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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 07/15] x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 20:40:16 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220614183723.491313492@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220614183721.656018793@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>

commit f52ea6c26953fed339aa4eae717ee5c2133c7ff2 upstream

Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigation uses similar mitigation as MDS and
TAA. In preparation for adding its mitigation, add a common function to
update all mitigations that depend on MD_CLEAR.

  [ bp: Add a newline in md_clear_update_mitigation() to separate
    statements better. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
 static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
 
@@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	srbds_select_mitigation();
 
 	/*
-	 * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
-	 * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done.
+	 * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, update and print their
+	 * mitigation after TAA mitigation selection is done.
 	 */
-	mds_print_mitigation();
+	md_clear_update_mitigation();
 
 	arch_smt_update();
 
@@ -257,14 +257,6 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation
 	}
 }
 
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void)
-{
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
-		return;
-
-	pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
-}
-
 static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
@@ -312,7 +304,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation
 	/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
 		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
-		goto out;
+		return;
 	}
 
 	if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -326,7 +318,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation
 	 */
 	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
 	    mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
-		goto out;
+		return;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
 		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
@@ -358,18 +350,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation
 
 	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
 		cpu_smt_disable(false);
-
-	/*
-	 * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
-	 * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
-	 */
-	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
-	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
-		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
-		mds_select_mitigation();
-	}
-out:
-	pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
 }
 
 static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
@@ -394,6 +374,33 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_
 early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "" fmt
+
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		return;
+
+	if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS mitigation, if
+	 * necessary.
+	 */
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+		mds_select_mitigation();
+	}
+out:
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+		pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SRBDS: " fmt
 
 enum srbds_mitigations {



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-06-14 18:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-14 18:40 [PATCH 5.4 00/15] 5.4.199-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 01/15] cpu/speculation: Add prototype for cpu_show_srbds() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 02/15] x86/cpu: Add Jasper Lake to Intel family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 03/15] x86/cpu: Add Lakefield, Alder Lake and Rocket Lake models to the to Intel CPU family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 04/15] x86/cpu: Add another Alder Lake CPU to the Intel family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 05/15] Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 06/15] x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 08/15] x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 09/15] x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 10/15] x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 11/15] x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 12/15] x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 13/15] x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 14/15] KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.4 15/15] x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 21:47 ` [PATCH 5.4 00/15] 5.4.199-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-06-15  2:43 ` Shuah Khan
2022-06-15  9:22 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-06-15  9:28   ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-06-15 19:18 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-06-15 22:02 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-16  1:59 ` Samuel Zou
2022-06-16  8:29 ` Jon Hunter

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