From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D8378C43334 for ; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 18:50:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1358033AbiFNSuv (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jun 2022 14:50:51 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41918 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1358057AbiFNStm (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jun 2022 14:49:42 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7B1E64EA31; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 11:45:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 117BE61840; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 18:45:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1E7ECC3411B; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 18:45:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1655232326; bh=M88ntiARURm760ki/mrnNLBHITRKuw/71cYMRERSVj4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SFnorxJPcgTn/Kqb+vHQGyzvfnWI8ECD5djxjovxEK+J8ZNOb5WHq8VOPtnu5OLIV VG08ZBO3oowDSuWu2RpNlWwrwjbACAxN7JNrlc3YQcRGFCem+uw1/WQ7CQEUCAG5J2 6y7UhtbnCd4J8gNkdKQOeWkUMsuk3JBgaBv2wXyE= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Pawan Gupta , Borislav Petkov , Thomas Gleixner Subject: [PATCH 5.15 09/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 20:40:38 +0200 Message-Id: <20220614183722.748540861@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220614183720.512073672@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220614183720.512073672@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Pawan Gupta commit a992b8a4682f119ae035a01b40d4d0665c4a2875 upstream The Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) variant of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities may expose RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY data. Mitigation for this is added by a microcode update. As some of the implications of SBDS are similar to SRBDS, SRBDS mitigation infrastructure can be leveraged by SBDS. Set X86_BUG_SRBDS and use SRBDS mitigation. Mitigation is enabled by default; use srbds=off to opt-out. Mitigation status can be checked from below file: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1103,6 +1103,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_ #define SRBDS BIT(0) /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO BIT(1) +/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ +#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1124,16 +1126,17 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x1), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO), + VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), {} }; @@ -1214,10 +1217,14 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru /* * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed * in the vulnerability blacklist. + * + * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data + * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as + * SRBDS. */ if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) && - cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS)) + cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS); /*