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
  * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
  * block until more entropy is needed.
@@ -896,6 +883,19 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbit
  * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
  * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
  *
+ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
+ * as the event type information from the hardware.
+ *
+ * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
+ * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
+ * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
+ * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
+ * times are usually fairly consistent.
+ *
+ * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
+ * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
+ * order deltas of the event timings.
+ *
  **********************************************************************/
 
 static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
@@ -973,109 +973,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *b
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
 
-/* There is one of these per entropy source */
-struct timer_rand_state {
-	unsigned long last_time;
-	long last_delta, last_delta2;
-};
-
-/*
- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
- * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
- *
- * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
- * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
- * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
- */
-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
-{
-	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
-	long delta, delta2, delta3;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-
-	if (crng_ready())
-		return;
-
-	/*
-	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
-	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
-	 * in order to make our estimate.
-	 */
-	delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
-
-	delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
-
-	delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
-
-	if (delta < 0)
-		delta = -delta;
-	if (delta2 < 0)
-		delta2 = -delta2;
-	if (delta3 < 0)
-		delta3 = -delta3;
-	if (delta > delta2)
-		delta = delta2;
-	if (delta > delta3)
-		delta = delta3;
-
-	/*
-	 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
-	 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
-	 * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
-	 */
-	credit_init_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
-}
-
-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-			  unsigned int value)
-{
-	static unsigned char last_value;
-	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
-
-	/* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
-	if (value == last_value)
-		return;
-
-	last_value = value;
-	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
-			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
-	if (!disk || !disk->random)
-		return;
-	/* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
-	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-
-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
-	struct timer_rand_state *state;
-
-	/*
-	 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
-	 * source.
-	 */
-	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (state) {
-		state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES;
-		disk->random = state;
-	}
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
  * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
@@ -1237,6 +1134,109 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
 
+/* There is one of these per entropy source */
+struct timer_rand_state {
+	unsigned long last_time;
+	long last_delta, last_delta2;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+ * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+ * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
+ *
+ * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
+ * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
+ * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
+ */
+static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
+{
+	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
+	long delta, delta2, delta3;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+
+	if (crng_ready())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
+	 * in order to make our estimate.
+	 */
+	delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
+
+	delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
+
+	delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
+
+	if (delta < 0)
+		delta = -delta;
+	if (delta2 < 0)
+		delta2 = -delta2;
+	if (delta3 < 0)
+		delta3 = -delta3;
+	if (delta > delta2)
+		delta = delta2;
+	if (delta > delta3)
+		delta = delta3;
+
+	/*
+	 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
+	 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
+	 * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
+	 */
+	credit_init_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
+}
+
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+			  unsigned int value)
+{
+	static unsigned char last_value;
+	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
+
+	/* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
+	if (value == last_value)
+		return;
+
+	last_value = value;
+	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
+{
+	if (!disk || !disk->random)
+		return;
+	/* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
+	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
+
+void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+{
+	struct timer_rand_state *state;
+
+	/*
+	 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
+	 * source.
+	 */
+	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (state) {
+		state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES;
+		disk->random = state;
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
  * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another