From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 09/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 20:40:38 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220614183722.748540861@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220614183720.512073672@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit a992b8a4682f119ae035a01b40d4d0665c4a2875 upstream
The Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) variant of Processor MMIO Stale
Data vulnerabilities may expose RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY data.
Mitigation for this is added by a microcode update.
As some of the implications of SBDS are similar to SRBDS, SRBDS mitigation
infrastructure can be leveraged by SBDS. Set X86_BUG_SRBDS and use SRBDS
mitigation.
Mitigation is enabled by default; use srbds=off to opt-out. Mitigation
status can be checked from below file:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1103,6 +1103,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
#define MMIO BIT(1)
+/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
@@ -1124,16 +1126,17 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x1), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
{}
};
@@ -1214,10 +1217,14 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
/*
* SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
* in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ *
+ * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data
+ * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as
+ * SRBDS.
*/
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
- cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
/*
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-14 18:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-14 18:40 [PATCH 5.15 00/11] 5.15.48-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/11] Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/11] x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/11] x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 07/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/11] x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/11] KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 22:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/11] 5.15.48-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-06-15 0:09 ` Fox Chen
2022-06-15 2:47 ` Shuah Khan
2022-06-15 4:05 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-06-15 9:18 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-06-15 12:45 ` Allen Pais
2022-06-15 15:13 ` Ron Economos
2022-06-15 17:00 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-06-15 22:03 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-16 3:26 ` Tyler Hicks
2022-06-16 9:33 ` Jon Hunter
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