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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 16/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 20:40:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220614183724.778516077@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220614183720.928818645@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

commit 1dc6ff02c8bf77d71b9b5d11cbc9df77cfb28626 upstream

Similar to MDS and TAA, print a warning if SMT is enabled for the MMIO
Stale Data vulnerability.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1215,6 +1215,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 
 #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
 #define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
 
 void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
@@ -1259,6 +1260,16 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-06-14 18:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-14 18:40 [PATCH 4.19 00/16] 4.19.248-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 01/16] x86/cpu: Add Elkhart Lake to Intel family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 02/16] cpu/speculation: Add prototype for cpu_show_srbds() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 03/16] x86/cpu: Add Jasper Lake to Intel family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 04/16] x86/cpu: Add Lakefield, Alder Lake and Rocket Lake models to the to Intel CPU family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 05/16] x86/cpu: Add another Alder Lake CPU to the Intel family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 06/16] Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 07/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 08/16] x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 09/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 10/16] x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 11/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 12/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 13/16] x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 14/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 15/16] KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-15  2:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 00/16] 4.19.248-rc1 review Shuah Khan
2022-06-15  9:26 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-06-15 18:05 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-06-15 22:02 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-16  1:58 ` Samuel Zou
2022-06-16  8:29 ` Jon Hunter
2022-06-16 11:07 ` Pavel Machek

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